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“Make good choices.”
“You can do it with a smile on your face or you can do it pouting, either way—it has to get
done.”
“Buck up buttercup; it’s called labor for a reason.”
“Do not panic.”

ii

Acknowledgements
In many ways this has been the most difficult section of my dissertation to write. I do not
know how to begin thanking all the people who made this document possible, kept me (partially)
sane, and dealt with all the “drama” that surrounds me and a doctoral program. I do not think that
anything that I will say will do justice to the people who have helped me get to where I am
today. Nevertheless, I will try. My brevity is not due to lack of gratitude but set as a control for
the overwhelming appreciation that I feel and would not be appropriate for an acknowledgement
portion of a dissertation.
My mind naturally makes lists and categories, so that is what I will do here.
To God: I let go. Thank you.
To Kevin: You always do the right thing and make the hard decisions. Your
example has served us well. Thank you.
To Mom and Dad: Enrichment started this. Your enriching support is what keeps me going. This
is because of you. All of it. Thank you.
To Jim: You have never given me bad advice. On the first day of class (circa 2008), you asked if
anyone considered going to graduate school. Your question started a 10+ year journey. I
do not believe that it is possible for someone to be more kind, forgiving, and patient.
What’s more—you are an exceptional political scientist. Thank you.
To Joey, Jordyn, Alex: You always knew the right time to check in and the right time to give
distance. Thank you.
To Colin: You really know how to challenge me. Thank you.
To PawPaw: You are always there to selfishly listen to me ramble about my current problem,
issue, or worry. Thank you.
To Mr. Tom and Mrs. Linda: The wine (and council) gave me something to look forward to at
the end of a long work week. Thank you.
To my (very forgiving and generous) committee: You have done more than just rearrange your
schedules for me. Many of you helped me get through a very difficult time. Your
patience and understanding will not be forgotten. Thank you.

iii

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. iii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. vi
Chapter 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1
1.2. Problem Statement/Statement of Purpose and Research Question(s) ...................... 4
1.3. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................. 5
1.4. Definition of Key Terms .......................................................................................... 6
1.5. Organization of Dissertation..................................................................................... 9
Chapter 2. Literature Review, Theory, and Hypotheses ................................................... 11
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 11
2.2. A Note on Policy Issues ......................................................................................... 12
2.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses ............................................................... 19
2.4. Summary and Conclusion....................................................................................... 33
Chapter 3. Data and Variable Description ........................................................................ 35
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 35
3.2. Data and Methods ................................................................................................... 35
3.3. Moral, Economic, Hybrid Policy Opinions ............................................................ 37
3.4. Religious Belonging, Religious Behaving, Religious Believing ............................ 48
3.5. A Note on Political and Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables ................... 57
3.6. Summary................................................................................................................. 58
Chapter 4. Moral Policy Opinions .................................................................................... 60
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 60
4.2. Religious Dimensions ............................................................................................. 61
4.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models ............................................................ 72
4.4. Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 98
Chapter 5. Economic Policy Opinions ............................................................................ 104
5.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 104
5.2. Religious Dimensions ........................................................................................... 105
5.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models .......................................................... 114
5.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 135
Chapter 6. Hybrid Policy Opinions ................................................................................. 142
6.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 142
6.2. Religious Dimensions ........................................................................................... 143
6.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models .......................................................... 151
6.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 174

iv

Chapter 7. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 179
7.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 179
7.2. Summary............................................................................................................... 180
7.3. Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................ 188
References ....................................................................................................................... 190
Appendix. Variable Description .................................................................................... 199
Curriculum Vita .............................................................................................................. 208

v

Abstract
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed light on the influence of religion on
Americans’ attitudes toward policy concerns. How do denominational affiliation, religious
participation, and religious beliefs influence one’s views on social and/or economic policies? I
consider the impact of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing—also
known as the “3B’s” – on public opinion toward contemporary issues in the United States. In this
comprehensive analysis, I discover the importance of including the religious dimensions in
models of public policy attitudes. The first part of this project is to outline the current state of the
literature and present existing theories concerning the influence of religion in politics. I offer
considerations for developing a unified theory that involves (1) the influence of the clergy and
religious social groups and (2) religious beliefs as the driving force behind (most) policy
opinions. In the second part of this project, I model the effect of the three dimensions of religion
on (1) moral policy issues, (2) economic policy issues, and (3) hybrid policy issues. Overall, I
find that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing influence moral policy
concerns; however, religious beliefs are most useful in explaining economic policy issues. The
influence of religion on hybrid policies—or those policies with both value-based and economic
components—is largely dependent upon the nature of the hybrid issue. I find that policies
regarding humanitarian—arguably value-based—concerns are influenced by all three religious’
dimensions; whereas, those issues that have predominately economic components are affected by
religious beliefs.
Collectively, I demonstrate that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious
believing are important considerations when studying public opinion on policy concerns. I
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suspect that religious organization’s standings on moral or value-based issues are well-defined
while doctrine on economic issues are generally ambiguous.

vii

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction
The last few decades have brought about much change in the religious landscape of the
United States. Trends in public opinion data reveal that denominational affiliation in the United
States is declining and there is a growing number of individuals who consider themselves
religiously unaffiliated or nonreligious (Jones, Cox, Cooper, and Lienesch 2016; Cooperman,
Smith, and Richey 2015). According to a 2016 Public Religion Research Institute (thenceforth
PRRI) report, roughly 25% of the population is religiously unaffiliated—up from 14% in 2004—
and 39% of young adults—up from 23% in 2006—do not claim a religious identity (Jones et al.
2016). Scholarly literature has also addressed these concerns indicating that Americans report
“leaving religion” due to factors such as the influence of political preferences, skepticism
concerning religion, and life stressors (Vargas 2011). Indeed, this change has brought about
divisions among religious and non-religious members of American society, where attitudes
concerning moral or values-based policies (e.g., legality of same-sex marriage) have filtered
through public discourse often pitting religious and nonreligious identifiers against one another.
Those individuals who are more religious are more likely to take conservative views on valuesbased policies policy positions than their non-religious counterparts who hold more progressive
policy opinions (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, and
Mattias de Vries 2011; McCarthy and Garand 2017; Lugo et al. 2008).
Contemporary reports may lead to the conclusion that the impacts of religion are lessening in
the United States largely due to the decline in formal religious participation or denominational
affiliation (Newport 2016). However, careful analyses of survey data reveal a somewhat different
and complex story. Recent data demonstrate that while the percent of the religiously unaffiliated
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is growing in the United States, this portion of the voting population consisted of approximately
15% in the 2016 election. Thus, most of the electorate reported some ties to religion. Indeed,
roughly 75% of Americans reported belonging to either a Christian or non-Christian faith. In
addition, 36% of Americans attend religious services weekly and another 33% of American
attend services a few times a month/year (Pew 2014; ANES 2016). Scholars have noted that
while Americans are less likely to identify with organized religion some of these individuals are
not consistently nonreligious (Hout 2017). Many of those individuals who report being
nonreligious at one point in time will subsequently identify with an organized religious group at
a later date.
Classic studies of the influence of religiosity on political behavior have emphasized
social groups and political participation and attitudes (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944;
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and McPhee 1954), where religion is considered a transmitter of group
norms that differentiate separate political communities (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1998). Marsh and
Kaase (1979) connect religious salience or religious importance with political participation and
argue that political participation is a function of religiosity which influences the propensity for
participation. Layman (2001) argues that the teachings of one’s church provide adherents with
perspectives on moral judgements that can then be transmitted into political or policy opinions.
Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2014) argue that religion is not only an important aspect of American
politics through political identification and political behavior, but also that religion is evident in
all aspects of political life, including preferences for government policies, the interpretation of
laws, and attitudes toward the development of government programs.
Previous research about the effects of religion and partisanship produce significant
findings, whereby voters with strong and conservative religious preferences largely support the
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Republican Party while religious liberals and secularists support the Democratic Party (Smidt
and Kellstedt 1991; Miller and Wattenberg 1984; Willcox 1992). Layman (1997) argues that the
influence of religion and doctrinal conservatism on partisanship and vote choice has grown over
time, where religiously committed individuals increasingly support Republican candidates.
Likewise, Kellstedt (1989) demonstrates that conservative Protestants are aligning with the
Republican Party, and Miller and Shanks (1996) find that individuals with no religious traditions
often vote for liberal candidates. Kellstedt and Green (1993) argue that religious traditions have a
substantial influence on overall religious beliefs, and that these opinions contribute to political
expressions—i.e. vote choice and policy preferences.
In addition, scholars argue that religious tradition or denominational affiliation and
overall religious beliefs hold greater influence on political behavior and vote choice for those
individuals that believe that religion is salient or an important part of their life. Hirschl and
colleagues (2012) are among several scholars who demonstrate that religious identity influences
vote choice and that the relationship between religious identity and voting behavior has increased
significantly in the last few decades. This point is exemplified when church involvement is
considered, suggesting that those who are more involved in their churches are more influenced
by their religious beliefs than those individuals who are less committed to church community
participation. In turn, this religious commitment and belief system influences voting behavior,
candidate selection, and political preferences (Kellstedt 1989; Kellstedt and Green 1993; Miller
and Shanks 1996).
Due to the importance of religion in shaping political preferences, influencing policy
opinions, and contributing to voting behavior of many Americans, there is a need to improve our
understanding of the relationship between the various dimensions of religion and overall political
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preferences. The purpose of this dissertation is to (1) identify and define three dimensions of
religion, (2) determine the relationship between these components and policy opinions, and (3)
provide support for the “3B” approach to studying the intersection of religion and politics. I
argue that it is important to measure the three dimensions of religion—belonging, behaving, and
believing—separately in empirical analyses to further explore how the various religious
dimensions affect a wide spectrum of political policy domains. In doing so, I determine which
dimension of religion influences which policy domain.
1.2.Problem Statement/Statement of Purpose and Research Question(s)
There is limited scholarly literature that addresses the impact of religion on a variety of moral
or social/values-based issues and economic policy issues. In this dissertation, I apply the “3B”
classification schema and discuss separately the effects of each dimension (religious belonging,
religious behavior, and religious belief) on public opinion relating to various contemporary
issues in the United States. Largely, this is a three-part project. The first part addresses the
effects of religion on policy attitudes relating to moral/values-based issues. The second part of
this project outlines the effects of religion on economic policy preferences. The last part
concerns the impact of religion on issues that are considered both moral/values-based and
economic (i.e. immigration and climate change). In this dissertation, I shed light on the
systematic ways the religion dimensions influence policy preferences among policy domains.
Scholars have made connections between the three religion dimensions and policy opinions but
have largely concentrated on a specific policy domain, e.g. moral policy issues. Likewise, there
is a rich line of literature that addresses the influence of religion on a specific policy issue, e.g.
same-sex marriage. Scholarly literature is limited insofar as there are few works that address the
different dimensions of religion on a variety of policy issues.
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The unique contribution of this dissertation to the field is two-fold. First, I use the “3B”
approach presented in the literature, but I offer a more comprehensive model to capture the
effects of religiosity. Indeed, by incorporating all three religious dimensions separately (i.e.
religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing) in my models, I highlight which
religious dimension influence public opinion in different policy domains. My second
contribution is the inclusion of several policy issues as the dependent variables in my models.
The extant literature is limited as scholars typically estimate the effects of religion on only a few
issues, and this makes it difficult to make explicit comparisons across issues and highlight the
relative effects of the different dimensions of religion.
In this dissertation I am concerned with how religious affiliation, religious participation, and
religious belief influence American’s views on moral/social value issues, economic policy
issues, and those issues that are considered both social/values-based and economic. Hence, my
contribution includes a comprehensive study of not only the three types of major religious
dimensions (belonging, behaving, and believing) but also how these religious classifications
influence public opinion across a range of issues.
1.3. Data and Methodology
The principal survey used in the analyses is the 2016 American National Election Survey
(henceforth ANES). The ANES has a total sample size of 4,271 adults. This dataset is used to
provide analyses on the relationship between the three religious dimensions and moral,
economic, and hybrid public policy opinions. This rich dataset contains many questions of
interest including opinions on same-sex marriage, legality of abortion, spending on the poor,
raising minimum wage, increasing immigration, environmental concerns, and foreign policy
opinions. There are also several religion-oriented variables including religious tradition, church
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attendance, and belief in the Bible. I also use the 2016 General Social Survey (henceforth GSS)
and the 2013 Economic Values Survey (henceforth EVS). By using these two additional datasets,
I provide supporting evidence to ANES data analysis and explore other policy concerns that are
not found using ANES data, e.g. public opinion on pornography laws (GSS) or government
responsibility in providing public services (EVS). I use ordered logit and logit to discern the
effects of the three dimensions of religion on moral/values, economic, and hybrid policy
opinions.
1.4. Definition of Key Terms
In this section, I address several key terms including religion, the three dimensions of
religion—belonging, behaving, and believing—and policy domains—moral, economic, and
hybrid.
1.4.1. Religion
While this dissertation offers a theoretical framework to understanding the influence of
religious dimensions in determining individuals’ policy preferences, it does not attempt to
outline philosophical arguments for the nature or construction of religion or religious ideals. In
his seminal work, The Sacred Canopy, Berger (1967) offers an excellent explanation and
discussion of the formation of religion and the roots of religious belief. Ultimately, he (Berger
1967, 27-28) argues that religion is simply a way for individuals or societies to deal with chaos.
Religion is a way for people to answer questions about the unknown. It provides purpose and
support in times of despair. The “sacred canopy” acts as a shelter that shields groups in time
distress. Thus, Johnstone (2016,14) defines religion as “a set of beliefs and rituals by which a
group of people seeks to understand, explain, and deal with a world of complexity, uncertainty,
and mystery, by identifying a scared canopy of explanation and reassurance under which to live.”
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Recent empirical scholarship assumes that religion exists in American society and focuses on
religious measurement issues (Steensland et al. 2000). There is consensus—not without debate—
about the measurement of religion as religious commitment or belonging, behaving, and
believing (see Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009 and Layman 2001 for examples). Thus, I define
religion by incorporating Berger (1967) and Johnstone’s (2016) explanation of religion and
including measurement components of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious
believing.
Religious Belonging. I define religious belonging as the group or religious community
with which individuals associate. Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other Christian and nonChristian traditions are the religious groups that I use to measure religious belonging. I also
highlight differences among ethnic and racial groups including black Protestants and Hispanic
Catholics. In addition, I incorporate a traditional/modernism approach by differentiating between
mainline Protestants, black Protestants and evangelical Protestants.
Religious Behaving. I define religious behaving as acts of religious participation.
Examples of religious behaving include worship or service attendance, religious community
contributions, frequency of prayer, religious activity, and participation in religious conversions.
Religious Believing. I define religious believing as doctrinal principles, viewpoints, or
teachings that influence the way individuals view the world. I measure religious believing as the
importance of religion in daily life, religion as a guiding force in daily life, literal interpretations
of the bible, perceptions of the image of God, and strength of religious conviction and
spirituality. Due largely to data restrictions, this list is not all-inclusive; however, the available
data are extensive and provide a foundation for understanding the relationship between religion
and public opinion.
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In sum, my definition of religion is as follows:
Religion is a social group phenomenon (religious belonging) where individuals can
practice (religious behaving) a set of commonly shared beliefs (religious believing)—often
involving the recognition of a higher power—in attempts to explain the world around them.
1.4.2. Policy Domains
The next term, moral/value-based issues, is largely rooted in the subfield of morality
politics or previously defined as the “politics of sin” (Meier 1999). Tatalovich and Daynes
(1998) include a list of policies issues such as abortion, the death penalty, gay rights, and
pornography that are considered to be moral policies. As a point of reference, Koopman (2009)
included abortion, gay rights, end-of-life issues, gambling, sex education policy, and the death
penalty in his discussion of morality politics. For the purposes of this dissertation, I include
public opinion on abortion policy, LGBTQ policy, capital punishment, assisted suicide,
pornography laws, sex education, and prayer in public places. I use Koopman’s (2009) work as a
guideline in classifying moral policy issues. “Morality policies redistribute ‘values,’ whereas
redistributive policies redistribute ‘economic’ rewards” (Koopman 2009, 549). Thus, I define
economic issues as those directly involving economic or monetary concerns: government
funding or services, government spending, deficit reduction, tax policy, economic inequality, and
minimum wage. While much attention has been given to the role of religion in moral/valuebased issues, there is less consideration of the influence of religion on economic policy attitudes.
Thus, this dissertation attempts to shed light on this subject.
Lastly—perhaps the most ambiguous category— are the hybrid issues. These issues are
those that have characteristics that can be represented by both value and economic issue
categories. For example, immigration reform can be considered a hybrid issue. On one hand,
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increasing immigration in the United States or allowing refugees to enter the country can hold
very strong moral/value-based components, especially as it relates to humanitarian concerns. On
the other hand, immigration attitudes can take on an economic component if questions are geared
toward building a government funded border wall with Mexico (for example).
1.5. Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds as follows.
In Chapter 2, I discuss the current state of the literature regarding the effect of religion on
moral or social values-based issues, economic issues, and hybrid issues. In this chapter, I also
outline traditional theories of religion and politics and develop a theoretical argument for
measuring religion and its influence on policy opinions. Based on the prevailing scholarly
literature I develop my own hypotheses.
In Chapter 3, I provide a description of the variables and data and methods used in the overall
project. I measure religious belonging as religious traditions, noting differences among the
effects of religious traditions on certain contemporary issues. I also include measures to ensure
that the effects of within religious tradition differences are accounted for in the models. For
example, I separate Protestants into three groups: mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and
evangelical Protestants. Similarly, I include measures for both Catholics and Hispanic Catholics.
Religious behaving is measured using frequency of church attendance, religious contributions,
religious activity participation, frequency of prayer, and involvement in religious conversion.
Religious believing is measured through the importance of religion in one’s life, whether religion
provides guidance in daily life, the interpretation of the Bible as the word of God, belief in life
after death, belief in God, traditional/progressive religious beliefs, interpretation of Jesus’
teachings, and strength of religious commitment and spirituality.
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Religious belonging, behaving, and believing are measured separately in the analyses to
highlight the differences in the three dimensions of religion. Thus, the independent variables in
the models are based on survey questions that capture religious belonging, behaving, or
believing, whereas, the dependent variables in the models are measured via survey questions that
represent public opinion toward various moral/value, economic, or hybrid issues.
In Chapter 4 I report analyses and results from the first set of policies: moral or values-based
issues. Included in this chapter are issues regarding public opinion toward the legality of
abortion, LGBTQ issues, capital punishment, vaccines in schools, and the legalization of
marijuana. Chapter 5 contains analyses and results from the second set of policies: economic
issues. I include analyses of public opinion concerns regarding government funded health care,
increase in government services, increase in government spending on a variety of issues, the
economy, taxes, inequality, and increasing the minimum wage. Chapter 6 covers public opinion
regarding hybrid issues including immigration, the environment, and foreign policy.
In Chapter 7 I offer a conclusion and an outline for future projects. This dissertation is
intended to shed light on the relationship between religion and policy opinions. By measuring
religion as belonging, behaving, and believing (separately) in the models, and running analyses
with many policy issues, I identify which dimensions of religion influence individuals’ positions
in various policy domains. With this, I hope to help religion and politics scholars develop a more
comprehensive theoretical explanation about which religious dimensions influence which policy
opinions. The theoretical arguments that I present in this dissertation build on existing theories to
help scholars better understanding the impact of religion.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review, Theory, and Hypotheses
2.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, I provide a general outline of the current
literature in the field of religion and politics as it relates to the influence of religion on public
opinion. Second, I offer a summary of relevant existing theories in the field of religion and
politics and present a consolidated theoretical explanation for connections between religiosity
and policy attitudes. In this section I discuss the influence of church organizations and their
leaders (ministers, clergy, priests) on public opinion and argue that the clergy has considerable
influence in informing and fostering public opinion on political matters. In turn, the more
exposure to the clergy and the teachings of the religious organization, the more opportunity there
is for church-goers to be influenced by their messages. Therefore, I posit that the clergy play a
vital role in understanding the causal link between religion and public opinion. 1 In addition, the
more religious a person is (the more the person is involved in a congregation or religious
activities) the more exposure that person has to their church’s teachings on particular policy
issues, controlling for other influencers in public opinion such as political identification, political
ideology, age, education, income, etc. I argue that the best approach to understanding the causal
link between religion and public opinion is to first understand the role of the clergy and churches
as a social group and then to breakdown religion into three dimensions: religious belonging,
religious behaving, and religious believing (Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth 2009; Layman 1997;
2001; Green, Kellstedt, Smidt, and Guth 2007; among others) and measure these dimensions
separately in empirical analyses to discern which dimension of religion (belonging, behaving, or

Although I am interested in the role of the clergy in public opinion formation, I do not directly address the clergy’s
influence in public opinion in this dissertation. Chiefly, I am concerned with how religion influences public opinion
under the assumption that the clergy, religious doctrine, and religious social groups help to develop and shape
religious opinions and beliefs. In turn, people apply these religious principles to their attitudes toward policy issues.
1
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believing) influences which policy opinion domain (moral/values, economic, or hybrid). 2 This
dissertation is both comprehensive and exploratory in nature, and the theoretical argument
presented here serves as a step in the explaining the causal link between religion and policy
attitudes.
2.2. A Note on Policy Issues
Moral-Social Values.3 In the last few decades, the importance of social or moral and
values/based issues has increasingly become a significant concern in the minds of Americans
(Garand and McCarthy 2016). The attention that Americans give to these social issues has
important consequences as it shows a change in the religious landscape of the United States.
Before the 1970s, religious differences on policy matters were predominately between the
different religious affiliations (e.g. Protestants, Catholics, Jews); however, in recent years issues
such as abortion and same-sex marriage have led to major differences within religious groups.
For example, evangelical Protestants hold mostly conservative views on same-sex marriage and
abortion; on the other hand, mainline Protestants take a more liberal stance (than evangelical
Protestants) on these issues.
Political parties and political elites capitalize on this divide by structuring their platform
on one side of an issue and targeting certain religious groups and individuals (Jelen 2001;
Layman 2001; Jelen and Wilcox 2003). While Democrats are predominately pro-choice on the
abortion issue, Republican have typically taken the pro-life stance on abortion. According to
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Saroglou (2011) argues that there are four dimensions of religion: belonging, behaving, believing, and bonding.
The bonding component involves “self-transcendent experiences that bond the individual with what it perceives to
be the transcendent ‘reality,’ with others, and/or with the inner-self. Most often, this occurs within a ritualized
framework (Saroglou 2011, 1326).” These frameworks include prayer, worship services, religious ceremonies, etc.
Ultimately, Saroglou (2011) argues that there are common practices across religions that connect individuals.
3
I use the terms “moral,” “value-based,” and “social” interchangeably throughout the text. However, there are
delineations among components of moral issues. For example, moral issues can be those that are related to sexuality
or those issues that are related to values, human rights, and altruism. When appropriate, I make distinctions among
these terms.
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Adams (1997), the result of this alignment became a new social evolution. Because of this,
evangelical Protestants moved into the Republican Party, while mainline Protestants and
Catholics moved more toward the center of the ideology scale (Jelen 2009). By the mid-1970s,
the presence of these issues led to the rise of the Christian Right (Wilcox, Goldberg, and Jelen
2000). This generated a clear divide among the religious, solidifying the creation of religious
liberals and religious conservatives.
Scholars have identified several values-based issues where religion increasingly has an
influence. These issues include abortion, LGBTQ rights, capital punishment, and the HHS
contraception mandate associated with the Affordable Care Act, among others. As an example,
gay rights—including same sex marriage and anti-LGBTQ discrimination policies—have
become one of the most prominent and hotly contested social issues. Overall, the public supports
equal treatment of homosexuals; however, many religious individuals hold the belief that
homosexuality is an immoral act, citing biblical teachings as their reason for disagreeing with
what they describe as the homosexual lifestyle (Loftus 2001, Wilcox and Norrander 2002;
“Religion, Race, and Same-Sex Marriage” 2012). While tolerance may be on the rise for the
majority of Americans, religious individuals are more likely to hold negative views on
homosexuality than non-religious individuals (Gallup 2012 ). Tolerance and acceptance may be a
result of the coming of age of a new generation, the media’s positive portrayal of same sex
couples, and the increasing number of individuals who have contact with homosexuals (Wilcox
and Wolpert 2000; Jelen 2009).
The literature on the attitudes toward gay rights is quite diverse, but the influence of
religion remains a consistent source of opposition (Gaines and Garand 2010). Church attendance
and attitudes toward gay rights are directly correlated, with frequent church attenders
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considerably less likely to support gay rights. In addition, scholars have found that this applies
to particular religious traditions. For example, Roman Catholics are not significantly different
than others in their preferences relating to anti-discrimination laws (Wilcox and Norrander
2002); however, evangelical Protestants are largely against same-sex marriage. In sum, the
approval of same-sex marriages is increasing overall, but it remains largely unpopular among
highly religious individuals and certain religious traditions where church teachings are
traditionally conservative. In this project I delve deeper into this relationship. Here I demonstrate
the specific differences among religious affiliations, frequent vs. infrequent church attenders, and
traditionalist vs. progressive biblical interpretations and opinions on moral issues including
same-sex marriage, LGBTQ rights, among others.
Economic Issues. What is the role of religion in relation to economic issues and political
preferences? While the role of religiosity in shaping Americans’ positions on moral/values-based
issues is heavily documented, there is considerably less scholarly literature on the relationship
between religiosity and attitudes on economic issues. Indeed, the literature is limited to a handful
of scholars (e.g. Bartels 2008; McCarthy et al. 2016; and Wilson 2009) who reveal important and
significant differences in economic policy opinions among individuals with conservative
religious beliefs compared to individuals with progressive religious beliefs.
Wilson (2009) argues that by the middle of 21st century mainline Protestants will hold
predominately progressive economic attitudes. He finds evidence that black Protestants and
mainline Protestants are significantly more supportive of “people on welfare” than evangelical
Protestants. In addition, Jews and black Protestants are liberal on many economic and social
justice questions, Catholics and mainline Protestants are generally moderate, whereas evangelical
Protestants are conservative on economic and social justice questions (Smidt 2001; Wald and
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Calhoun-Brown 2007; Wilson 2009). Wilson (2009) also discusses the relationship between faith
and economic attitudes among religious groups, arguing that major political movements have
been influenced by religious beliefs (Noonan 1998). Indeed, support for economic policies that
uplift the poor in society is inspired by Christian teachings and religious beliefs (Trattner 1999;
Bartkowski and Regis 2003).
In previous research, my co-authors and I have found that biblical interpretations
influence how Americans think about economic or redistributive policies (McCarthy et al. 2016).
Those individuals who hold more conservative religious beliefs are less likely to favor increasing
taxes on the rich and raising minimum wage. In addition, conservative religious adherents are
also less likely to support government redistributive polices. We also find that black Protestants
are more likely to express favorability of increasing taxes on the rich and raising minimum wage
than other religious denominations.
In sum, scholars have found that religion does play an important role in how individuals
evaluate economic policies. However, there are few scholarly works that consider the three
dimensions of religion on economic policy concerns. In this dissertation, offer a comprehensive
evaluation of the role of religion in shaping economic policy attitudes.
Hybrid Issues. Hybrid issues are the most difficult to classify because they have both
moral/value-based and economic characteristics. For the purposes of this dissertation, I consider
three policy areas hybrid: immigration, climate change, and foreign policy. Because much
attention is given to immigration reform, climate change legislation, and foreign policy concerns
by the media and political elites and survey data reveal the importance of these issues and
divisions in public opinion on approval and policy solutions (Pew 2019; Gallup 2019; PRRI
2018) I include these policy areas in the hybrid policy analyses.
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There is (limited) scholarly research that addresses the role of religion in shaping public
opinion on immigration policy (Gillis 2003), climate change legislation and regulation (Egan and
Mullin 2017; Shao 2017; and Shao and McCarthy 2019), and foreign policy (Guth 2009; Page
2006). Largely, these scholars have found that religion is a factor in how individuals assess these
policy issues. Based on their findings and available survey data, I speculate that the three
religious dimensions influence hybrid policy issues. This is especially true when I consider the
effects of the behaving (worship attendance) and believing (biblical literalism) dimensions of
religion.
As an example, I explain why I classify climate change as a hybrid issue and provide an
overview of the state of the literature on climate change attitudes. On one hand, support for
government funding to reduce climate change is economic in nature in that it involves funding
by the federal government. On the other hand, climate change is a moral or value-based concern
in that it taps into opinions on bettering society and helping future generations. Scholars have
documented differences in environmental concerns among religious traditions (Ecklund et al.
2017; Newman et al. 2016; Shao 2017; Shao and Goidel 2016; Shao and McCarthy 2019)
finding evangelical Protestants are among those who are most unconvinced about global
warming and its anthropogenic causes (Smith and Leiserowitz 2013; Shao et al. 2014; Shao and
McCarthy 2018). While other scholars have noted that there has been a rise in concern about
environmental issues among evangelicals (Kearns 1997) and other Christians (Van Dyke et al.
1996; Wilkinson 2010, 2012), contemporary scholarship has reinforced the notion that
evangelical Protestants (Ecklund et al. 2017; Newman et al. 2016; Shao 2016; Shao and
McCarthy 2018) are least likely to believe that global warming or climate change is happening.
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While there has been disagreement in the literature regarding the influence of religious
belonging on environmental concerns, there is (somewhat of) a consensus among scholars on the
influence of doctrinal beliefs—biblical literalism, end-times theology, conservative
eschatology—on opinions about climate change (Guth et al. 1995; Barker and Bearce 2013;
Kilburn 2014; Peifer et al. 2016). Barker and Bearce (2013) explain end-times theology as the
belief that Jesus will return and that this return will include a battle of good and evil.
“Premillennial dispensationalism”—a factor in the end-times theology —is marked by the belief
the earth must deteriorate before the Second coming of Jesus. Worldly deterioration includes
environmental collapse. Indeed, these scholars conclude that those individuals who believe that
the earth has a preordained end-time are less likely to want to preserve the earth for future
generations (Barker and Bearce 2013). Those for whom religion is a salient part of their lives are
more likely to believe in natural versus manmade causes of global warming—due in part to their
beliefs about the Second coming of Jesus and the end-times where religiosity can influence one’s
belief about global warming because it may conflict with their belief in divine involvement on
Earth (Ecklund et al. 2017). Overall, scholars have found that conservative religious beliefs are
negatively associated with environmental concerns due to belief in end-times theology and the
belief in the second coming of Jesus (Guth et al. 1995; Barker and Bearce 2013; Shao 2016).
Several scholars have found that there are negligible differences in environmental
attitudes among those who are frequent religious service attenders and those who attend religious
services infrequently (Guth et al. 1995; Eckberg and Blocker 1989; Clements et al. 2014).
Alternatively, some scholars have demonstrated that frequency of service attendance is
negatively related to perceptions of environmental factors (Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright
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and Dunlap 2011). Likewise, Shao et al. (2014) find that there is a negative relationship between
service attendance and beliefs about the severity of global warming.
Scholarly literature is also limited in discerning the relationship between religion and
immigration policies. However, there are a few noteworthy works (see Gillis 2009). Knoll (2009)
finds that frequent service attenders, and minority religious groups (mainly Jewish adherents) are
more likely to support progressive immigration policies. McDaniel, Nooruddin and Shortle
(2010) argue that “Christian nationalism” or a religious interpretation of America’s identity is
what influences immigration attitudes, not solely religious affiliation. Nteta and Wallsten (2012)
are interested in the role of the clergy in attitudes toward immigration and find that the clergy are
essential in relating messages regarding immigration concerns. Overall, when religious leaders
portray pro-immigration attitudes, so too do their congregations.
Scholars have also considered the influence of religion on foreign policy concerns. Jelen
(1994) argues that religious group membership, i.e. religious denominations, contributes to
foreign policy opinions. Catholics are “dovish” whereas evangelical Protestants are “hawkish” in
their international attitudes. Later, Guth (2009) concludes that religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing all influence foreign policy opinions; however, religious
beliefs are especially important contributors in foreign policy concerns. Baumgartner, Francia,
and Morris (2008) also find that religious beliefs play an important role in shaping foreign policy
opinions. In addition, Evangelical Protestants are often in favor of aggressive policy attitudes
toward the Middle East and hold negative sentiments toward Muslims and favorable sentiments
toward Jews.
Admittedly, this is not a comprehensive list of scholars who discuss the role of religion in
shaping environmental concerns, immigration attitudes, and foreign policy opinions. The
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purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that attention is given to the effects of religion on these
policy issues; however, there is no general consensus in the literature on which religious
dimension influences policy opinions. In this dissertation, I offer a better understanding of the
influence of religion on hybrid policy concerns.
Ultimately, I contend that three dimensions of religion (religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing) shape public opinion on three policy (moral, economic, and
hybrid) domains.
2.3. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
The theoretical background and hypotheses sections proceed as follows. First, I highlight
the major theories in the field of religion and politics. Second, contribute to the existing
theoretical arguments in the field and provide several hypotheses regarding religious belonging,
behaving, and believing and their effects on the three policy opinion domains. Throughout these
sections, I provide specific examples of how religious belonging, behaving, and believing have
differing effects on policy opinions.
2.3.1. Theories of Religion in the United States
I begin this section by providing a brief discussion of existing theories in the field of religion
and politics. I also explain the theoretical arguments surrounding the influence of religion on
policy opinions. Lastly, I provide an overarching theoretical argument that includes aspects of
existing theories, i.e. the 3Bs or religious commitment conceptualization of religion (Layman
2001, 55).
The most thorough account of the various theories in the field of religion and politics is
provided by Hertzke, Olson, den Dulk and Flowler (2019). The authors discuss seven major
theories and conclude that while each one is useful in discerning particular aspects of the
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relationship between religion and politics, no one theory is all-inclusive. The theories presented
by Hertzke et al. (2019) include (1) the civil-religion thesis, (2) the unconventional-partners
thesis, (3) the culture wars thesis, (4) the secularization thesis, (5) populism, (6) the religiousmarketplace thesis, and (7) the culture-shift thesis.
First, proponents of the civil-religion thesis argue that America’s “religion” actually
consists of a shared group of political ideals or civic creed that is not dependent upon religious
denominations. Indeed, all American participate in the civil-religion. Examples of this include
“under God” in the pledge of allegiance, and “In God We Trust” on our currency (Hertzke et al.
2019). Second, the unconventional-partners thesis involves the partnership between the
government and religious organizations. Religion provides individuals with a code of moral
conduct that guide civic engagement and political decisions. Third, advocates of the culture wars
thesis (Hunter 1991) argue that the public is largely divided into two camps: conservatives and
progressives. Conservative members of society value traditional lifestyles (opposition to samesex marriage); whereas, progressive encourage the introduction of new ideas and lifestyles.
Fourth, scholars such as Norris and Inglehart (2004) posit that as nations industrialize and
modernize religious identity decreases in society. Largely, political activism is an attempt to
derail the secularization of the United States (Hertzke et al. 2019, 42). Fifth, the populism theory
involves religious movements and their ability to enact change in political matters. Most notably,
black churches have been instrumental in enacting change in American politics (Smith and
Harris 2005; Olson 2009). Sixth, proponents of the religious-marketplace thesis argue that
churches compete for members and thus create a “free-market” in which individuals can choose
their religious affiliation (Finke and Stark 2005). The churches that can appeal to the broader
public will survive, whereas, those churches who cannot compete suffer from declining
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membership. Lastly, Inglehart (1990) argues that there has been a shift in culture where
individuals are less concerned with organized religion but instead place conservable weight on
spirituality.
Each of these theories have a rich line of literature that provides support for their
corresponding arguments. However, the enormous breadth of theories has left the field of
religion and politics with an ununified theoretical explanation of how religion influences policy
opinions. I rely on components of each of these theories when I propose the (working)
theoretical arguments in this dissertation.
2.3.2. Explanations of Religion and Policy Concerns: The Clergy and Congregations
Scholars have long identified ways in which individuals form their political opinions and
how these opinions develop into their understanding of politics, political leaders, and political
institutions. Through the process of political socialization, a person learns how to translate their
observations of politics into judgements on politics. This process is advanced and developed
from childhood to adulthood (Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimpel 2009). A contributing agent of
political socialization (other agents include family life, schools, and social networks) is religious
socialization and the influence of churches and religious congregations in one’s life. Indeed,
scholars have argued that church congregations are among the most far-reaching organization in
the United States (Putnam 2000). Congregations are transmitters of doctrinal teachings, group
norms, and moral belief judgements. In addition, congregations are largely politically
homogeneous where there is large conformity among Jews (Democrats) and evangelical
Protestants (Republicans) within their congregation as it relates to political party preferences and
ideological beliefs (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007).
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Layman (2001) and Weisberg (2005) note differences between religious and nonreligious individuals on moral issue opinions such as same-sex marriage and abortion policy.
Religious individuals are more likely to hold conservative views on same-sex marriage and
abortion policy than non-religious adherents who are more likely to take progressive policy
opinions. Pearson-Merkowitz and Gimple (2009) exemplify this point by arguing that religious
beliefs and practices also have an influence on policy opinions. Indeed, those individuals with
strong religious beliefs and practices often have constrained political attitudes where they reflect
the political opinions of their religious congregation. This demonstrates a causal link between
religion—denomination, practice, and belief—and public opinion. Particularly, scholars have
shown that there is a relationship between religious beliefs and moral or social policy opinions
such as same-sex marriage (Layman 2001; Weisberg 2005; Jelen 2009; McCarthy and Garand
2017), economic policy opinion (McCarthy et al. 2016; Wilson 2009), and foreign policy
attitudes (Guth, Green, Kellstedt, and Smidt 2005). Religious leaders are tasked with informing
and enlightening their congregations not only on religious doctrine and practices but also current
societal and political events. Religious leaders are instrumental in relaying the teachings of the
church to their congregants and offering solutions—based on biblical teachings and doctrinal
traditions —to political issues.
One’s religiosity is dependent on the influence and leadership of religious officials,
where religious leaders often find themselves in a position where their congregation is in need
(or want) of their guidance on contemporary societal issues, including political matters where
community issues can shape political attitudes and policy opinions (Jelen 1993; Olson 2009).
The influence of the clergy in political matters not only depends on the religious official, but also
on a congregation’s theological orientations and religious traditions (Olson 2009). For example,
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black Protestant pastors are extremely influential in their congregations regarding political
matters (Smith and Harris 2005; McDaniel 2011). Djupe (2002) contends that the clergy obtain
their political positions by responding to current issues in their environment, and many clerics
freely provide their opinions on political issues to their congregations to connect religious
principles to current events (Olson 2000).
Olson (2009) and colleagues outline four categories of clergy political action: electoral
activities, advocacy, partnership, and gap filling (see Olson 2009; Crawford et al. 2001; Guth et
al. 1997; Olson et al. 2005; and Smidt 2004).4 The clergy’s political activities consist of urging
congregation members to vote (electoral activities), preaching about political issues (advocacy),
forming congregational study groups around salient issues (advocacy), joining a civic
organization (partnership) or leading a congregational service activity such as a food pantry or
homeless shelter (gap filling). These political activities are influential forming and shaping
public opinion. Overall, Jelen (2001) argues that the clergy influences their congregation in four
distinct ways: (1) reinforcing preexisting beliefs, (2) linking certain religious beliefs to political
views, (3) mobilizing their congregations to act on political beliefs, and (4) changing the views
of the congregation.
Based on the preexisting literature, I argue that churches and the clergy are instrumental
in forming and reinforcing political attitudes and beliefs on moral and economic political
policies. Specifically, religious individuals are more likely than non-religious individuals to be
affected by religious congregations and their leaders. Because of this, religion—religious
denomination or tradition (religious belonging), religious participation (religious behaving), or
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The list of clergy activities and related citations is found in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and American
Politics. This description is among the most comprehensive and straightforward description of the influence of the
clergy in political activities. For this reason, I have included the “typology” of activities as seen in Olson (2009).

23

doctrinal beliefs (religious believing)—plays an important role in political policy opinions.
Overall, religious congregations and their leaders play a significant role in influencing public. In
the following sections, I build on this (simple) theoretical model by adding three dimensions of
religion and policy opinion domains.
2.3.3. A (Working) Theory on The Three Religious Dimensions
There is considerable debate among scholars who study the intersection of religion and
politics regarding the measurement of religious indicators and the relative importance of
different dimensions of religion in shaping political attitudes and behavior. Traditional
scholarship has examined religion through various theoretical “lenses” that have led to many
conclusions regarding the relationship between religion and policy opinions.
These theories are rooted in sociology, psychology, and political science (albeit- a newer
subfield in political science). While scholars have attempted to provide a working theory that
connects religion to political attitudes, the field is left with a mix of theoretical understanding
and lacks an overarching theory that explains this relationship. Smidt, Kellstedt, and Guth (2009)
highlight three core theories in the Oxford Handbook of Religion and American Politics. These
three theories include the ethnoreligious perspective or religious belonging (denominational
affiliation), the religious restructuring or traditional-modernism perspective (largely religious
beliefs and religious participation), and the “three B’s” perspective (religious belonging,
religious behaving, religious believing).
Djupe and Calfano (2014, pg. 21) outline several other theoretical frameworks including
religious commitment (the three B’s), psychological approaches (religious identity), and social
network approaches. The authors argue that there are large within denominational differences
that are often ignored by scholars who incorporate the three B’s in their analyses. I address these
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within denominational differences and use the Steensland et al. (2000) classification schema as
guidance in the models.5 I argue that the three B approach is the most comprehensive model to
understand the influence of religion on political attitudes. Indeed, this approach which I consider
the three dimensions of religion incorporates aspects of many existing theories in the field
including the culture-wars thesis, the secularization thesis, populism, the religious market-place,
religious identity, and the culture-shift thesis.
Through this dissertation, I demonstrate the empirical fortitude of the three dimensions of
religion (belonging, behaving, and believing) and its effect on policy opinions. I provide
supporting evidence to the three B approach on certain policy issues by linking the religious
dimensions to policy domains. This is unique in that there are few (if any) scholarly works that
address all three religious dimensions on a variety of policy issues. Through my analyses, I find
that there is considerable significance of religious belonging, behaving, and believing on policy
opinions. Religious belonging has the greatest effect on moral or social values issues. Religious
behaving and religious believing have a significant influence on both moral and economic policy
concerns.
I now more closely explain the three dimensions of religion and offer a theoretical
explanation (rooted in current literature) on the influence of religion on policy opinions. The first
dimension of religion is belonging (denominational affiliation). The second dimension is
behaving (religious participation). The third dimension is believing (doctrinal belief and biblical
literalism).
Belonging. Coined by scholars as the ethnoreligious perspective, the “belonging”
perspective is chiefly interested in religion as a social group that influences political opinions
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A lengthy discussion of this classification schema is in Chapter 3. It accounts for both within and among religious
denominational differences.
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like other group level variables such as race or region (McTague and Layman 2009).
Ethnoreligious models focus on division among the major religious traditions where religious
groups are encased within their own political cultures. These scholars who incorporate this
perspective into their models look to religious traditions or key religious groups as a center for
public opinion formation, treating religious groups as another mechanism for social interaction.
Thus, membership in a certain religious tradition influences political opinion through the
interaction that individuals have with their religious community (Green and Guth 1993).
Kleppner (1970) describes this relationship as the “political expression of shared values derived
from the voter’s membership in and commitment to, ethnic and religious groups” (cited in Smidt
et. al 2009). Scholars who have used the ethnoreligious perspective—most closely associated
with religious belonging or religious denominational affiliation—in their analyses conclude that
the various religious groups will behave politically different from one another. For example,
traditional scholarship noted that Jews and Catholics are distinctly different than (northern)
Protestants. Indeed, Protestants are more likely to align with the Republican Party; whereas,
Jewish and Catholic adherents are more likely to be a member of the Democratic Party
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee 1954; Green 2007; McTague and Layman 2008).
Scholars have begun to note that ethnoreligious perspective may have ignored important
within-traditions differences. Ammerman (1997) argues that as society began to become more
mobile, religious traditions that were rooted in “ethnicity, region, and family” began to break
down. As a result of this mobility and exposure to new religious cultures, the strict
denominational differences that were previously observed began to be influenced by another
factor: religious beliefs. Another important theoretical perspective, the traditional-modernism
approach, focuses on differences in traditional and progressive religious views. Hunter (1991)
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expresses his concern for these differences and the need for scholarship to recognize how these
differences influence public opinion in his “Culture Wars” theory in which he argues that
religious traditions have become polarized along traditional and progressive lines. In many ways,
traditionalist Catholics may have more in common with traditionalist Protestants than they may
have with progressive Catholics. Other scholars such as Layman and Green (2005) find that
traditionalist beliefs push individuals toward the Republican Party whereas progressive ideals
push individuals toward the Democratic party. Consequently, these scholars have noted
differences both among and within religious denominations in terms of conservative and
progressive theologies (Hunter 1991).
While the ethnoreligious perspective is still useful as religious groups play a large role in
shaping opinions and voting behavior (Wuthnow 1989; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Layman 2001; Guth
et al 2006; Green et al. 2007), it is problematic to measure the influence of religion solely based
on religious traditions. Within denominational distinctions are needed to address potential
differences. I argue that within denominational differences are captured by delineating
Protestants into three groups: mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical
Protestants. In addition, I separate Catholics into two categories: Catholics and Hispanic
Catholics.
According to the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, Mainline Protestants favor the legality of
abortion in all/most cases (60%), support same-sex marriage (57%), and believe that stricter
environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost (56%). Catholics also hold progressive
views on these issues. Catholics are split on their opinions on abortion where 48% believe that
abortion should be legal in all or most cases and 47% believe that abortion should be illegal in all
or most cases. In addition, 70% of Catholics believe that homosexuality should be accepted and
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57% strongly favor/favor same-sex marriage. Fifty-five percent of Catholics believe that stricter
environmental laws are worth the cost and 48% argue that government aid to the poor does more
good than harm. Jewish adherents favor the legality of abortion in all/most cases (83%), strongly
favor/favor homosexuality (77%), and being that stricter environmental laws and regulations are
worth the cost (71%). While there is no delineation among Hispanic Catholics and Catholics in
the 2015 Religious Landscape Study, there are both Evangelical and Mainline Protestant groups.
Evangelical Protestants are generally more conservative in their opinions on abortion (63%
illegal in all/most cases), same-sex marriage (64% oppose/strongly oppose), and government aid
to the poor (56% believe that it does more harm than good).
Thus, the following hypotheses are rooted in aforementioned theories of religion and
politics—especially the ethnoreligious perspective where individuals use social interaction and
group associations to influence and contribute to their opinions—and survey reports such as the
2014 Religious Landscape Study.
I posit that religious belonging—denominational affiliation within and among religious
traditions—contributes how individuals assess moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.
H1: Religious Belonging: Denomination affiliation (among and within religious traditions)
effects moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.
H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews hold progressive policy opinions
regarding moral, economic, and hybrid issues.
H1b: Evangelical Protestants, and Hispanic Catholics hold conservative policy opinions
regarding moral issues.
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Behaving. Like the process that results in religious belonging or denominational affiliation
being converted into policy opinions, the process that results in religious behaving being
converted into conservative moral policy opinions and progressive economic policy opinions
involves the influence of the clergy and congregations. Those individuals who are more exposed
to the church’s teachings (by attending services more frequently or participating religious
activities) are more exposed to church doctrine and consequently mirror their churches teachings.
For example, scholars have found that Catholics who attend church more frequently hold
different opinions than those Catholics who are infrequent church attenders (Layman 2001;
McTague and Layman 2008). Frequent church attenders hold more conservative views than nonfrequent attenders on same-sex marriage policies (Garand and McCarthy 2017). Survey research
has also demonstrated that frequent service attenders are less likely to support abortion, same-sex
marriage legislation and climate change policy (Pew Research Center, 2015) In a previous
article, my coauthors and I have found that religious behaving influences opinions toward
economic issues such as support for government spending and healthcare (McCarthy et al. 2016).
This component of the three religious dimensions is limited insofar as scholars often couple
religious behaving and religious believing into a religiosity index (Putnam and Campbell 2010;
McCarthy et al. 2016). Djupe and Calfano (2014,23) consider this a shortcoming of the religious
commitment approach where scholars often “blend religious beliefs and behaviors.” I argue that
religious behaving and believing should be measured separately in analyses to explore
differences between the religious dimensions.
Based on the findings in preexisting and survey research literature I argue that religious
behaving contributes to moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. Those who are more
religiously active will reflect the opinions of their religious leaders, congregations, and church’s
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teachings on policy issues. Therefore, members of traditionally conservative congregations will
hold more conservative policy opinions; whereas, members of traditionally progressive
congregations will hold more liberal policy opinions. The driving force behind religious
behaving is the degree to which individuals participate in religious activity.
Indeed, the 2014 Religious Landscape Survey reveals several noteworthy trends regarding
religious participation and political beliefs. First, those who attend service at least once a week
believe that abortion should be illegal in all/most cases (63%), that homosexuality should be
discouraged (51%), and oppose/strongly oppose same-sex marriage (62%). The findings
regarding economic issues are less clear where religiously active and non-active individuals are
split in their opinions regarding government aid to the poor. Overall findings suggest that
religiously active individuals hold more conservative policy opinions relative to non-church
attenders regarding policy concerns. However, and based on the above-mentioned existing
scholarly literature, I argue that religiously active individuals hold more progressive economic
policy opinions when controlling for the effects of socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics.
H2: Religiously active individuals will generally hold more conservative policy opinions
(relative to non-church attenders).
H2a:Religiously active individuals take conservative policy stances on moral issues (due
in part to the influence of the clergy and biblical teachings on “pelvic politics” and end of
life issues).
H2b: Religiously active individuals take progressive policy stances on economic issues
(due in part to the influence of the clergy and biblical teachings on helping the poor in
society).

30

H2c: Religiously active individuals take conservative policy stances on hybrid issues that
involve government spending (i.e. environmental protections) but more progressive
policy stances on hybrid issues that involve humanitarian concerns (i.e. allowing refugees
to enter the country), due to the influence of the clergy and biblical teaching.
Believing. Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2007) argue that religious beliefs are the major
component in understanding how people behave politically. They argue that there is a great deal
of convergence between religious beliefs and policy opinions. Other scholars have also noted
differences among those individuals who believe in the literal translation of the Bible as the
“word of God.” Biblical literalists are politically more conservative and Republican than other
individuals within their own religious traditions (Layman 2001). Biblical literalism is often
associated with negative attitudes toward the legality of abortion and same-sex marriage
legislation (Gaines and Garand 2010; Garand and McCarthy 2016). In prior research, my coauthors and I have found that biblical literalism is negatively related to economic policy
opinions. Those individuals who believe that churches should preserve traditional beliefs rather
than adopt new progressive policies that reflect societal changes are less likely to support
increasing taxes on the rich and raising minimum wage (McCarthy et al. 2016). Religious beliefs
are also connected to hybrid policy opinions, especially as it relates to economic concerns (as
previously discussed). There is limited research that incorporate religious believing into
empirical analyses. This is largely due to survey limitations and restrictions. Indeed, Smidt,
Kellstedt, and Guth (2009) argue that there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the
influence of religious beliefs on policy opinions.
According to the 2014 Religious Landscape Study, biblical literalists believe that
abortion should be illegal in all or most cases (64%), homosexuality should be discouraged
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(55%), oppose/strongly oppose same-sex marriage (66%), and that “stricter environmental laws
and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy (48%).” Again, the general findings
suggest that biblical literalist are conservative (53%). However, reported economic concerns are
limited to government aid to the poor and beliefs on the size of government. I posit that biblical
literalists hold more progressive economic views when controlling for socioeconomic and
demographic considerations. Therefore, and based on (limited) scholarly research and
preliminary analyses, I posit that religious believing contributes to moral, economic, and hybrid
policy opinions.
H3: Biblical literalists hold conservative policy opinions (relative to those who do not believe
that the bible is the word of God).
H3a: Biblical literalists will be more likely to take conservative policy stances on moral
issues (due to the
influence of the clergy and church teachings).
H3b: Biblical literalists take progressive policy stances on economic issues.
H3c: Biblical literalists take conservative policy stances on hybrid issues that involve
government spending (i.e. environmental protections) but more progressive policy
stances on hybrid issues that involve humanitarian concerns (i.e. immigration).
There are several other measures of religious believing included in the models, however,
the main variable of interest is biblical literalism. Throughout this dissertation, I discuss these
variables and often find that there is variation between believing religion is important and that
religion serves as guidance in daily life on policy concerns. This suggests that those who believe
that religion is important are influenced by religion differently than those who believe that
religion serves as guidance. Thus, my hypotheses regarding the other religious belief variables
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are that religious beliefs have an overall effect on policy concerns; however, the direction of the
effect is unknown.
2.4. Summary and Conclusion
The point here is that religion matters in influencing public opinion. However, religious
traditions, religious participation, or religious beliefs alone do not fully capture the potential
effects of religiosity on individuals’ policy attitudes. In many cases, there are differences among
and within religious denominations as it relates to moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.
The proceeding chapters will address these differences and further explore variations among
religious dimensions. Thus, the models are influenced by the “3B” classification schema:
religious belonging (i.e. traditions), religious behaving (i.e. worship attendance), and religious
believing (i.e. biblical literalism and religious importance) (Layman 1997; 2001; Guth, Green,
Kellstedt, and Smidt 1999). However, I measure each dimension separately in the models.
Overall, my hypotheses are rooted in the lineage of the ethnoreligious perspective, the
traditional-modernist perspective, and the “three Bs” perspective while incorporating the
influence of the clergy and religious socialization. I highlight existed theoretical arguments and
posit that the religious dimension approach (my delineation of the “three Bs”) incorporates
aspects of these theories, especially the culture-wars thesis and the populism thesis. My work is
unique in that it applies various aspects of these theories and more carefully exposes the
variables at work in the “three B” model: belonging, behaving, and believing. By measuring
these dimensions separately in the models, I shed light on which dimensions influence which
policy domain. Looking at these variables separately in the models paints a clear(er) picture of
the relationship between religion and public opinion concerns. On one hand, those individuals
who associate positively with belonging, behaving, and believing tend to hold generally more
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conservative views that those who do not associate a religious denomination, participate in
religious activity, or believe in biblical literalism. On the other hand, those individuals who are
“less religious” are more likely to hold progressive views on policy opinions. These findings are
important insofar as they suggest the potential for a changing political and religious landscape as
more individuals are associating with being non-religious. The proceeding chapters address the
nuances of this statement by fleshing out differences in policy opinions contingent upon
belonging, behaving, and believing.
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Chapter 3. Data and Variable Description
3.1. Introduction
To explore the effects of religion on policy opinions, I rely on several data sources and a
wide variety of both religious and policy opinion variables. This chapter proceeds as follows.
First, I discuss the data used in the analyses in chapters 4 through 6. Second, I define the
dependent variables that include moral, economic, and hybrid policy issues. Third, I describe the
main independent variables. These variables include religious belonging, religious behaving, and
religious believing. Lastly, I conclude the chapter with a snapshot of the variables that are
employed in the models.
3.2. Data and Methods
There are three primary data sources that are included in the models: 2016 American
National Election Survey, the 2016 General Social Survey, and the 2013 Economic Values
Survey. I use ordered logistic and logistic regression in the models included in the empirical
chapters. For each model I examine the variance inflation factors (VIF) as a check for
multicollinearity, and in no case are the VIFs outside acceptable levels; therefore, there is no
evidence of multicollinearity in any of the models.
3.2.1. American National Election Survey
I use data from the 2016 American National Election Survey to estimate the effects of
religious belonging (denominational affiliation), behaving (church attendance and religious
contributions), and believing (religious importance, religious guidance in daily life, biblical
literalism, and spirituality), on various moral, economic, and hybrid issues. The American
National Election Survey (ANES) includes both a pre-election and post-election survey.
Respondents were interviewed between September 7 and November 7, 2016 (pre-election) and
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November 9, 2016 and January 8, 2017 (post-election). The interviews consisted of both face-toface interviews and Internet questionnaires. Interviews were conducted in both English and
Spanish. There is a total sample size of 4,271 adults 18 years and older.
I chose to use ANES data in all analyses for several reasons. First, the ANES provides a
suitable number of variables, especially as they relate to religious belonging, religious behaving,
and religious believing. I considered the use of other datasets for this dissertation; however, each
alternative choice is limited in the number of variables relating to religious believing. Second,
the ANES has an extensive set of variables relating to moral, economic, and hybrid policy issues;
these variables constitute the dependent variables in my analyses. Thus, I can draw conclusions
concerning which groups of policy issues (moral, economic, hybrid) are influenced by religious
belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. Lastly, in this dissertation I focus on
policy related variables, i.e. “should the government regulate businesses to protect the
environment?” rather than public opinion on whether an issue is justifiable, i.e. “is global
warming happening?” The ANES provides several policy related variables in each policy
opinion category. ANES data are used in all empirical chapters.
3.2.2. General Social Survey
The General Social Survey is an annual survey conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center, and the 2016 GSS has a sample of 2,867 adults ages 18 years and older. This
dataset is unique in that it includes key religious variables of interest that highlight religious
belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. For example, included in the data are
variables representing religious tradition preferences, religious conservativism/liberalism,
strength of religious denominational attachment, frequency of prayer, belief in life after death,
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beliefs about God, and frequency of religious activity participation. The General Social Survey is
used to supplement ANES survey data in Chapter 4 (moral issues).
3.2.3. Economic Values Survey
The 2013 Economic Values Survey conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute
has a total sample size of 2,002 adults 18 years and older. The survey was conducted between
May and June 2013. The uniqueness of this dataset is twofold. First, there are a number of
variables that measure religious belonging, religious behavior, and religious belief. This is
especially true for the religious belief component of religiosity. Survey questions concerning
Jesus’ teachings, care for the poor, and views on the image of God allow for a close examination
of policy preferences as a function of religious belief . Second, there are many economic policy
opinion questions that focus on support for government action and intervention. The Economic
Values Survey is used to supplement ANES survey data in Chapter 5.
3.3. Moral, Economic, Hybrid Policy Opinions
The principal data set used in the analyses is the 2016 American National Election
Survey. The 2016 General Social Survey and the 2013 Economic Values Survey are used to
supplement ANES analyses. In this section, I describe the moral, economic, and hybrid policy
opinion variables that are used in the analyses in Chapter 4 (Moral Policy Opinions), Chapter 5
(Economic Policy Opinions), and Chapter 6 (Hybrid Policy Opinions). 2016 ANES data are used
in all three empirical chapters. GSS data are used in Chapter 4 (Moral Policy Opinions), while
EVS data are used in Chapter 5 (Economic Policy Opinions). This section proceeds as follows:
First, I provide descriptions of the moral issues (dependent variables) used in Chapter 4. Second,
I highlight the variables of interest in Chapter 5 (dependent variables) for the economic issues
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used in the models. Third, I outline the dependent variables used in the hybrid models in Chapter
6.
3.3.1. Moral Policy Opinions
Chiefly, the variables that are included in the following section involve “pelvic politics”
or those issues that relate to the morality of sexuality. “Pelvic politics” was coined by Leege and
Kellstedt (1993) and later used by Jelen (2009) and included abortion related issues and gay and
lesbian rights. The moral or values-based policies that I include in the models rely on the
division of moral policy issues outlined by Leege and Kellstedt (1993) and Jelen (2009). These
policy domains include abortion legislation, and a variety of LGBTQ issues. While public
opinion toward the pro-life or pro-choice debate has generally remained constant and closely
divided in the last two decades (Gallup Poll 2018), there are considerable differences among the
religious and religiously unaffiliated (Gallup 2018). Those who attend religious services more
frequently often identify with being pro-life; whereas, the non-church attenders and the
religiously unaffiliated identify with being pro-choice.
Abortion
• ANES: “ Which one of the opinions…best agrees with your view? (coded 0) By law,
abortion should never be permitted, (coded 1) by law, only in the case of rape, incest,
or woman’s life in danger, (coded 2) by law, for reasons other than rape, incest, or
woman’s life in danger if need established, (coded 3) by law, abortion as a matter of
personal choice.
In this dissertation, I examine closely these differences and address the influence of the three
religious dimension in support for or opposition to the legality of abortion.
Opinions regarding the legality of same-sex marriage have not been as stable as opinions
on the legality of abortion in recent years (Gallup 2018). However, there are also key differences
among the religious and religiously unaffiliated. These differences are exemplified when
frequency of church attendance is accounted for in the models (Garand and McCarthy 2016).
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Frequent service attenders are more likely to not support the legality of same-sex marriage than
non-frequent service attenders.
Same-sex marriage
• ANES. “Which comes closest to your view? (Coded 1) Gay and lesbian couples
should be allowed to legally marry. (Coded 0) Gay and lesbian couples should be
allowed to form civil unions but not legally marry. (Coded -1) There should be no
legal recognition of a gay or lesbian couple’
• GSS. Do you agree or disagree? Homosexual couples should have the right to marry
one another’s relationship.” This variable ranges from “0” strongly disagree to “4”
strongly agree.

There are several other LGBTQ issues that have been given considerable attention in
recent years. These issues include anti-discrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians against
job discrimination, the legality of abortion, required service to same-sex couples by private
business owners, and the use of bathrooms by transgender individuals. In this dissertation, I
include a full analysis of the influence of religion on these issues. I posit that religious behaving
and religious believing will have an influence on how one evaluates LGBTQ issues. Similar to
public opinion on same-sex marriage legislation, more religiously active individuals and those
who hold more conservative religious beliefs will be less supportive of LGBTQ legislation.
Anti-discrimination laws
• ANES. “Do you favor or oppose laws to protect gays and lesbians against job
discrimination? This variable ranges from “0” strongly oppose to “3” strongly favor
anti-discrimination laws to protect gays and lesbians against job discrimination.
Gay adoption
• ANES. “Do you think gay or lesbian couples should be legally permitted to adopt
children?” This variable is coded “0” if respondent believes that gays and lesbians
should not be able to adopt and “1” if gay or lesbian couples should be legally
permitted to adopt.
Required service
• ANES. “Do you think business owners who provide wedding-related services should
be allowed to refuse services to same-sex couples if same-sex marriage violates their
religious beliefs, or do you think business owners should be required to provide
services regardless of a couple’s sexual orientation?” This variable ranges from “0”
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strongly believes being allowed to refuse services to “5” strongly believes in business
owners being required to provide services for gay and lesbian couples.
Transgender bathrooms
• ANES. “ Should transgender people—that is, people who identify themselves as the
sex or gender different from the one they were born as—have to use the bathrooms of
the gender they were born as, or should they be allowed to use the bathrooms of their
identified gender? This variable ranges from “0” or respondent very strongly believes
that transgender people should use the bathroom of the gender they were born with to
“5” or respondent very strongly believes that transgender people should be allowed to
use the bathroom of their identified gender.
Sex education, and pornography laws are included in the models dealing with “pelvic
politics.” It is reasonable to expect that opinions on sex education and pornography laws are
influenced by one’s religiosity. I believe that religious behaving and religious belief will have an
effect on these variables where those individuals who are more religiously active and hold
conservative religious beliefs are more likely to not support sex education in public schools and
more in favor of legislation that restricts pornography. Thus, I have included several variables
that I consider “pelvic politics” in the models.
Pornography laws
• GSS. “Which of the following statements comes closest to your feelings about
pornography laws: (coded 0) there should be no laws forbidding the distribution of
pornography, (coded 1) there should be laws against the distribution of pornography
to persons under 18, (coded 2) there should be laws against the distribution of
pornography, whatever the age.”
Sex education
• GSS. “Would you be for (coded 1) or against (coded 0) sex education in the public
schools?”
I also include public opinion toward issues that are not related to sexuality. End of life
issues including assisted suicide and the death penalty are considered moral/values-based
policies in the models because they have values-based or ethical components. These issues deal
with the legality of ending a life. In particular, the death penalty involves a governing body

40

taking a life as ultimate punishment (Koopman 2009). Gallup (2018) trends demonstrate that the
public is largely divided on the death penalty for a person convicted of murder, where 56% of the
public is in support of the death penalty and 41% is opposed. I suspect that religion has an effect
on one’s belief assisted suicide and the death penalty because these two issues involve the ending
of life.
Assisted suicide
• GSS. “When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should
be allowed by law to end the patient's life by some painless means if the patient and
his family request it?” This variable is coded “0” if respondent disagrees and “1” if
the respondent agrees that doctors should be allowed by law to end a patient’s life if
requested.
Capital Punishment
• ANES. “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?”
This variable ranges from “0” strongly opposes the death penalty to “3” strongly
supports the death penalty.
• GSS. “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?”
The variable is coded a “0” if respondent opposes the death penalty and “1” if the
responded favors the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.

Lastly, religion arguably influences opinions on prayer in public places. While the
legality of prayer in public schools has been consistently popular among the American public
(Green and Guth 1989; Gallup 2014) there are considerable differences among religious
traditions. Catholics are less likely to support prayer in public schools (Delfattore 2004) than
other religious denominations. However, Jelen (2009) points out one important caveat: school
prayer is important for both individuals who believe that religion is important and those
individuals who believe that religion is not an important part of their daily life.

Prayer in schools
• GSS. “The United States Supreme Court has ruled that no state or local government
may require the reading of the Lord's Prayer or Bible verses in public schools. What
are your views on this? Do you approve or disapprove of the court ruling?” This
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variable is coded “0” if respondent disapproves of the court ruling and “1” if the
respondent approves of the court ruling.

In this dissertation, I shed light on policy opinions toward these moral or value- based
issues and address the current climate of public opinion through full empirical analyses that
capture the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing.
In sum, the following variables are used in the analyses in Chapter 4:
Table 3.1. Moral/value-based policy opinion variables

American
National Election
Survey

General Social
Survey

Abortion
Anti-discrimination laws (same-sex)
Gay adoption
Required service (same-sex)
Transgender bathroom
Death penalty

Gay marriage
Assisted suicide
Pornography laws
Sex education
Prayer
Death penalty

3.3.2. Economic Policy Opinions
Scholars have noted important differences among religious traditions and opinions on
economic policy positions (Smidt 2001; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2007; Wilson 2009). Overall,
the extant scholarly literature demonstrates that Jewish adherents and black Protestant express
liberal views on economic policies, Catholics and mainline Protestant hold moderate economic
policy opinions and evangelical protestants favor conservative economic policy opinions. In
addition to these findings, my coauthors and I have found that religious belief is related to
economic policy opinions. Individuals who believe in preserving traditional religious beliefs are
more likely to hold progressive economic policy opinions (McCarthy et al. 2016).
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I include variables representing three economic policy domains in the models (1)
government service, (2) government spending, (3) fiscal or monetary policies . I consider an
issue to be economic if it involves monetary compensation by the government or opinions on
fiscal policies including the deficit reduction, raising taxes, the government’s role in reducing
economic inequality, and increasing the minimum wage.
There are fewer scholarly works on the relationship between religion and economic
policy opinions than on the relationship between religion and moral policy concerns. However,
public opinion on government service and government spending has been long documented by
data analytic sources such as Gallup, Pew Research Center, and the Public Religion Research
Institute. Overall findings demonstrate that there are significant differences between Democrat
and Republican identifiers, where Democrats often hold more liberal economic policy opinions
and Republican are more conservative in their economic policy opinions. Thus, I argue that
religion influences economic policy opinions where those who hold more conservative religious
beliefs (and/or are members of a conservative religious tradition) are more likely to support
conservative economic policy. Conversely, those individuals who believe in more progressive
religious beliefs (and/or who are members of progressive religious traditions) will be more likely
to support liberal economic policies.
Thus, the dependent variables that are included in the economic policy opinion models
are as follows:
Government service
• ANES. The government service variable is a 7-point scale that ranges from “0” or the
government should provide fewer services to “6” or the government should provide
more services.
• EVS. “It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take
care of themselves?” This variable ranges from “0” or completely disagree to “3”
completely agree.
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Government spending
• ANES. There are several variables that involve public opinion toward government
spending included in the models: spending on social security, spending on crime,
spending on welfare, and spending on the poor. These variables are all coded “1” if
the respondent reports favoring increased government spending, “0” if the respondent
favors keeping spending the same, and “-1” if the respondent supports decreased
spending.
• ANES. There are two variables regarding government spending that are coded on a 7point scale: healthcare spending and defense spending. Like the other government
spending variables, high values denote favorability in increasing government
spending and low values denote favorability in decreasing government spending.
• EVS. Spending on social services. This variable asks respondents if they completely
agree (coded 3), mostly agree (coded 2), mostly disagree (coded 1), completely
disagree (coded 0) on whether the “government is providing too many social services
that should be left to religious groups and private charities.”
Deficit reduction
• ANES. “How important is it to reduce the deficit?” This variable is coded “4” if
extremely important, “3” if very important, “2” if reducing the deficit is moderately
important, “1” if it is a little important to reduce the deficit, and “0” if the respondent
believes that it is not important at all to reduce the national deficit.
Taxes
• ANES. The variable tax is coded “2” if respondent supports increasing taxes on
millionaires, “1” if respondent feels neutral about increasing taxes on millionaires,
and “0” if the respondent it opposed to increasing taxes on millionaires.
• EVS. The variable ranges from “0” strongly oppose to “3” strongly favor “increasing
the tax rate on Americans earning more than $250,000 a year.”
Inequality
• ANES. “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the government trying to
reduce the difference in incomes between the richest and poorest household?” This
variable ranges from “0” or strongly opposes government action to reduce inequality
to “4” or strongly agrees that the government should reduce inequality.
• EVS. “The government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and poor.”
This variable ranges from “0” or completely disagree to “3” or completely agree.
Minimum Wage
• ANES. The variable minimum wage is coded “0” if the respondent believes that the
minimum wage should be decreased or eliminated, “1” if the minimum wage should
be kept the same, and “2” if the respondent believes that the minimum wage in the
United States should be increased.
• EVS. The variable ranges from “0” or strongly oppose to “3” or strongly favor
“increasing the minimum wage from $7.25 an hour to $10.00 an hour.”
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In sum, there are two datasets used in the empirical analyses of Chapter 5 (Economic Policy
Opinions): 2016 ANES and the 2013 EVS. I explore the effect of the three dimensions of
religion on economic policy opinion. I argue that conservative religious beliefs yield general
conservative economic policy opinions. In addition, I argue that more progressive religious
beliefs yield progressive economic policy opinions. In Table 3.2 , summarize the economic
variables used in the analyses in Chapter 5.
Table 3.2. Economic policy opinion variables

American National Election Survey

Economic Values Survey

Government service
Government spending
- social security
- crime
- welfare
- poor
- healthcare
- defense
Deficit reduction
Taxes
Inequality
Minimum wage

Government responsibility
Social services spending
Taxes
Inequality
Minimum wage

3.3.3. Hybrid Policy Opinions
The last set of policy opinions include those issues that can have both moral and
economic components. For example, building a border wall with Mexico has a moral component
if related to human rights issues and an economic component if related to government spending.
There are three hybrid policy categories that are included in the analyses: immigration, the

45

environment, and foreign policy. In Chapter 6, I use 2016 ANES data for all analyses. Therefore,
the variable description below is exclusive to ANES data.
The first hybrid policy category involves immigration policy opinions. Previous research
has highlighted difference among conservative and liberal identifiers in their opinions on
immigration where conservatives are more likely to favor immigration restrictions and liberals
are more likely to favor increasing immigration (Gallup Poll 2019). I suspect that religion
influences immigration policy opinions in several ways. First, if an individual is a member of an
ethnic or racial religious minority (Hispanic Catholics), then they will be more likely to want to
increase immigration than those individuals of ethnic or racial religious majorities (Catholics). I
also expect that those individuals who hold progressive religious beliefs will be more likely to
hold progressive beliefs on immigration than those who hold conservative religious beliefs. This
is due in part to progressive/conservative religious teaching that include interpretations of Jesus’
teaching and biblical literalism.
I include four measures of immigration policy in the models in Chapter 6.
Immigration
• Immigration Level. “What should immigration levels be?” The variable ranges from
“0” or immigration to be decreased a lot to “4” or immigration should be increased a
lot.
• Citizenship. This variable deals with citizenship and ranges from “0” or oppose
birthright citizenship to “6” or support for birthright citizenship.
• Syrian refuges. This variable ranges from “0” or strongly opposes allowing Syrian
refuges in the United States to “6” or strongly supports allowing Syrian refuges in the
United States.
• Border wall. This variable ranges from “0” or strongly opposes building a border wall
with Mexico to “6” or strongly supports building a border wall with Mexico.
The next hybrid policy domain deals with the environmental policy concerns. Scholars
have long noted the role of religion in public opinion toward the environment. Most notably,
there are differences in the existence of global warming among religious traditions where
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evangelical Protestants are less likely to believe that global warming exists than other religious
traditions (Shao et al. 2016). For the purposes of this dissertation, I am interested not in the belief
of the existence of global warming but environmental policy opinions. Thus, I measure public
opinion on environmental policy as environment/job protection and spending on the
environment.
Environment
• Environment/job protection. The environment-jobs tradeoff self-placement scale
ranges from “0” or “no regulation because it will not work and will cost jobs” to “6”
or “regulate business to protect the environment and create jobs.”
• Spending. The variable is coded “-1” if the respondent supports decreasing spending
on the environment, “0” if spending on the environment should be kept the same, and
“1” if the government should increase spending on the environment.
Based on previous research, I argue that religious belonging (denomination), religious behaving
(service attendance), and religious believing (doctrinal belief) has an influence on environmental
policy positions (Shao and McCarthy, forthcoming).
The last hybrid policy issue that I consider in this dissertation is foreign policy as it
relates to free trade and the United States Military. Few scholars have addressed the issue of
religion and foreign policy concerns; however, James Guth’s (2009) work on the intersection of
religion and foreign policy opinion demonstrates that there are considerable effects of religion on
foreign policy opinions accounting for religious tradition, religious behavior, and religious
beliefs in the models. In Chapter 6, I highlight which dimension of religion influence foreign
policy opinions. I argue that progressive/conservative religious beliefs are associated with
progressive/conservative foreign policy opinions.
Foreign Policy
• Military. This variable ranges from “0” or strongly opposes sending troops to fight
ISIS to “6” or strongly supports sending troops to fight ISIS.
• Free trade. The variable also ranges from “0” or strongly opposes free trade
agreements to “6” strongly favors free trade agreements.
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In sum, I consider hybrid issues to include those policies that have both moral and
economic components. There is limited scholarly research on all three hybrid policy opinions
that I examine in this dissertation. Perhaps the most abundant line of literature (still limited) is
religion and its effects on public opinion toward the environment. The limited existing research
demonstrates that religion plays a significant role in how individuals think about immigration,
the environment, and foreign policy. Table 3.3 summarizes the dependent variables in Chapter 6.
Table 3.3. Hybrid policy opinion variables
Immigration
- immigration level
- citizenship policy
- refugees
- border wall
American National Election Survey
Environment
- environment/job protection
- spending
Foreign policy
- military
- free trade

3.4. Religious Belonging, Religious Behaving, Religious Believing
There are three major components of religiosity that are included in the models in
subsequent chapters. The coding classification is influenced on the coding schema presented by
Steensland et al. (2000), Layman (2001), Smidt et. al (2009), and Putnam and Campbell (2010).
The analyses that I present in this dissertation focus on measuring religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing separately to tease out differences among these religious
components and discern their effects on overall policy opinions as it relates to several moral,
economic, and hybrid policy concerns.
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3.4.1. Religious Belonging
ANES. For the religious belonging variables, I have separated individuals into eight
religious denominations or traditions: mainline Protestant, black Protestant, evangelical
Protestant, Catholic, Hispanic Catholic, other Christian, Jewish, and other (non-Christian)
religion.6 Those individuals who do not identify with a religious denomination or tradition—i.e.
seculars, atheists, agnostics, and the nones—are the excluded or contrast group in the models.
Scholars have long noted important differences among these religious groups (Stark and Glock
1968; Sernett 1991; Green et al. 1996; Steensland et al. 2000; among others). Chiefly,
Protestantism should be classified to include distinctions among mainline Protestants, black
Protestants, and evangelical Protestants. There are distinct differences among these religious
groups in terms of religious practices (religious behaving) and doctrinal belief (religious
belonging) (Hertzke et al. 2019). For example, evangelical Protestants tend to believe in the
literal interpretation of the Bible; whereas, mainline Protestants are more likely to interpret the
Bible as inspired by God rather than the literal word of God. Black Protestants often hold
conservative positions on biblical literalism or theology, believing that the Bible is the word of
God, and a progressive interpretation of Jesus’ message and teachings in the Bible. Black
Protestants interpret God’s message as requiring social (or government acts) to uplift the poor in
society (Hertzke et al. 2019; McDaniel 2008). In light of these differences, mainline Protestant is
coded 1 for those individuals who report being non-black and a member of the mainline
Protestant faith and 0 for all other respondents. Black Protestant is coded 1 for black respondents
who also identify with being a Protestant and 0 for all other respondents. The evangelical
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I have coded the variables the same for ANES, GSS, and EVS datasets.
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variable is coded 1 for those individuals who are non-black evangelical Protestants and 0 for all
other respondents.
There are also key distinctions between white and Hispanic Catholics including religious
behaving and religious beliefs. For example, Hispanic Catholics tend to hold more conservative
views on moral policy issues such as same-sex marriage than white Catholics (Pew Research
Center 2017). Hispanic Catholics interpret the Bible and the teaching of the Catholic Church to
favor the uplifting of the poor in society through social or government programs (Hertzke et. al
2019); whereas, non-Hispanic Catholics tend to take a more middle of the road position on
biblical literalism and social programs. Catholic is coded 1 for individuals who identify as being
Catholic and non-Hispanic and 0 for all other respondents. Hispanic Catholic is coded 1 for
individuals who identify as both Hispanic and Catholic, and 0 otherwise. Christian is coded 1 for
those individuals who report being a member of another Christian group (excluding Mainline
Protestant, black Protestant, evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Hispanic Catholic faiths) and 0
for all other respondents. Jewish is coded 1 for individuals who identify with the Jewish faith and
0 otherwise. Other religion includes other non-Christian religious faiths (i.e. Muslim, Buddhist,
Hindu, etc.) and 0 otherwise. Lastly, the excluded category in the models is those individuals
who do not associate with a religious denomination or tradition. This variable is coded 1 if the
respondent is agnostic, atheist, or secular and 0 otherwise.
I also include in the religious denomination category a variable that captures both
religious tradition (belonging) and religious ideology (believing). The question asks respondents
to classify their religion as fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal. I use this variable in the GSS
models. I have coded the variable 2 if respondent reports their religion is fundamentalist, a 1 if
the respondent reports that their religion is moderate, and 0 if their religion is liberal. I include
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this variable in the religious belonging category because it involves the classification of the
respondent’s religious traditions into fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal categories. Therefore, I
believe that this variable is another measure of religious belonging. However, this variable also
taps into religious belief.
GSS. In the GSS religious belonging is separated into four major categories: Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, and Other Religion. In addition, I have separated Protestants into three groups:
mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, and black Protestants. I code mainline Protestants a
1 for those individuals who report being both non-black and Protestant respondents and 0
otherwise. Evangelical Protestants as those individuals who report being both (1) born again and
(2) Protestant. Likewise, the black Protestant variable is coded 1 if individuals report being both
(1) black and (2) a Protestant. In addition, Catholics are separated between Hispanic and other
Catholics. Catholics are coded a 1 for individuals who identify with being non-Hispanic and
Catholic and 0 otherwise. Hispanic Catholic is coded a 1 for individuals who report being both
Hispanic and Catholic and 0 otherwise. Jewish is coded 1 for individuals who associate with the
Jewish tradition and 0 otherwise. Other religious tradition is coded 1 for those members of other
religious faiths. The contrast (or excluded) category are those individuals who are religiously
unaffiliated. The unaffiliated variable is coded 1 if the respondent reports being unaffiliated or
having no religion and 0 otherwise.
EVS. The variables in the Economic Values Survey have a similar coding schema to the
religious belonging variables in the ANES and the GSS. The variable mainline Protestant is
coded 1 for those individuals who are white, non-born-again Protestants and 0 otherwise. Black
Protestant is coded 1 for respondents who are both black and Protestant and 0 otherwise.
Evangelical Protestant is coded 1 for respondents who are white, born again, and Protestant and
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0 for all other respondents. Catholic is coded 1 for all white Catholics and 0 otherwise. Hispanic
Catholic is coded 1 for those individuals who report being both Hispanic and Catholic and 0
otherwise. The variable Jewish is coded 1 for all Jewish adherents and 0 otherwise. The variable
other religion is coded 1 if the respondent is a member of other religious traditions and 0
otherwise. The excluded (contrast) group is those individuals who are religiously unaffiliated or
report belonging to no religious tradition.
I posit that there are among and within denominational differences in policy opinions. I
present these differences among the various religious traditions and their influence on policy
opinions in my analysis chapters. I argue that race (i.e. black Protestant vs. mainline and
evangelical Protestant), ethnicity (Hispanic Catholic vs. Catholic), and culture (fundamentalist,
moderate, liberal religious tradition) are among the major contributors to these differences in
moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.
3.4.2. Behaving
The next component of religion is religious behaving. Traditionally, scholars have
included religious behaving in their research in the form of church attendance and frequency of
prayer. I use these variables in the models in my analysis chapters. I argue that rote religious
behavior is generally related to conservative moral policy opinions and liberal economic policy
with a few distinct exceptions that are discussed at length in my analyses chapters.
The American National Election Survey has two variables that are related to religious
behaving: service attendance and religious contributions. Service attendance is measured based
on how often individuals attend religious services. The categories range from never attending
services to attending services more than once per week. The variable religious contributions is
coded 1 if respondent has contributed to a religious group in the past 12 months and 0 otherwise.
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The General Social Survey has several variables relating to religious behaving: service
attendance, frequency of religious activity participation, frequency of prayer, and religious
conversion. Religious service attendance measures the frequency of which an individual attends
religious services and ranges from never attending religious services to attending services more
than once a week. Frequency of religious activity participation is a variable that measures how
often respondents take part in church activities. The variable ranges from 0 or never participating
in a religious activity to 10 or once per day. Frequency of prayer encapsulates how often
respondents pray and ranges from 0 or never to 6 or several times per day. Lastly, the GSS
provides a unique variable labeled religious conversion that asks respondents if they have every
tried to encourage someone to believe or accept Jesus Christ. The variable is coded 1 if yes and 0
otherwise. The Economic Values Survey has one religious behaving variable: religious service
attendance. Religious service attendance is coded 5 for those individuals who report attending
religious services more than once a week to 0 or never attending religious services.
Overall, I argue that religious behaving is positively related to moral, economic, and
hybrid policy opinions. Those individuals who attend religious services more frequently, pray
more often, participate in religious activity, financially contribute to religious organizations, and
who are involved in religious conversations are more likely to hold conservative moral policy
opinion views. The effect of the religious behaving variable on economic and hybrid policy
opinions is less clear. On one hand, I argue that those individuals who are members of certain
religious denominations (i.e. black Protestants) and participate in religious services and religious
activity are more likely to hold liberal economic policy positions due to religious culture and
doctrinal teachings. On the other hand, other religious traditions (i.e. Evangelical Protestants) are
more likely to hold conservative economic policy positions when they are involved in religious
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participation and activity, also due to religious culture and doctrinal teachings. It is important to
measure the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing separately
in the models to discern differences in public opinion especially as it relates to the less
documented policy issues such as gun regulations or immigration reform.
3.4.3. Religious Believing
The final component of religion that I use in this dissertation is religious believing. In
previous research, my co-authors and I have combined aspects of religious believing to create a
religiosity scale that includes religious importance, biblical literalism, and beliefs about
relationship with God (McCarthy, Olson, and Garand forthcoming 2019). In this dissertation, I
am concerned with how the specific components of religious believing influence moral,
economic, and hybrid policy opinions. Therefore, I include measures of religious importance,
religious guidance, biblical literalism, and spirituality in the models using ANES data. In the
models using GSS data, I include belief in life after death, biblical literalism, belief about God,
strength of religiosity, and strength of spirituality. The Economic Values Survey dataset contains
the following religious believing variables: biblical literalism, belief in the image of God,
religious importance in daily life, conservative/progressive religious beliefs, and the
interpretation of Jesus’ teachings.
ANES. I begin with the variables from the ANES survey. Religious importance is a binary
variable that is coded 1 if religion is an important part of one’s daily life and 0 if religion is not
an important part of daily life. Religious guidance is measured using a 4-point scale ranging from
0 or no guidance in day-to-day living, 1 some guidance in daily living, 2 quite a bit of guidance,
to 3 or a great deal of guidance in daily life. Biblical literalism captures one’s belief in whether
the Bible is the literal word of God (coded 2), word of God but is not the literal word (coded 1),
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or not the word of God (coded 0). Lastly, Spirituality is a dichotomous variable that highlights
whether a respondent considers herself spiritual (coded 1) or not spiritual (coded 0).
GSS. I have used similar GSS variables. The variable post life measures whether an
individual believes in a life after death, coded a 1 when the respondent reported yes and 0 when a
respondent did not report believing in life after death. Similar to the biblical literalism variable
used in ANES data models, biblical literalism is coded a 0 if the Bible is an ancient book of
fables, 1 if the Bible is the inspired word of God but should not be taken literally, and 2 if the
Bible is the actual word of God. The variable God ranges from 0 to 5, where respondents range
from reporting no belief in God (coded 0) to complete belief in the existence of God (coded 5).
The last set of variables, strength of religiosity and strength of spirituality, are consisted of 4categories that ranges from not religious/not spiritual (coded 0) to very religious/very spiritual
(coded 4). The General Social Survey is unique in that it also offers a variable that askes
respondents about the fundamentalism or liberalism of the respondent’s religion.
EVS. Regarding EVS data, biblical literalism is coded 1 if the respondent believes that
the Bible is the word of God and 0 if the respondent believes that the Bible is a book written by
men and not by God. The image of God variable captures whether respondents believe that God
exists and if they can have a personal relationship with God. The variable is coded 2 if the
respondent believes that God is a person, 1 if God is an impersonal force, and 0 if there is no
God. or there is no God (coded 0). Religious importance ranges from 0 for religion is not
important to 3 religion is the most important thing in life. The variable preserve beliefs is coded
0 if respondents believe that religion should adopt modern beliefs, coded 1 if religious beliefs
should be adjusted considering new circumstances, and coded 2 if beliefs and practices should be
preserved. This variable is particularly important in the analyses because it highlights the degree
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to which individuals believe that biblical teaching should remain resistant to changes in society
or that religious teachings should change and reflect societal demands. Lastly, the variable care
for the poor highlights the interpretation of Jesus’ teachings. There are 5 categories that range
from 0 (Jesus promoted private charity) to 4 (Jesus promoted a just society in his teachings).
I posit that religious belief will influence moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. In
general, conservative religious beliefs are related to more conservative policy opinions. In my
analyses chapters I discuss specific nuances in the findings.
In Table 3.4, I provide an overview of the three dimensions of religion: religious
belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing and the variables that are included in
proceeding analyses.
In sum, I use ANES, GSS, and EVS survey data in the empirical chapters to shed light on
effect of the three major dimensions of religion: religious belonging, religious behaving, and
religious believing on moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions. Measured separately in the
models, these components provide the basic framework for understanding which aspects of
religion influence which policy opinion domain. Throughout this project I attempt to retain the
coding scheme of the variables so that conclusions can be drawn and compared among sets of
analyses.
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Table 3.4. Religious dimension variables

Belonging

American
National
Election
Survey

General
Social
Survey

2013
Economic
Development
Survey

Behaving

Believing

Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other non-Christian
Unaffiliated (excluded group)

Service attendance
Religious contributions

Religious importance
Religious guidance
Biblical literalism
Spirituality

Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Jewish
Other Religion
Religious tradition strength
Religious fundamentalism
Unaffiliated (excluded group)

Service attendance
Religious activity
participation
Frequency of prayer
Religious conversion

Post life
Biblical literalism
Belief in God
Strength of religiosity
Strength of spirituality

Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Jewish
Other faith
Unaffiliated (excluded group)

Service attendance

Biblical literalism
Image of God
Religious importance
Preserve beliefs
Care for the poor

3.5. A Note on Political and Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables
I include standard political and socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models.
Overall these variables are coded the same in ANES, GSS, and EVS datasets.
3.5.1. Political Variables
Partisan identification is a 6 point-scale where a 6 represents identification as a strong
Republican and 0 represents identification with being a strong Democrat. Likewise, political
ideology is a 6-point scale where a 6 represents identification with being a strong conservative
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and 0 represents identification with being a strong liberal. I expect partisan identification and
political ideology to have a significant effect in the models. Republican and conservatives will
hold conservative policy opinions; whereas, Democrats and liberals will hold progressive policy
opinions.
3.5.2. Socioeconomic/Demographic Variables
Black, Hispanic, and Asian are all (exclusively) coded 1 if the respondent identifies as
being black, Hispanic, or Asian and 0 otherwise. Gender is coded 0 if the respondent is a man
and 1 if the respondent is a woman. Married is coded 1 if the respondent is married and 0
otherwise. I included married in the models because previous research demonstrates that marital
status has an effect on a variety of moral and economic policy opinions. Age is the respondents
age in years. Education is the respondent’s education on a seven-point scale (6-point scale for
GSS data) ranging from 0 or less than 8th grade education to 6 or post-graduate education. Lastly,
household income ranges from 0 or low income to 27 or high income. Household income ranges
from 0 or low income to 6 or high income for GSS and EVS data.
3.6. Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the three major datasets that are used in the
analyses in Chapter 4 through Chapter 6. There are three major data sources: 2016 ANES, 2016
GSS, and the 2013 EVS. In addition, I highlight the key variables that are used in the empirical
chapters. The main independent variables used in the models can be clustered into three groups:
religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing. Likewise, the dependent
variables can be clustered into three policy opinion domains: moral policy opinions, economic
policy opinions, and hybrid policy opinions. In the following chapters, I provide supporting
evidence for the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2. In Chapter 4, I provide analyses to support
the hypotheses relating to moral or values-based policy issues. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate the
58

effect of religion on economic policy opinions. In Chapter 6, I highlight the effects of religion on
hybrid policy opinions.
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Chapter 4. Moral Policy Opinions
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the effects of the three dimensions of religion on moral or
values-based policy issues. Using data from the 2016 ANES survey, I estimate the effects of the
three dimensions of religion on moral policies relating to LGBTQ rights: (3) same-sex marriage,
(5) anti-discrimination laws against same-sex couples, legalized gay adoption, (5) requiring
businesses to provide services over their religious objections to same-sex couples, and (6) use of
transgender bathrooms. I also present two models that estimate the effect of religious belonging,
religious behaving, and religious believing on opinions toward (1) abortion policy and (2) the
death penalty. Using 2016 GSS data, I present the findings for the effects of religious belonging,
religious having, and religious believing on opinions toward (1) same-sex marriage and (2) the
death penalty. In addition to the ANES variables, the 2016 GSS is unique in that it provides
variables concerning public opinion toward (3) assisted suicide, (4) pornography laws, (4) sex
education, and (5) prayer in public schools that serve as dependent variables in the models.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present a series of bivariate analyses of select
moral values-based policy opinions. The two issues that I have included in these preliminary
analyses are public opinion toward abortion legislation and public opinion regarding the legality
of same-sex marriage. I have chosen these two issues because they reflect current and
important—and often debated—moral policy issues. There is considerable existing scholarly
literature that discusses the effects of religion on opinion toward abortion and same-sex marriage
policy opinion; however, these studies are limited in scope because they do not include all three
religious dimensions in the models. The first set of preliminary analyses highlight the importance
of measuring religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing separately in the
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models. Overall, the bivariate results show that there are variations among religious traditions
and opinions toward abortion policy and same-sex marriage legislation. The results also reveal
within-denominational difference among Protestants. Differences among church attenders and
non-church attenders in public opinion toward abortion and same-sex marriage legislation again
show the importance of including the religious behaving dimension in the overall models. Lastly,
biblical literalists and those individuals who believe that religion in important report different
opinions on abortion and same-sex marriage legislation than those who believe that the Bible is
not the word of God and those who believe that religion is not an important party of their daily
lives.
In the second section, I present a series of ordered logistic and logistic regression models
that estimate the effects of the independent variables (religious dimensions) and public opinion
on moral/values-based policy issues (dependent variables). Overall, the results of these analyses
highlight significant differences in the effects of the religious dimensions on public opinion
toward moral or values-based issues. In addition, these results show that religious belonging,
religious behaving, and religious believing contribute to how individuals think about public
policy issues. Lastly, I end this chapter with an overall picture of the influence of the religious
dimensions on policy opinions. In the concluding section, I also offer remarks about future
projects.
4.2. Religious Dimensions
In this section, I present four sets of bivariate analyses to demonstrate the importance of
measuring religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing separately in the full
empirical models included later in this chapter. In 4.2.1, I explore the effects of the first
dimension of religion—religious belonging. Religious belonging is divided among four groups:
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(1) Protestants, (2) Catholics, (3) Jews, and (4) other. In another set of preliminary bivariate
models, I separate Protestants into three groups: (1) mainline Protestants, (2) evangelical
Protestants, and (3) black Protestants. The division of these groups is based on previous literature
and the classification schema provided by scholars in the field of religion and politics (see
Chapter 3 for a discussion of measurement). In 4.2.2, I am interested in the second dimension of
religion—religious behaving. As an example, I include church service attendance as a measure
of religious behaving. The preliminary results expose differences among church attenders and
non-attenders on moral policy opinions, highlighting the importance of including religious
behaving in models that explore the influence of religion on moral or value-based policy
concerns. In 4.2.3, I am concerned with the last dimension of religion—religious believing.
Perhaps the most complicated measure of religion, I have chosen two measures of religious
believing (biblical literalism and religious importance) to explain differences in public opinion
on abortion legislation and same-sex marriage policy opinions.
4.2.1. Religious Belonging
Consistent with previous scholarly research, I have included religious denomination or
religious traditions in the belonging dimension of religion. Scholars have exposed differences
among religious traditions—i.e., Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other Christian, and non-Christian
faiths. In Table 4.1, I highlight the differences in public opinion on abortion regulation and samesex marriage among four religious traditions: Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and other Christian
and non-Christian adherents. The results of the preliminary analyses reveal significant
differences among the religious traditions (χ2 = 83.5431, Prob( χ2)= 0.000). Most notably, nearly
80% of those who identify with being Jewish believe that abortion should be legal in all
circumstances; whereas, 34% of Protestants, 40% of Catholics and 42% of other religious

62

identifiers believe that abortion should be legal in all circumstances. In addition, only 3.57% of
Jews believe that abortion should never be allowed compared to nearly 17% of Protestants, 13%
of Catholics, and 16% of other religious adherents. Regarding same-sex marriage, nearly 84% of
Jews reported being in favor of same-sex marriage; whereas, 43% of Protestants, 61% of
Catholics and nearly 52% of other religious believers reported supporting same-sex marriage. In
addition, there are large differences among religious traditions and those individuals who believe
that there should be no legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Specifically, 25% of Protestants,
10% of Catholics, 6% of Jews, and 30% of other religious groups believe that there should be no
legal recognition of same-sex marriages. These bivariate results are also statistically significant
(χ2 = 178.9776, Prob( χ2)= 0.000), demonstrating variation among the religious denominations in
support for same-sex marriage legislation. These denominational differences are noteworthy
insofar as they provide the first step in understanding differences in public opinion as a function
of religious belonging and as it relates to certain policy issues.
The distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage reveal that there are
noteworthy differences among religious traditions. These results suggest that religious belonging
(measured as religious tradition or denominational affiliation) has the protentional to greatly
influence public policy opinions. Specifically, I find—albeit just a bivariate finding—that Jews
hold progressive policy opinions. Without considering within denominational differences,
Protestants, Catholics, and other religious groups take a moderate standpoint on policy opinions
concerning abortion and a progressive standpoint concerning LGBTQ issues. Protestants,
Catholics and other religious groups collectively take a moderate standpoint on certain issues
because there is great variation within these religious traditions. For example, when Hispanic
Catholics are separated from other Catholics, Catholics in general take a more progressive or
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liberal stance on policy issues. Hispanic Catholics are relatively conservative compared to other
Catholics. Again, these differences can be explained through the ethnoreligious lens where social
group interaction influences opinions. Hispanic Catholic congregations are often more
Conservative in their viewpoints. In the next section I will discuss these within denominational
differences.
Table 4.1 distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage, 2016 ANES
Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Never allowed

16.72%

12.72%

3.57%

16.44%

Rape, incest, life of
mother
Many reasons

31.88%

32.25%

8.33%

26.97%

17.16%

14.56%

8.33%

14.81%

All circumstances

34.23%

40.45%

79.76%

41.78%

Abortion

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
1,148
83.5431
0.000

100
927

100
84

100
1,168

Same-sex
marriage
No legal recognition

24.45%

10.41%

5.88%

27.92%

Civil Union

32.23%

28.31%

10.59%

20.19%

Marriage allowed

43.32%

61.28%

83.53%

51.89%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
1,145
178.9776
0.000

100
922

100
85

100
1,164

While fleshing out denominational differences is useful in understanding the role that
religious groups play in shaping public opinion. Indeed, it can be problematic to measure the
include of religions solely based on religious traditions. To exemplify this point, in Table 4.2, I
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outline the within denominational differences among Protestants regarding policy attitudes
toward abortion (χ2 = 188.0717, Prob( χ2) = 0.000) and same-sex marriage (χ2 = 133.0976, Prob
(χ2) = 0.000). For example, there is large variation in opinion regarding abortion as it relates to
whether abortion should be allowed under any circumstances. Evangelical Protestants are the
group most against abortion (nearly 27%) followed by black Protestants (nearly 16%) and
mainline Protestants ( nearly 7%). Conversely, 19% of evangelical Protestants believe that
abortion should be allowed in all circumstances, compared to over 43% of mainline Protestants
and 52% of black Protestants who believe in unrestricted abortion. Similarly, mainline
Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical Protestants hold differing views regarding samesex marriage. Evangelical Protestants report support for no legal recognition (40%); on the other
hand, many mainline Protestants (nearly 60%) and black Protestants (nearly 46%) believe that
same-sex marriages should be allowed.
These preliminary results demonstrate that there are noteworthy within-denominational
differences and it is important to account for these differences in the overall models. I posit that
religious belonging—denominational affiliations within and among religious traditions—
contributes to moral policy opinions. Specifically, there are key differences in moral policy
opinions among mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants and Non-Hispanic and Hispanic
Catholics.
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Table 4.2 distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage among Protestants, 2016 ANES
Mainline
Protestants

Evangelical
Protestants

Black
Protestants

Abortion
Never allowed

6.59%

26.77%

15.74%

Rape, incest, life of
the mother

26.69%

37.88%

18.30%

Many reasons

18.37%

16.50%

13.62%

All circumstances

48.35%

18.86%

52.34%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
557
188.0717
0.000

100
594

100
235

Same-sex Marriage
No legal recognition

14.06%

40.07%

37.02%

Civil Union

26.91%

28.62%

17.45%

Marriage allowed

59.03%

31.31%

45.53%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
576
133.0976
0.000

100
594

100
235

4.2.2. Religious Behaving
I use worship attendance as the key indicator of religious behaving in the models. Other
components of religious behaving include (1) religious contributions, (2) religious activity or
participation not including worship attendance, (3) frequency of prayer, and (4) participation in a
religious conversion. However, worship attendance has been found to be a strong general
indicator of religious behaving, so for the sake of brevity I focus attention on this variable.
Scholars have demonstrated that those individuals who attend church more frequently often hold
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more conservative moral policy opinions. Based on these findings, I argue that religious
behaving—measured as religious participation or activity—contributes to moral policy opinions.
Those individuals who exhibit greater religious behaving will hold more conservative moral
policy opinions.
In Table 4.3, I demonstrate significant differences between church attenders and non-church
among the various religious traditions. Indeed, differences among church attenders and nonchurch attenders exist among all reported religious traditions—Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and
other religious adherents—regarding opinions on abortion policy and same-sex marriage. Among
church attenders, Protestants, Catholics, Jewish, and other religious adherents report that
abortion should be legal in all circumstances less frequently than those non-church attenders.
This is especially true for Protestants and Catholic identifiers. In addition, church attenders are
less likely to report that same-sex marriage should be allowed than those non-church attenders.
Indeed, the number of Protestants, Catholics, and other religious individuals nearly doubled in
their approval of same-sex marriage among non-church attenders. The distribution of attitudes
toward abortion policy among church attenders (χ2 = 55.7687, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) and non-church
attenders (χ2 = 21.1328, Prob(χ2) = 0.012) and the distribution of attitudes toward same-sex
marriage among church attenders (χ2 = 124.9176, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) and non-church attenders (χ2 =
33.5340, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) is statistically significant.
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Table 4.3 distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage among church attenders and non-church attenders, 2016 ANES
Church attenders
Non-church attenders
Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Never allowed

19.58%

14.91%

4.35%

18.74%

5.86%

7.93%

2.63%

9.73%

Rape, incest,
life of mother

33.88%

36.58%

10.87%

28.74%

24.27%

22.76%

5.26%

21.81%

Many reasons

16.83%

14.44%

10.87%

14.83%

18.41%

14.83%

5.26%

14.77%

All
circumstances

29.70%

34.07%

73.91%

37.70%

51.46%

54.48%

86.84%

53.69%

100
637

100
46

100
870

100
290

100
38

100
298

Abortion

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
909
55.7689
0.000

100
239
21.1328
0.012

Same-sex
marriage
No legal
recognition

27.78%

12.66%

8.70%

32.49%

11.76%

5.52%

2.56%

14.72%

Civil Union

33.85%

32.28%

17.38%

21.39%

26.05%

19.66%

2.56%

16.72%

Marriage
allowed

38.37%

55.06%

73.91%

46.13%

62.18%

74.83%

94.87%

68.56%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
907
124.9176
0.000

100
632

100
46

100
865

100
290

100
39

100
299
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100
238
33.5340
0.000

4.2.3. Religious Believing
The effects of religious beliefs are less documented than the effects of the religious
belonging and religious behaving dimensions of religion. However, scholars have noted
differences among those individuals who hold traditional or conservative religious beliefs. In
Table 4.4, I present bivariate results of religious belief differences including biblical literalism
and religious importance in the models.
Biblical literalism is associated with negative attitudes toward abortion (χ2 = 952.2676,
Prob(χ2) = 0.000) and sex-sex marriage legislation (χ2 = 1.0003, Prob(χ2) = 0.000). Individuals
who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God report approval for abortion in all
circumstances (19.88%) significantly less than those individuals who believe that the Bible is not
the literal word of God (75%). Similar attitudes are reported for beliefs concerning the legality of
same-sex marriage. Twenty-eight percent of people who believe that the Bible is the literal word
of God report supporting same-sex marriage; whereas, 83% of individuals who do not believe
that the Bible is the literal word of God support same-sex marriage. Overall, biblical literalism
plays a significant role in attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage
In addition, individuals who consider religious salient or an important part of their day to
day lives are generally unfavorable of abortion in all circumstances or believe that abortion
should only be legal in specific circumstances such as rape, incest, or life of the mother (χ2 =
556.4358, Prob(χ2) = 0.000). Religious importance is also related to opinions on same-sex
marriage. Those who believe that religion is important report unfavorable opinions on allowing
gay and lesbian couples to marry (χ2 = 515.5731, Prob(χ2) = 0.000). Conversely, individuals who
do not consider religion an important part of their daily life are more favorable toward the
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legality of abortion in all circumstances (nearly 70%) and allowing same-sex couples to marry
(nearly 82%).
Based on these preliminary findings, I argue that individuals who have conservative
religious beliefs will also have conservative moral or value-based policy opinions.
4.2.4. Summary
The purpose of the bivariate analyses is to demonstrate the core differences among the
three religious dimensions and build on my argument regarding the importance of measuring the
three dimensions of religion separately in empirical analyses concerning moral or value-based
policy opinions. In the following section, I provide additional evidence to support this claim via
full statistical models that capture the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and
religious believing on a series of moral policy opinions.
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Table 4.4 distribution of attitudes toward abortion and same-sex marriage by biblical literalism and religious importance, 2016 ANES
Biblical Literalism

Religious Importance

Not the Word
of God

Word of God but
not Literally

Literal Word
of God

Not Important

Important

Never allowed

2.71%

8.14%

29.37%

3.30%

18.09%

Rape, incest, life of mother

8.89%

28.51%

38.85%

13.63%

33.41%

Many reasons

13.04%

17.21%

11.90%

13.83%

15.06%

All circumstances

75.36%

46.14%

19.88%

69.24%

33.44%

Abortion

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
1,035
952.2676
0.000

100
1,929

100
1,201

100
1,453
556.4358
0.000

100
2,742

Same-sex marriage
No legal recognition

4.44%

9.76%

44.14%

5.97%

24.88%

Civil Union

11.96%

26.98%

27.51%

12.22%

29.31%

Marriage allowed

83.61%

63.26%

28.35%

81.81%

45.80%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
1,037
1.0e+03
0.000

100
1,185
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100
1,185

100
1,457
515.5731
0.000

100
2,792

4.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models
In this section I present empirical results for a series of logit and ordered logit models
relating to a range of moral policy preferences. I start with Table 4.5, in which I report the results
for the ordered logistic estimates for moral policy opinions concerning LGBTQ issues using
2016 American National Election Survey data: (1) legality of same-sex marriage, (2) gay and
lesbian job discrimination, (3) same-sex adoption, (4) service to same-sex couples, and (5)
transgender bathrooms. In Table 4.7, I report the results for the ordered logit estimates for moral
policy opinions concerning (6) abortion policy and (7) support for the death penalty. In a
separate set of analyses, I report the results for ordered logistic and logistic estimates for moral
policy opinions using 2016 General Social Survey data (Table 4.9). In the second set of analyses
I am concerned with providing an additional set of moral policy opinions: (8) legality of assisted
suicide, (9) approval of sex education in public schools, (10) favorability of pornography laws,
and (11) approval of prayer in public schools. I also present results from two sets of analyses that
serve as supplemental data to the models using 2016 ANES data. I report findings from public
opinion on two moral policy issues: (12) legality of same-sex marriage and (13) support for the
death penalty. Each model demonstrates public opinion regarding a moral or values-based issue
as a function of religious belonging, religious behaving, and/or religious believing. In addition, I
include in all models a set of standard political control variables such as partisan identification
and political ideology, as well as socioeconomic and demographic control variables such as age,
gender, race, marital status, and income.
Because some of my hypotheses about specific coefficients involve directional
hypotheses while others involve non-directional hypotheses, I report results from one-tailed and
two-tailed hypothesis tests, where appropriate. My overall argument is that religious belonging,
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behaving, and believing influence moral policy opinions. I also contend that there are differences
among and within the religious denominations and traditions (religious belonging).
4.3.1. Religious Belonging
What is the effect of religious belonging on attitudes towards moral policies? The first set
of analyses pertaining to LGBTQ issues is presented in Models 1-5 in Table 4.5. Here I find
evidence that religious belonging influences public opinion on LGBTQ policies, controlling for
the effects of other religion, political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables. There are
several noteworthy findings. First, evangelical Protestants are less likely than other religious
groups and the religiously unaffiliated to favor the legalization of same-sex marriage (b = -0.313,
z = -1.83). Second, Catholics (b = 0.302, z = 1.86) and Hispanic Catholics (b = 0.662, z = 2.46)
are more likely to favor and support policies allowing gays and lesbians to marry than other
religious groups and those who report having no religious affiliation. Third, Hispanic Catholics
are also more likely to strongly favor antidiscrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians (b =
0.491, z = 1.73) Fourth, mainline Protestants and Catholics are significantly more likely to
believe that government policies should allow gay and lesbian couples to adopt (Mainline
Protestants: b = 0.696, z = 3.35; Catholics: b = 0.576, z = 2.88) Fifth, mainline Protestants,
Catholics, and Jewish adherents are more likely to support required service to gay and lesbian
couples (Mainline Protestants b = 0.437, z = 3.37; Catholics b = 0.459, z = 3.76; Jewish
b = 0.486; z = 1.82) than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Finally,
regarding transgender bathrooms, evangelicals (b = -0.484, z = -3.34) and Hispanic Catholics (b
= -0.429, z = -1.83) are significantly less likely than other religious groups and the religiously
unaffiliated to believe that transgender persons should be allowed to use their bathroom of
choice; whereas, Jewish individuals are more likely to support transgender bathroom of choice (b
= 0.869, z = 2.96). Generally, these findings add support to preexisting research and Hypotheses
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1 presented in Chapter 2. All five LGBTQ moral policy issues reveal some significant
differences among religious denominations and those who are religiously unaffiliated.
In Table 4.6, I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting
same-sex marriage. The predicted probabilities are calculated by setting one religious tradition
equal to 1, setting all other religious traditions equal to 0, and setting the other variables equal to
their means. For example, the value presented for evangelical Protestants supporting no legal
recognition of same-sex marriage is 0.221, when all other religious traditions are equal to 0. In
this discussion, I draw attention to the statistically significant coefficients reported in Table 4.5.
Among evangelical Protestants, the probability of supporting same-sex marriage is 0.518 and the
probability of being religiously unaffiliated and supporting same-sex marriage is 0.571. Thus,
there is a difference of .053 among evangelical Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated where
evangelicals are less likely to support same-sex marriage than the religiously unaffiliated.
Conversely, Catholics (0.621) and Hispanic Catholics (0.678) are more likely to support samesex marriage than the religiously unaffiliated (0.571). While the differences between the various
religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated are not large, the underlying coefficients for
these variables are statistically significant.
In the next set of models presented in Table 4.7, I demonstrate the effect of religious
belonging on public opinion concerning the legality of abortion (Model 6) and public opinion on
capital punishment or the death penalty (Model 7). Like the findings that I present in Table 4.5,
there are key differences among religious denominations. First, mainline Protestants are more
supportive of abortion rights (b = 0.518, z = 3.49) than other religious groups and the religiously
unaffiliated. Next, mainline Protestants (b = 0.295, z = 2.13) and evangelical Protestants (b =
0.330, z = 2.15) are more likely to support the death penalty than other religious and nonreligious
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groups. Jewish adherents are significantly less likely to support the death penalty (b= -0.476, z =
-1.86).
In Table 4.8, I report the predicted probabilities among the religious traditions and their
support for abortion legislation. As one can see, there are little differences among the religious
groups regarding abortion. Relying on Model (6) presented in Table 4.7, the coefficient for
mainline Protestant (b = 0.518, z = 3.48) is statistically significant. Thus, among mainline
Protestants, the probability of supporting abortion in all circumstances is 0.538 and the
probability of being religiously unaffiliated and supporting abortion in all circumstances is 0.450.
There is a difference of .088 between mainline Protestant and secular support for abortion policy.
There are no other statistically significant coefficient among the religious belonging variables
relating to the legality of abortion.
What about the effect of religious belonging on other moral/values-based issues? Using
2016 GSS data, I analyze several moral or values-based issues including public opinion toward
sex-education in public schools (Model 8), legality of assisted suicide (Model 9), support for
laws that restrict the distribution of pornography (Model 10), and prayer in public schools
(Model 11), legality of same-sex marriage (Model 12), and capital punishment (Model 13).
Similar to the results presented in Table 4.9, there are a few key differences among the religious
denominations. First, Catholics are less likely to support sex education in public schools (b
= -1.658, z = -1.72); whereas, Hispanic Catholics are more likely to favor sex education in public
schools (b = 2.312; z = 2.33) than the religiously unaffiliated. This finding highlights the
importance of among and within denominational differences. Second, Catholics (b = -0.878, z =
-1.92) are less likely to support laws against the distribution of pornography in all cases. Third,
black Protestants are less likely to approve of court ruling that no government may require the
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reading of the Lord’s Prayer or Bible verses in public schools (b = -0.689, z = -1.70).7 Lastly,
mainline Protestants (b = 0.420, z = 1.95) and other religious traditions (b = 0.953,z = 2.03) are
more likely to favor the death penalty for persons who are convicted of murder. The variable
fundamental represents whether respondents’ religious denominations are fundamental,
moderate, or liberal. Based on previous research and prior analysis, I argue that those who have
a fundamental religious denomination will be more likely to support the death penalty than those
who have moderate or liberal religious traditions. This coefficient for this variable is both
positive and statistically significant ( b = 0.181, z = 1.74).
Taken together, the results of Models 1 through Model 13 demonstrate key differences
between and among religious traditions or denominations and highlights the influence of
religious belonging on moral policy opinions. While the coefficients were not (always) in the
expected direction—especially as it relates to Hispanic Catholics—these findings are significant
in that they demonstrate the importance of considering the effects of religious belonging on
Americans moral policy attitudes. Among and within denominational differences remain an
important aspect in understanding the influence of religion in American public opinion.

Note: a high value on the variable “prayer” represents unfavorable sentiments of government required prayer in
schools.
7
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Table 4.5 Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
Model (4)
Same-sex Marriage
Discrimination
Adoption
Service
b

z

b

Belonging
Mainline
B. Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic

z

b

z

0.265
0.074
-0.313
0.302

1.58
0.27
-1.83*
1.86*

0.261
0.26
-0.029
0.18

1.64
0.97
-0.18
1.19

0.696
0.333
-0.086
0.576

H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other Religion

0.662
0.071
0.444
0.347

2.46**
0.44
1.07
1.53

0.491
0.119
0.617
0.355

1.73*
0.77
1.48
1.60

Behaving
Attendance
Contributions

-0.239
0.008

-6.60***
0.08

-0.192
0.122

Believing
Importance

0.188

1.06

Guidance
Biblical Literalism

-0.259
-0.633

Spirituality

Model (5)
Bathrooms

b

z

b

3.35***
1.10
-0.42
2.88**

0.437
0.216
-0.133
0.459

3.37***
0.96
-0.92
3.76***

-0.015
-0.124
-0.484
-0.032

-0.11
-0.54
-3.34***
-0.26

0.174
0.25
-0.021
0.44

0.56
1.28
-0.05
1.62

0.129
-0.029
0.486
0.202

0.56
-0.23
1.82*
1.21

-0.429
-0.168
0.869
0.18

-1.83*
-1.30
2.96**
1.07

-5.18***
1.23

-0.213
0.105

-5.02***
0.89

-0.177
-0.225

-5.40***
-2.61**

-0.065
0.004

-1.94*
0.05

0.264

1.51

0.38

1.72

0.504

3.47***

0.000

0.00

-3.90***
-8.31***

0.002
-0.391

0.03
-5.14***

-0.241
-0.691

-3.00**
-7.67***

-0.294
-0.277

-4.92***
-4.23***

-0.073
-0.485

-1.21
-7.22***

-0.024

-0.45

0.076

1.52

-0.04

-0.63

-0.030

-0.66

0.028

0.60

Political Variables
Identification

-0.133

-5.32***

-0.177

-7.13***

-0.104

-3.60***

-0.217

-10.14***

-0.169

-7.82***

Ideology

-0.36

-9.24***

-0.27

-7.03***

-0.367

-7.97***

-0.338

-10.56***

-0.454

-13.89***
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z

Model (1)
Same-sex Marriage
b

z

Model (2)
Discrimination
b

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married
Black
Hispanic

-0.161
-0.747
-0.546

-1.84
-3.67***
-2.99**

-0.155
-0.271
0.076

Asian
Gender
Age
Education
Income

-0.647
0.343
-0.015
0.099
0.030

-2.76**
4.24***
-6.22***
3.54***
5.16***

-0.169
0.180
-0.001
0.112
0.027

N
Pseudo R2
χ2
Prob χ2

3,285
0.22
1375.13
.0000

z

Model (3)
Adoption

Model (4)
Service

b

z

b

-1.79
-1.33
0.41

-0.14
-0.797
-0.504

-1.33
-3.50***
-2.43*

-0.122
0.158
0.060

-1.65
0.92
0.38

-0.141
-0.422
0.095

-1.87
-2.40*
0.60

-0.72
2.24*
-0.44
4.01***
4.66***

-0.433
0.352
-0.016
0.032
0.039

-1.51
3.63***
-5.72***
0.97
5.49***

-0.045
0.306
-0.004
0.014
0.006

-0.23
4.44***
-1.97*
0.58
1.24

-0.488
0.338
-0.004
0.115
0.020

-2.57**
4.85***
-1.78
4.76***
3.91***

3,275
0.101
636.20
.0000

3,254
0.234
867.16
.0000
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z

Model (5)
Bathrooms

3,266
0.125
1300.95
.0000

b

z

3,201
0.139
1428.02
.0000

Table 4.6. Predicted probabilities for same-sex marriage associated with religious denominations
Same-sex marriage
Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christians
Jewish
Other religion
Secular

No legal recognition

Civil Union

Support

0.154
0.175
0.221
0.151
0.117
0.175
0.137
0.146
0.183

0.231
0.242
0.261
0.229
0.205
0.242
0.220
0.226
0.246

0.615
0.583
0.518
0.621
0.678
0.583
0.664
0.628
0.571
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Table 4.7. Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of
moral policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (6)
Model (7)
Abortion
Death Penalty
b

z

b

z

Belonging
Mainline

0.518

3.49***

0.295

2.13*

B. Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other Religion

0.244
-0.118
-0.141
0.240
0.041
0.526
-0.107

0.96
-0.78
-1.02
1.01
0.28
1.49
-0.55

0.140
0.330
-0.012
0.204
0.072
-0.476
-0.138

0.61
2.15*
-0.10
0.86
0.53
-1.86*
-0.80

Behaving
Attendance
Contributions

-0.227
-0.167

-6.89***
-1.87*

-0.115
-0.253

-3.30***
-2.75**

0.085
-0.238

0.54
-3.91***

0.556
-0.245

3.55***
-3.84***

-0.638
0.246

-9.13***
4.96***

0.159
-0.056

2.29*
-1.12

Political Variables
Identification
-0.125
Ideology
-0.335

-5.58***
-9.62***

0.164
0.316

7.33***
9.52***

Believing
Importance
Guidance
Biblical
Literalism
Spirituality

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Gender

-0.184
0.544
-0.530
-0.137
0.093

-2.32*
2.76**
-3.21***
-0.66
1.27

0.144
-0.298
-0.465
-0.063
-0.158

1.85
-1.75
-2.88**
-0.33
-2.18*

Age
Education
Income

0.010
0.159
0.028

4.56***
6.27***
5.22***

0.003
-0.195
0.010

1.22
-7.77***
1.95

N
Pseudo R2
χ2
Prob ( χ2 )

3,291
0.191
1570.70
.0000

3,260
0.088
689.92
.0000
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Table 4.8. Predicted probabilities for abortion attitudes associated with religious denominations
Abortion

Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Secular

No
circumstance

Rape, incest, life
of mother

Many reasons

All circumstances

0.089
0.110
0.142
0.114
0.110
0.127
0.089
0.141
0.131

0.226
0.248
0.276
0.277
0.249
0.264
0.225
0.275
0.267

0.147
0.150
0.152
0.152
0.150
0.152
0.147
0.152
0.152

0.538
0.492
0.431
0.427
0.491
0.457
0.539
0.432
0.450
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Table 4.9 Ordered Logistic and Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions, 2016 GSS data
Model (8)
Sex Education
b

z

Model (9)
Assisted Suicide
b

z

Belonging
M. Protestant
B. Protestant

0.406
0.354

0.73
0.57

0.391
-0.206

1.13
-0.51

Evangelical

-0.075

-0.14

-0.138

-0.43

Catholic
H. Catholic
Jewish

-1.658
2.312
-

-1.72*
2.33**
-

0.093
-0.485
-0.013

0.16
-0.86
-0.02

Other
Fundamental

0.269
0.109

0.22
0.51

0.224
-0.026

0.33
-0.19

Behaving
Attendance

-0.069

-1.07

-0.068

Activity
Prayer
Save soul

-0.068
0.071
-0.114

-1.1
0.64
-0.36

Life after death
Literalism
God

-0.173
-0.043
-0.005

Religiosity
Spirituality

Model (10)
Pornography Laws
b
-0.106
0.190

z

Model (11)
Prayer
b

z

Model (12)
Same-sex Marriage
b

z

Model (13)
Death Penalty
b
0.42
0.069

z

-0.41
0.50

-0.262
-0.689

-0.98
-1.70*

0.211
-0.142

0.92
-0.43

1.95*
0.23

0.023

0.09

-0.420

-1.40

-0.246

-1.02

0.203

0.90

-0.878
0.741
-0.755

-1.92*
1.60
-1.34

0.165
-0.676
0.315

0.32
-1.33
0.50

0.224
-0.002
0.900

0.59
0.00
1.63

-0.052
0.128
-0.098

-0.14
0.35
-0.24

-0.312
-0.116

-0.57
-0.99

-1.007
0.117

-1.59
0.89

-0.467
-0.086

-1.26
-0.81

0.953
0.181

2.03*
1.74*

-1.78*

0.042

1.18

0.047

1.19

-0.134

-4.40***

-0.08

-2.68**

-0.058
-0.030
-0.299

-1.47
-0.42
-1.56

0.166
-0.047
0.225

4.47***
-0.81
1.37

-0.012
-0.148
-0.002

-0.28
-2.49**
-0.01

-0.008
0.036
-0.465

-0.27
0.69
-3.33***

-0.039
-0.063
-0.07

-1.31
-1.31
-0.51

-0.45
-0.18
-0.03

-0.064
-0.513
0.096

-0.25
-3.43***
1.07

-0.146
0.310
0.017

-0.75
2.40**
0.25

-0.035
-0.618
-0.168

-0.17
-4.52***
-2.40**

0.421
-0.556
-0.096

2.41*
-5.04***
-1.55

0.121
0.192
0.062

0.76
1.81*
1.12

0.241

1.42

-0.177

-1.62

0.104

1.09

-0.064

-0.60

-0.001

-0.02

0.025

0.31

-0.152

-0.84

-0.163

-1.45

0.028

0.30

0.033

0.33

0.051

0.64

-0.193

-2.60**

-3.88***
-4.16***

-0.104
-0.167

-2.36*
-2.76**

-0.061
0.269

-1.56
4.92***

-0.062
-0.194

-1.46
-3.37***

-0.16
-0.33

-4.88***
-7.05***

0.156
0.239

4.93***
5.48***

Believing

Political Variables
Identification
-0.273
Ideology
-0.411
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Model (8)
Sex Education

Model (9)
Assisted Suicide

Model (10)
Pornography Laws

Model (11)
Prayer

Model (12) Samesex Marriage
z

Model (13)
Death Penalty

b

z

b

z

b

z

b

z

b

b

z

Married
Black
Hispanic

-0.782
-1.069
0.576

-2.62**
-1.99*
0.74

-0.375
-0.948
-0.289

-2.09*
-2.61**
-0.75

0.388
-0.879
0.203

2.59**
-2.63
0.67

0.102
0.162
0.091

0.63
0.48
0.25

-0.285
-0.474
-0.225

-2.17*
-1.68
-0.83

0.024
-0.695
-0.16

0.19
-2.80**
-0.62

Gender

-0.071

-0.29

-0.352

-2.25*

0.791

5.77***

-0.133

-0.92

0.437

3.69***

-0.335

-3.03**

Age
Education
Income
Constant

-0.021
0.602
0.147
5.200

-2.71**
4.87***
1.66
4.52

-0.011
0.090
0.106
3.973

-2.19
1.13
1.89
5.54

0.015
-0.112
-0.134

3.60***
-1.63
-2.77**

-0.013
0.403
0.030
0.883

-2.77**
5.21***
0.58
1.47

-0.023
0.188
0.128

-6.40***
3.27***
2.99**

-0.002
-0.169
0.049
-0.475

-0.69
-2.98**
1.23
-1.00

Socioeconomic/
Demographic

N
Pseudo- R2
χ2
Prob (χ2)

1,223
0.229

1,229
0.214

1,285
0.155

1,213
0.224

1,237
0.178

1,815
0.115

152.79
.0000

300.77
.0000

302.78
.0000

376.00
.0000

665.83
.0000

276.48
.0000
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4.3.2. Religious Behaving
The second dimension of religion that I am interested exploring is religious behaving. I
have measured religious behaving as (1) worship or service attendance, and (2) religious
contributions in Models 1-7 using 2016 ANES data. Using 2016 GSS data, I include (1) worship
attendance, (2) religious activity other than worship attendance, (3) frequency of prayer, and (4)
whether an individual has urged someone to accept Jesus as savior.
Across all 2016 ANES moral policy issues, service attendance has a statistically
significant effect on the dependent variables in the models. From Table 4.5 one can see that those
who attend religious services more frequently are less likely to support LGBTQ issues across the
policy spectrum. Frequent worship attenders are less likely than those who do not attend worship
services to believe that gays and lesbians should be allowed to legally marry (b = -0.239, z = 6.60), less likely to strongly favor anti-discrimination laws that protect gays and lesbians from
job discrimination (b = -0.192, z = -5.18), less likely to believe that gay and lesbian couples
should be legally permitted to adopt children (b = -0.213, z = -5.02), less likely to believe in
requiring business owners to provide services to gay and lesbian couples (b = -0.177, z = -5.40)
and less likely to support transgender people being allowed to use the bathroom of their
identified gender rather than the gender that they were born (b = -0.065, z = -1.94).
In Figure 4.1 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome on the
dependent variable, same-sex marriage. The solid lines represented the predicted probability of
supporting same-sex marriage, supporting civil unions, or favoring no legal recognition of samesex marriages. The dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. Support for same-sex
marriage decreases from nearly 72% to approximately 50% as frequency of service attendance
increases. Conversely, support for no legal recognition increases from almost 7% to nearly 16%
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as the frequency of service attendance increases. In a similar pattern, support for civil unions
increases from 22% to nearly 35% as frequency of service attendance increases. This suggests
that frequent service attenders are overall less likely to support same-sex marriage than nonfrequent attenders. However, frequency of service attendance is also related to an increase in

.8

support for civil unions.

.4

.6

Support same-sex marriage

.2

Support civil unions

0

No legal recognition

0

1

2
Church Attendance

3

4

Figure 4.1. Attitudes toward same-sex marriage by service attendance

Furthermore (Table 4.7), frequent service attenders are less likely to support abortion
rights (b = -0.227, z = -6.89) in all circumstances than non-frequent service attenders and less
likely to support capital punishment (b = -0.115, z = -3.30) for convicted murderers that nonfrequent service attenders. In this dataset, regular service attenders express consistent pro-life
opinions. I demonstrate these findings in Figure 4.2. Here I report the predicted probabilities
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associated with each outcome on the dependent variable, abortion. Support for abortion being
legal in all circumstances decreases from nearly 53% to 31% as frequency of service attendance
increases. Frequent service attenders are also more likely to support abortion never being legal
than non-frequent service attenders. Indeed, the predicted probability increases from nearly 5%
to nearly 11% as service attendance increases. Approval for the legality of abortion in cases such
as rape, incest, and life of the mother increase as service attendance increase, moving from
nearly 22% to nearly 37%. However, there is little change among the frequency of church
attendance on abortion being permitted in many circumstances. In sum, frequent service
attenders are less likely to support abortion in all circumstances and more likely to support
abortion never being legal than non-frequent service attenders. Frequent attenders are also more

.6

likely to support abortion policies in cases such as rape, incest, and life of the mother.

.4

All circumstances

.2

Specific reasons

Many reasons

0

Never legal

0

1

2
Church attendance

3

Figure 4.2. Attitudes toward abortion by service attendance
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The religious contributions variable also has a negative effect on public opinion toward
requiring service to gay and lesbian couples, abortion, and the death penalty. Those who
contribute to religious organizations are less likely to believe in required service to gay and
lesbian couples (b = -0.225, z = -2.61), less likely to believe in the legality of abortion (b
= -0.167, z = -1.87), and less likely to favor the death penalty (b = -0.253, z = -2.75). Clearly,
individuals who are active in attending worship services and in making contributions to religious
organizations strongly favor morally conservative public policies.
Using 2016 GSS data, I further explore the effects of religious behaving on a series of
social values or moral/based policy issues using worship attendance as well as other measures of
religious behaving including religious activity, frequency of prayer and soul conversion.
Religious activity is a variable that ranges from 0 to 9 where high values represent frequent
participation in church organization activities and low values represent never participating in
religious organization activities. Frequency of payer measures how often individuals pray. High
values denote daily prayer and low values denote no prayer. The variable save soul represents
whether the respondent has ever tried to encourage someone to believe in or accept Jesus Christ
as savor (1 = yes, 0 = no). Similar to the models using 2016 ANES data, I find that there are
significant and negative effects of service attendance on public opinion regarding same-sex
marriage and the death penalty. Those individuals who attend worship services more frequently
are less likely to support assisted suicide (b = -0,068, z = -1.78), less likely to support the legality
of same-sex marriage (b = -0.134, z = 4.40) and less likely to support the death penalty for
convicted murderers (b = -0.080, z = -2.68). In addition, those who participate in religious
activity are more likely to favor pornography laws (b = 0.166, z = 4.47) than those individuals
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who do not participate in religious activity in addition to worship attendance. Frequency of
prayer is positively related to government policy on regulation of prayer in public schools. Those
who pray more frequently are less likely to support the Supreme Court ruling that no state or
local government may require prayer in public schools (b = -0.148, z = -2.49). Lastly, those
individuals who have reported being involved in attempting to save someone’s soul by speaking
to them about God or Jesus are less likely to support same-sex marriage legislation (b = -0.465, z
= -3.33).
The effect of the religious behaving variables is not consistent across all dependent
variables, however, there is some effect of religious behaving on the various dependent variables
(except for attitudes toward sex education). In general, those who exhibit greater levels of
religious behavior are more likely to hold conservative viewpoints on moral policy issues,
controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. This point highlights the
importance of including the second dimension of religion—religious behaving—in future
research.
While the results of the models show that religious behaving influences how one views
moral or values-based policy issues, there is some inconsistences among 2016 ANES and 2016
GSS data. To address this issue, I have conducted a factor analysis of the religious behaving
variables and find that these variables load sufficiently on a single factor (Eigelvalue = 2.424;
variance explained = 1.750). Based on these factor analysis results, I create a “religious
behavior” variable and substitute it into my models using GSS data. Religious behavior includes
service attendance, religious activity, frequency of prayer, and talking to someone about Jesus
being the savior.
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In Table 4.10 I present the results from the models including the religious behavior
variable. Overall, the results are similar to the results that I presented in Table 4.9. It is important
to note that the effect of the religious behavior variable is statistically significant and in the
expected direction for all but one of the dependent variables (prayer). Religiously active
individuals are less likely to support sex-education in schools (b = -0.389, z= -1.88) and less
likely to believe in assisted medical suicide (b = -0.491, z = -3.87) than those individuals who are
less religiously active. In addition, an increase in religious behavior yields an increase in public
opinion toward government policy that restricts the distribution of pornography (b = 0.625, z =
5.41), controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Lastly, religiously active
individuals are less likely to support same-sex marriage legislation (b = -0.558, z = -5.48) and
capital punishment (b = -0.435, z = -4.45), than less religiously active individuals. These results
are consistent with previous research and demonstrate the importance of including religious
behaving when modelling attitudes toward moral or value-based policy opinions.
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Table 4.10 Ordered Logistic and Logistic Regression estimates for models of moral policy opinions using religious activity score, 2016 GSS data

Model (8a)
Sex Education
b
Belonging
M. Protestant
B. Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
H. Catholic
Jewish
Other
Fundamental
Behaving

z

Model (9a)
Assisted Suicide

Model (10a)
Pornography
Laws

Model (11a)
Prayer
b

z

b

z

b

z

z

Model (12a)
Same-sex
Marriage

Model (13a)
Death Penalty

b

z

b

1.15
-0.48
-0.49
0.22
-0.90
0.00
0.32
-0.23

-0.131
0.186
0.022
-0.950
0.759
-0.661
-0.320
-0.118

-0.51
0.49
0.09
-2.09*
1.64
-1.17
-0.59
-1.02

-0.284
-0.660
-0.411
0.116
-0.616
0.386
-1.099
0.126

-1.07
-1.64
-1.39
0.23
-1.22
0.62
-1.71
0.96

0.225
-0.125
-0.311
0.185
0.015
0.904
-0.428
-0.091

0.99
-0.38
-1.30
0.49
0.04
1.65
-1.17
-0.85

0.403
0.044
0.210
-0.095
0.145
-0.113
0.942
0.181

1.88*
0.15
0.93
-0.26
0.40
-0.28
2.01*
1.78*

3.87***

0.625

5.41***

-0.028

-0.22

-0.558

-5.48***

-0.435

-4.45***

-0.189

-0.98

-0.085

-0.41

0.482

2.79**

0.122

0.77

0.289
-0.025

2.25*
-0.38

-0.617
-0.195

-4.53***
-2.85**

-0.553
-0.078

-5.03***
-1.30

0.192
0.062

1.82*
1.14

0.431
0.316
-0.052
-1.560
2.241

0.78
0.52
-0.10
-1.64
2.28**

0.289
0.113

0.24
0.53

0.396
-0.194
-0.156
0.125
-0.503
0.003
0.218
-0.031

Activity
Believing
Life after
death

-0.389

-1.88

-0.491

-0.130

-0.34

-0.055

Literalism
God

-0.044
0.027

-0.19
0.19

-0.513
0.098

-0.22
3.43***
1.13

Religiosity
0.246
Spirituality
-0.112
Political Variables
Identification -0.272

1.47
-0.64

-0.174
-0.156

-1.60
-1.42

0.071
-0.004

0.76
-0.04

-0.076
-0.029

-0.72
-0.31

-0.004
0.084

-0.05
1.09

0.021
-0.194

0.26
-2.67**

-3.88***

-0.106

-2.42*

-0.066

-1.69*

-0.064

-1.52

-0.166

-5.10***

0.155

4.94***

Ideology

-4.19***

-0.165

-2.74**

0.265

4.85***

-0.198

-3.44***

-0.328

-7.02***

0.239

5.48***

-0.412

Table 4.10, continued
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Model (8a)
Sex Education
b

z

Model (9a)
Assisted Suicide
b

Model (13a)
Death Penalty
B

b

z

b

-2.08
-2.65**
-0.77

0.400
-0.878
0.187

2.68*
-2.65*
0.62

0.094
0.089
0.136

0.58
0.26
0.38

-0.298
-0.464
-0.223

-2.28*
-1.64
-0.83

0.023
-0.679
-0.162

0.20
-2.74**
-0.63

-0.344

-2.20*

0.737

5.47***

-0.176

-1.23

0.454

3.87***

-0.339

-3.09***

-0.010
0.090
0.105
3.538

-2.13*
1.15
1.89
6.24

0.014
-0.086
-0.133

3.37***
-1.27
-2.76**

-0.013
0.414
0.039
1.668

-2.98**
5.43***
0.76
3.55

-0.022
0.187
0.129

-6.07***
3.27***
3.02**

-0.003
-0.169
-0.048
-0.439

-0.77
-3.02***
1.19
-1.28

-2.58**
-1.89
0.71

-0.374
-0.954
-0.298

Gender

-0.042

-0.17

Age
Education
Income
Constant

-0.020
0.585
0.145
4.354

-2.66**
4.80***
1.64
4.78
1,223
0.227
151.52
.0000

Model (12a)
Same-sex
Marriage

z

-0.765
-1.002
0.552

N
Pseudo- R2
χ2
Prob (χ2)

Model 11(a)
Prayer

b

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married
Black
Hispanic

z

Model (10a)
Pornography
Laws

1,229
0.2133
300.25
.0000

1,285
0.149
292.41
.0000
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1,213
0.220
360.05
.0000

z

1,237
0.175
654.70
.0000

z

1,815
0.l143
275.63
.0000

4.3.3. Religious Believing
The last dimension of religion is religious believing. I have measured religious believing
as (1) religious importance, (2) religious guidance, (3) biblical literalism, and (4) spirituality in
the models using 2016 ANES data. Using 2016 GSS data, I measure religious believing as (1)
belief in life after death, (2) biblical literalism, (3) belief in God, (4) strength of religiosity, and
(5) strength of spirituality.8 The religious believing dimension of religion is perhaps the most
complex dimension. Religious individuals may exhibit strong conservative opinions on certain
policy issues and strong progressive opinions on other policy issues. One explanation of this is
that religious individuals use Jesus’ teachings and the interpretation of scripture in formulating
their policy opinions, but interpretations of Jesus’ teachings and interpretation of scripture will
vary across individuals and religious traditions.
I begin with Table 4.5 and the effects of religious importance on the series of LGBTQ
issues. Those who believe that religion is important in daily life are more likely to support
required services to gay and lesbian couples (b = 0.504, z = 3,47). Religious guidance in daily
life is, as expected, related to conservative opinions on the legality of same-sex marriage (b =
-0.259, z = -3.90), laws that permit gay and lesbians to adopt children (b = -0.241, z = -3.00), and
required service to same-sex couples (b = -0.294, z = -4.92). Notably biblical literalism has a
negative effect on all LGBTQ policy issues. Individuals who believe that the Bible is the literal

To remind the reader: Religious importance is coded 1 if religion is an important part of one’s daily life and 0 if
religion is not an important part of daily life. Religious guidance is measured using a 4-point scale ranging from 0 or
no guidance in day- to- day living, 1 some guidance in daily living, 2 quite a bit of guidance, to 3 or a great deal of
guidance in daily life. Biblical literalism captures one’s belief in whether the Bible is the literal word of God (coded
2), word of God but is not the literal word (coded 1), or not the word of God (coded 0). Spirituality is a
dichotomous variable coded 1 or spiritual and 0 or not spiritual. The variable life after death measures whether an
individual believes in a life after death (coded 1) or 0 otherwise. The variable God ranges from 0 to 5 where
respondents report no belief in God (coded 0), to complete belief in the existence of God (coded 5). Strength of
religiosity and strength of spirituality are 4-category variables that range from not religious/not spiritual (coded 0) to
very religious/very spiritual (coded 4).
8
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word of God are less likely to support gay and lesbian couples marrying (b = -0.633, z = -8.31),
less likely to favor laws that protect against discrimination of gay and lesbians (b = -0.391, z =
-5.14), less likely to believe in a law that permits same-sex couples to adopt (b = -0.691, z =
-7.67), less likely to support required service to gay and lesbian couples (b = -0.277, z = -4.23),
and less likely to support transgender persons using the bathroom of their choice (b = -0.485, z =
-7.22). As expected, biblical literalists hold conservative policy opinions; whereas, those who
have a more flexible interpretation of the Bible claim more progressive and pro-LGBTQ policy
stances.
As an example, in Figure 4.3 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each
outcome on the dependent variable, same-sex marriage. Nearly 72% of individuals who believe
that the Bible is not the word of God support same-sex marriage; whereas 61% of biblical
literalist support same-sex marriage. Support for civil unions and support for no legal recognition
of same-sex couples increases as values on the biblical literalism scale changes. In sum, there is
general support for the legality of same-sex marriage; however, biblical literalists are less likely
to approve of same-sex marriage than those who have more relaxed interpretations of the Bible.
In Table 4.7 I present the results of the effect of religions believing on abortion and
capital punishment. Those who believe that religion is an important part of their daily life are
more likely to support the death penalty (b = 0.556, z = 3.55), demonstrating conservative
sentiments toward end of life issues. The coefficient for religious guidance is negative and
statistically significant in both models. Those individuals who believe that religion provides a
great deal of guidance in their daily life are less likely to favor abortion related policies (b = 0.238, z = -3.91) and less likely to favor capital punishment on convicted murderers (b = -0.245,
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z = -3.84). This is consistent with a general pro-life view reflecting both anti-abortion and anti-

.8

death penalty sentiments.

.4

.6

support for same-sex marriage

.2

support for civil unions

0

no legal recognition

not the word of God

word of God, not literal

literal word of God

Figure 4.3. Attitudes toward same-sex marriage by biblical literalism

Biblical literalism is related to conservative abortion policy and capital punishment
polices. Respondents who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are less likely to
approve of abortion (b = -0.638, z = -9.13) and more likely to favor capital punishment (b =
0.159, z = 2.29) than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God.
In Figure 4.4 I show the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome of abortion
policy opinions. There is great variation among biblical literalists and those who believe that the
Bible is not the word of God. For example, 61% of those who have a more flexible interpretation
of the bible support abortion in all circumstances; whereas, 30% of biblical literalists support
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abortion in all cases. Interestingly, support for abortion in cases such as rape, incest, and life of
the mother increases as opinions on the interpretation of the Bible become stricter. Nearly 18%
of those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God support abortion in certain cases;
whereas, 37% of biblical literalists support abortion in certain circumstances. This is due in part
to the majority of those who have a flexible interpretation of the Bible already supporting
abortion in all circumstances.

.4

.6

All circumstances

.2

Specific reasons
Many reasons

0

Never legal

not the literal word of God

word of God, not literal

literal word of God

Figure 4.4. Attitudes toward abortion by biblical literalism

Another key finding in Table 4.7 is that spiritual individuals (b = 0.246, z = 4.96) are
more likely to support abortion rights, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the
models. This is consistent with the hypothesis that those who are spiritual will hold more liberal
moral policy opinions. Overall, the models using 2016 ANES data show that the religious
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believing dimension of religion has a significant (and general consistent) effect on moral policy
opinions.
The results of the 2016 GSS models that I present in Table 4.9 demonstrate that there are
again effects of religious believing on moral policy opinions, especially as it relates to biblical
literalism. Those individuals who believe that there is a life after death are more likely to support
same-sex marriage than those individuals who do not believe in life after death (b = 0.421, z =
2.41), controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. This finding is surprising in
that it is the only statistically significant result among the effects of belief in an afterlife on the
series of moral/values-based policy positions. In future projects, I will explore the effects of this
variable at greater length. There is reason to think that those who believe in a life after death will
be more likely to hold conservative policy opinions than those who do not believe in a life after
death, contrary to the findings presented in Table 4.9.
Similar to the findings presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.7, biblical literalists generally hold
conservative moral or values-based policy opinions. Biblical literalists are less likely to support
government laws that allow for medical assisted suicide (b = -0.513, z = -3.43), more likely to
support strict pornography distribution laws (b = 0.310, z = 2.40), less likely to support laws that
do not permit prayer in public schools (b = -0.618, z = -4.52), less likely to support same-sex
marriage (b = -0.556, z = 5.04). In contrast to previous findings, biblical literalists are more
likely to support the death penalty (b = 0.192; z = 1.81) than those who believe that the Bible is a
book of stories written by man. I suspect that this difference can be explained with additional
analyses. I maintain my argument that biblical literalists will generally hold more conservative
moral policy opinions.
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Belief in God is related to negative opinions about laws that do not permit prayer in
public schools (b = -0.168, z = -2.40). Those who believe in God are less likely to support prayer
restrictions in public schools than those individuals who do not believe in God. Lastly,
spirituality is negatively related to opinions on the death penalty. Spiritual individuals are less
likely to support the death penalty (b = -0.193, z = -2.60) than those individuals who do not
consider themselves spiritual. Overall, the models using GSS data add supporting evidence to
ANES models. Not only does religious believing influence public opinion on moral/values-based
issues, but also biblical literalism is consistently related to conservative moral policy opinions.
4.3.4. A Note on the effects of Control Variables
While the purpose of this chapter is on the influence of religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing on moral or value-based issues there are significant findings
relating to the control variables in the models. As expected, Republicans and conservatives are
more likely to hold conservative moral policy opinions than Democrats and liberals, controlling
for the effects of the other variables in the models. Republicans and conservatives are less likely
to support policies relating to LGBTQ issues and abortion rights policies; whereas Democrats
and liberals are more likely to support LGBTQ and abortion rights policies. Republicans and
conservatives are more likely to favor the death penalty than Democrats and liberals. A similar
pattern emerges in the results using GSS data. Republicans and conservatives are less in favor of
sex education in schools, assisted suicide, same-sex marriage than Democrats and liberals.
In addition to the political variables, there is significance among the socioeconomic and
demographic variables included in the models. Marital status, race, ethnicity, gender, age,
education, and income have an influence on one’s assessment of social or value-based policy
concerns. Overall, blacks, Hispanics, and older individuals demonstrate little support LGBTQ
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rights. Women are more likely to support LGBTQ policies than men. Older individuals are less
likely to support LGBTQ policies than younger individuals. Those with higher levels of
education are more in favor of policies that yield LGBTQ rights than those with lower levels of
education. Income is related to LGBTQ policy concerns. Higher levels of income yield greater
support for these issues. Marital status influences support for abortion policies. Those who are
married are less likely to support abortion in any or all circumstances than those who are not
married. African Americans, younger individuals, those with higher levels of education and
income report approval for less restrictive abortion policies. Lastly, Hispanics, older individuals
and those with high levels of education are less likely to support the death penalty.
4.4. Conclusion
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that religious belonging, religious behaving, and
religious believing influence public opinion on contemporary moral or value-based policy issues.
I also argue that it is important to consider these effects separately in the models to flesh out
differences within and among the dimensions of religion. Specifically, in this chapter I am
concerned with the effects of the three dimensions of religion on how individuals assess moral or
social values-based policy issues. Consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, I find
that there are differences within the religious belonging dimension. I also find that religious
behaving and religious believing greatly affects public opinion on various moral issues. These
results demonstrate not only a need to include religious identifiers in models of public onion but
also to include the three dimensions of religion separately when conducting empirical analyses.
In this conclusion I provide a summary of the major findings presented in this chapter and offer
remarks about future research.
Religious belonging. The results of the models show that there are among and within
denominational differences in public opinion on moral policy issues. For example, mainline
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Protestants are progressive in their opinions on gay and lesbian adoption and required service to
gay and lesbian couples. Evangelical Protestants are significantly less likely to support same-sex
marriage and transgender individuals using the bathroom of their choice than other religious
denominations and the religiously unaffiliated. Catholics are more pro-LGBTQ policies than
other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Hispanic Catholics are also more likely to
support same-sex marriage and policies that prohibit gay and lesbian discrimination but are less
likely to support transgender bathroom of choice policies than other religious groups and the
religiously unaffiliated or secular. Consistent with the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2, I find
that Jewish adherents are more progressive on certain LGBTQ policy concerns, supporting
required service to gay and lesbians couples and policies that allow transgenders to use their
bathroom of choice. Jews are also less likely to support the death penalty than other religious
groups; whereas evangelical and mainline Protestants are more likely to support the death
penalty for convicted murders. Using 2016 GSS data, I find consistencies between the models
regarding the death penalty. However, in the GSS models I include a variable that measures
whether one’s religion is fundamental, moderate, or liberal. Those individuals who report
fundamental or moderate religious affiliation are more likely to support the death penalty than
those individuals who are part of a liberal religious organization, controlling for the effects of the
other variables in the models. Interestingly, mainline Protestants are more likely to support proabortion legislation than other religious groups and seculars or the religiously unaffiliated. The
last finding of note is that Hispanic Catholics are in favor of sex education in public schools and
Catholics are not in favor of restrictive pornography laws.
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To summarize support for these hypotheses:
Hypothesis

Support

Note

H1: Religious Belonging → moral
policy opinions

Partially supported

The effects were not consistent
across all moral policies

H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics,
Jews → progressive policy opinions

Partially supported

Mainline Protestants and
Catholics are generally
progressive in their moral
policy opinions
Few differences between
Jewish adherents and the
religiously unaffiliated

H1b: Evangelical Protestants,
Hispanic Catholics → conservative
policy opinions

Partially supported

Evangelicals are conservative
regarding LGBTQ concerns
and the death penalty
Hispanic Catholics report
progressive LGBTQ and sex
education policy opinions

What does this tell us about future research? These findings are consistent with the
overall hypothesis that religious belonging influences moral policy opinions; however, there are
inconsistences within and among denominations and the classification of conservative, moderate,
or progressive support for policies. Ideological differences exist among religious adherents
within a particular denomination, thus making it difficult to classify the group as conservative,
moderate, or progressive. Future projects can address this issue by more closely examining these
within group differences. Overall, the results from these models support the general hypothesis
that religious denomination has an influence on assessments of moral policy opinions. Scholars
should continue to use religious denominations in their research as predictors of public opinion
relating to moral policy issues.
Religious behaving. What is the effect of religious behaving or religious activity on
public opinion? The influence of religious behaving is clearer than those of the religious
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belonging dimension. Specifically, religious worship attendance has a consistent effect on how
Americans think about moral policy issues. Religious worship attendance is negatively related to
public opinion on all LGBTQ rights policies. Those who attend worship services more frequently
are largely against same-sex marriage, gay and lesbian discrimination policies, gay and lesbian
adoption, required service to gay and lesbian couples, and legislation that allows transgender
people to use the bathroom of their choice. In addition, worship attendance is also related to antiabortion policies. Those who attend religious services more frequently are considerably less
likely to support the death penalty. Interestingly, individuals who report monetary contributions
to a religious organization are less likely than those individuals who do not contribute to
religious organizations to support required service to gays and lesbians, pro-choice abortion
policies, and the death penalty for convicted murders. Using 2016 GSS data, the religious
activity score—comprised of worship attendance, religious activity, frequency of prayer, and
saving souls—is significantly related to a number of moral policy opinions. Those who are
religiously active are less likely to support assisted suicide, more likely to support restrictive
pornography laws, less likely to support same-sex marriage policies, and less likely to support
the death penalty.
Therefore:
Hypothesis

Support

Religious behaving→ moral policy
opinions

Supported

H2a: Religiously active →
conservative opinions

Supported

Note

Supported in all ANES models.
Supported in 4/6 GSS models
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Where to go from here? Scholars should include a measure of religious behaving in their
models of support for moral policies. The results of the models are clear: religious belonging
influences public opinion on social issues. I speculate that those individuals who regularly attend
worship services and who participate regularly in religious activities are more likely to be
exposed to church doctrine and clergy teachings than those who are not religiously active.
Religiously active individuals are in turn influenced by their (religious) social group and apply
their beliefs to moral policies.
Religious believing. The last dimension of religion is religious believing. Similar to
religious belonging and more so religious behaving, religious believing influences public opinion
on moral policy issues. Those who believe religion is an important part of their daily life are
more likely to support gay and lesbian adoption and required service to gay and lesbian couples
than those who do not believe that religion plays an important role in daily life. Perhaps this is
due to the importance one places on Jesus’ teachings on how we should treat one another.
Additional research is needed to better understand the contradictions among religious importance
and the other religious believing variables included in the models. For example, those who use
religion as guidance in their daily lives are less likely to support same-sex marriage, gay and
lesbian adoption, required service to same-sex couples, transgender bathroom of choice
legislation, pro-choice abortion policies, and the death penalty. These findings are consistent
with expectations; conservative religious beliefs yield conservative moral policy opinions.
The effect of biblical literalism (or belief that the Bible is the literal word of God) is
statistically significant in all models using ANES and GSS data. 9 Overall those individuals who
believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are more likely to support conservative moral

9

There is one exception. There is no effect of biblical literalism on opinion regarding sex education in schools.
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policy opinions. Of note, biblical literalists are less likely to support assisted medical suicide but
more likely to support the death penalty. Perhaps this reflects opinions concerning just
punishment and pro-life sentiments that are present throughout the Bible.
I have also included a spiritually variables in the models that ask respondents about
whether they are spiritual people. The findings are interesting: those who are spiritual are more
likely to support abortion legislation but less likely to support the death penalty! I suspect that
these findings reveal a closer association to political stances than constraints of religion or
religious doctrine among spiritual individuals. Taken together these results demonstrate that
religious beliefs (specifically biblical literalism) play a significant role in influencing public
opinion on moral issues.
Therefore:
Hypothesis

Support

Religious believing → moral policy
opinions

Supported

H3a: Biblical literalists→
conservative policy opinions

Supported

Note

Supported in all models (except
Model (8):sex education)

In sum, the models that I have presented in this chapter demonstrate that religious
belonging, behaving, and believing influence public opinion on moral or value-based policy
issues. With this, scholars should continue to include variables representing the three dimensions
of religion in their models of moral policy attitudes. Religion not only plays an important role in
American politics, but it also influences contemporary politics by shaping and informing policy
opinions. In the next chapter, I explore the effects of the three religious dimensions on economic
policy concerns including government spending and government responsibility in fiscal issues.
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Chapter 5. Economic Policy Opinions
5.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I consider the effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and
religious believing on economic policy concerns. Using data from the 2016 ANES survey, I
estimate the effects of the religious dimensions on a series of government spending topics
including spending on (1) social security, (2) crime, (3) welfare, (4) the poor, (5) healthcare, and
(6) defense. In another set of models, I estimate the effects of religious belonging, behaving, and
believing on attitudes toward (7) increasing government services, (8) reducing the federal deficit,
(9) raising taxes, (10) reducing income inequality, and (11) increasing the minimum wage. Using
2013 Economic Values Survey data, I present findings for models that estimate the effects of
religion on attitudes toward (1) the government’s responsibility in taking care of people, (2)
whether the government provides too many services, (3) increasing taxes on the rich, (4)
reducing income inequality, and (5) increasing the minimum wage.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present bivariate analyses of the effects of
religious variables on two economic policy issues: spending on the poor and spending on social
security. I have chosen these two policy issues as examples because they reflect two major areas
of economic policy concern: government spending and social welfare programs. These
preliminary results demonstrate the importance of considering the effects of religious belonging,
religious behaving, and religious believing in the overall models and measuring religion
variables from these three clusters separately to capture the full effects of the religious
dimensions on economic policy opinions. The first section reveals differences among religious
traditions and differences within the Protestant faith. In addition, church attenders and nonchurch attenders vary on public opinion toward spending on the poor and spending on social
security. In the final set of preliminary bivariate analyses, I discuss differences among biblical
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literalist and religious importance in shaping opinions toward government spending on social
welfare issues. In the next section, I present the results of a series of ordered logistic regression
models that permit me to estimate the effects of variables representing the three religious
dimensions on attitudes toward economic policy concerns. These results demonstrate
considerable variation among religious believing measures.
5.2. Religious Dimensions
Similar to the preliminary results that I presented in Chapter 4, in this section I provide
preliminary bivariate analyses to demonstrate differences among and within religious traditions,
differences between church-attenders and non-attenders, and variation among biblical literalists
and (separately) differences between those who view religion as important and those who believe
that religion is not important on economic policy opinions. This section serves as a building
block for the full models in section 5.3. In section 5.2.1, I demonstrate whether differences exist
among and within religious traditions (religious belonging dimension) on spending on the poor
and spending on social security. In section 5.2.2, I reveal differences between church attenders
and non-church attenders (religious behaving) on economic policy concerns. Lastly and in
section 5.2.3., I demonstrate effects of biblical literalism and the importance of religion in daily
life (religious believing) on opinions toward government spending.
5.2.1 Religious Belonging
In Table 5.1 I present the distribution of responses among Protestants, Catholics, Jews
and other religious traditions on economic policy opinions including increasing (decreasing)
spending on the poor and increasing (decreasing) spending on social security. The results of the
bivariate analyses show that there are differences in opinions among religious traditions ( χ2 =
82.1326, Prob(χ2 = 0.000). Protestants are the religious group is most in favor of decreasing
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spending on the poor (23%); whereas, Jews are most in favor if increasing spending on the poor
(54%). Regardless of religious denomination, there is general support for increasing spending on
social security. However, there are notable differences ( χ2 = 30.5642, Prob(χ2)= 0.000). Catholics
(62.92%) are most in favor of increasing spending, while Jews are the least in support of
increasing spending (47%). In addition, other religious groups have the highest percentage (64%)
of respondents wanting to increase social security spending. Overall, the observed differences
among religious denominations and opinions toward spending on the poor and social security
reveal the importance of including religious affiliation in full statistical models.
Are there within-denomination differences on support for spending on the poor and spending
on social security? Table 5.2 shows the distribution of attitudes toward government spending on
the poor and social security among mainline, evangelical, and black Protestants. Mainline
Protestants (nearly 33%) and evangelical Protestants (33%) are least likely to report wanting to
increase spending on the poor; on the other hand, black Protestants are largely in favor of
increasing spending on the poor (72%). This reveals significant within-denominational
differences (χ2 = 131.9197, Prob(χ2)= 0.000). All three religious traditions report favoring
increase spending on social security; however, black Protestants (76.15%) are the most favorable
in increasing spending followed by evangelical Protestants (58.35%) and mainline Protestants
(57.49%). Again, there is statistically significant differences among mainline, evangelical, and
black Protestants and their support for spending on social security (χ2 = 29.2793, Prob(χ2)= 0.000)
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Table 5.1. distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security spending,
2016 ANES

Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Decrease spending

23%

16.58%

11.76%

13.54%

Keep spending the
same
Increase spending

44.27%

41.98%

34.12%

37.22%

32.73%

41.44%

54.12%

49.23%

Spending on the
Poor

Total
N
χ2
Prob (χ2)

100
1,152
82.1326
0.000

100
929

100
85

100
1,174

Spending on
Social Security
Decrease spending

6.60%

5.36%

7.06%

5.08%

Keep spending the
same
Increase spending

38.66%

31.73%

45.88%

30.91%

54.74%

62.92%

47.06%

64.01%

Total
N
χ2
Prob (χ2)

1,151
100
30.5643
0.000

933
100
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85
100

1,181
100

Table 5.2. distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security among
Protestants, 2016 ANES
Mainline

Evangelical
Protestant

Black Protestant

Spending on
the Poor
Decrease spending

19.34%

22.71%

5.91%

Keep spending the
same

48.19%

44.07%

21.94%

Increase spending

32.47%

33.22%

72.15%

100
579
131.9197
0.000

100
590

100
237

Decrease spending

6.20%

6.75%

2.09%

Keep spending the
same

36.32%

34.91%

21.76%

Increase spending

57.49%

58.35%

76.15%

Total
N
χ2
Prob (χ2)

100
581
29.2793
0.000

100
593

100
239

Total
N
χ2
Prob (χ2)

Spending on
Social
Security

In sum, variations among and within the religious belonging dimension of religion warrants
the estimation of a full statistical model that demonstrates the effects of religious denomination
and religious tradition on economic policy opinions. Based on these preliminary results, I argue
that religious denomination can have a significant influence on economic policy opinions. While
there are differences in the distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and spending on
social security among Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and other religious groups, opinions are
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generally in favor of increasing spending. However, within denomination differences exist
among Protestants. Indeed, black Protestants report much higher approval of increasing spending
on the poor and social security than mainline and evangelical Protestants. Thus, it is imperative
to consider both among- and within-denominational differences in estimating the effects of
religious belonging on economic policy attitudes.
5.2.2. Religious Behaving
In Table 5.3 I outline differences in the distribution of opinions among Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, and other religion church attenders and Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other
religion non-church attenders regarding increasing spending on the poor and increasing spending
on social security. Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and other service attenders are generally in favor
of spending on the poor. However, there are significant differences among the religious
denominations (χ2 = 61.3706, Prob(χ2) = 0.000). For example, nearly 32% of Protestants support
increasing spending on the poor; whereas, nearly 49% of other religious adherents support
increasing spending on the poor. A similar pattern emerges regarding attitudes among nonchurch attenders and support for government spending (χ2 = 23.4105, Prob(χ2)= 0.000).
Protestants (nearly 43%%) and Catholics (43%) report general approval of keeping spending the
same; whereas, Jewish adherents (67%) and other religious groups (50%) favor an increase
spending on the poor.
When considering approval for government spending on social security, the preliminary
results reveal differences among church attenders ( χ2 = 26.5637, Prob(χ2)= 0.000) but not among
non-church attenders (χ2 = 7.7186, Prob(χ2)= 0.259). Overall, in Table 3 it appears that
differences exist among the religious traditions and those who attend church services regarding
spending on the poor and spending on social security. Based on the preliminary bivariate results,
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it appears that non-church attenders hold more progressive economic policy opinions; whereas,
church attenders will hold more conservative economic policy opinions. This could be due to the
effects of other independent variables that are not accounted for in the bivariate analyses. These
results do suggest that it is important to include service attendance in full multivariate models of
economic policy attitudes.
5.2.3. Religious Believing
The last dimension of religion is religious believing. The two variables that I consider in
the preliminary analyses to capture religious believing is biblical literalism and religious
importance. Biblical literalism deals with one’s belief in the Bible being the literal word of God,
the word of God but not literally, or not the word of God. Religious importance is a binary
variable that measuring whether religious is or is not important in one’s life. In Table 5.4, I show
the distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security by biblical literalism
and religious importance. While there are seemingly small differences between the distribution
of attitudes toward spending on the poor (χ2 = 35.8634, Prob(χ2)= 0.000) and spending on social
security (χ2 = 38.1561, Prob(χ2)= 0.000) by biblical literalism opinions, differences do exist. For
example, those individuals who believe that the Bible is not the word of God (48.22%) are more
in favor of increasing spending on the poor than those who believe that the Bible is the literal
word of God (43.9%) In addition to these differences, biblical literalists (64.82%) report
favoring increasing spending on social security more than those who believe that the Bible is not
the word of God (52.50%).
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Table 5.3. distribution of attitudes toward government spending among church attenders and non-church attenders, 2016 ANES
Church attenders
Non-church attenders

Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Decrease

23.60%

17.40%

17.39%

14.25%

20.75%

14.78%

5.13%

11.45%

Keep the same

44.68%

41.38%

39.13%

36.83%

42.74%

43.30%

28.21%

38.38%

Increase

31.72%

41.22%

43.48%

48.92%

36.51%

41.92%

66.67%

50.17%

100
638

100
46

100
877

100
291

100
39

100
297

Spending
on the poor

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
911
61.3706
0.000

100
241
23.4105
0.001

Spending
on social
security
Decrease

7.24%

5.45%

10.87%

5.55%

4.17%

5.15%

2.56%

3.69%

Keep the same

39.41%

33.64%

47.83%

31.30%

35.83%

27.49%

43.59%

30.45%

Increase

53.35%

60.90%

41.30%

63.42%

60.00%

67.35%

53.85%

65.77%

100
642

100
46

100
883

100
291

100
39

100
298

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
911
26.5637
0.000
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100
240
7.7186
0.000

Table 5.4. distribution of attitudes toward spending on the poor and social security by biblical literalism and
religious importance, 2016 ANES
Biblical literalism

Religious Importance

Not the
word of
God

Word of
God but not
Literally

Literal
Word of
God

Not
Important

Important

Decrease

16.59%

17.44%

17.68%

16.27%

17.70%

Keep the same

35.20%

44.73%

38.42%

39.95%

40.76%

Increase

48.22%

37.83%

43.90%

43.79%

41.45%

Spending on
the poor

Total
N
χ2
Prob (χ2)

100
1,037
35.8634
0.000

100
1,927

100
1,205

100
1,457
2.6880
0.261

100
2,753

Decrease

7.13%

5.53%

6.04%

7.07%

5.57%

Keep the same

40.37%

35.97%

29.14%

39.19%

32.77%

Increase

52.50%

58.50%

64.82%

53.74%

61.66%

Total
N
χ2
Prob (χ2)

100
1,038
38.1561
0.000

100
1,935

100
1,208

100
1,457
24.9441
0.000

100
2,765

Spending on
social security
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A similar pattern emerges when considering religious importance, albeit there is no
statistical significance between the groups (χ2 = 2.6880, Prob(χ2)= 0.261) regarding attitudes
toward spending on the poor. Those who consider religion an important party of daily life
(66.66%) support an increase in spending on social security more than those who believe that
religion is not an important party of daily life (53.74%). These preliminary findings are
significant (χ2 = 29.9441, Prob(χ2)= 0.000).
Based on preexisting research and the results of the preliminary analyses, I contend that
those biblical literalists will hold more progressive economic policy opinions. As previously
discussed, there are differences among the distribution of opinions regarding spending on the
poor and spending on social security. In the full empirical models that I present later in this
chapter, I will flesh out these differences and shed light on the influence of religious belief on a
variety of economic policy opinions.
5.2.4. Summary
The purpose of these bivariate analyses is to show that there are differences among the
religious dimensions regarding economic policy concerns. This builds on my overall argument
that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing affects economic policy
opinions. However, because differences observed in bivariate analyses can disappear in
multivariate models with a full range of statistical controls, it is important to account for the
possible confounding effects of additional independent variables. In the next section, I provide
support for this argument through presenting the results of a series of logistic and ordered
logistic regression models that capture the effects of the religious dimensions on economic
policy opinions.
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5.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models
In this section I present the results for a series of ordered logistic regression models that
capture the effect of the three dimensions of religion on economic policy opinions. In the first set
of models, I present the results for economic policy opinions concerning government spending
on a series of issues using 2016 American National Election Survey data. The models include
public opinion toward support for increasing (decreasing) spending on (1) social security, (2)
crime, (3) welfare, (4) the poor, (5) healthcare, and (6) military defense. In a second set of
analyses, I provide the results of five other economic policy opinions. These models include (1)
increasing (decreasing) government service, (2) reducing the deficit, (3) increasing taxes on the
rich, (4) reducing inequality, and (5) raising the minimum wage. Using data from the 2013
Economic Values Survey, I present five additional models that serve as supplemental analyses to
the findings presented using ANES data. These models include public opinion toward (1) the
government’s responsibility to help the poor, (2) increasing social services, (3) increasing taxes
on the rich, (4) reducing inequality, and (5) increasing the minimum wage. 2013 EVS data is
unique in that there are several unique religious believing variables including whether one
believes in preserving traditional beliefs and Jesus’ message regarding caring for the poor in
society. In all models and across the datasets, I have used the standard control variables
including partisan identification and political ideology as well as a series of socioeconomic and
demographic variables: marital status, race, ethnicity, gender, age, education, and household
income.
Based on theory and previous research, I test my hypotheses about the effects of specific
variables using one-tailed and two-tailed hypothesis tests, where appropriate. The coefficients for
all of the religious belonging variables are tested using two-tailed tests, with the exception of the
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coefficient for mainline Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish variables. Based on the preexisting
literature, I suggest that these adherents will hold progressive economic policy opinions than
individuals of other religious traditions. The coefficients for the variables representing the
religious behaving and religious believing dimensions are analyzed using one-tailed tests. I posit
that religiously active (religious behaving) individuals are more likely to support progressive
economic policies due in part to the influence of their congregations, the clergy, and religious
doctrine. Likewise, I argue that religious believing is related to progressive economic policy
opinions. Those who hold more progressive or liberal religious beliefs will be more likely to
support government spending and hold more progressive or liberal economic policy opinions.
Finally, I use one-tailed hypothesis when analyzing the effects of partisan identification
and political ideology. I hypothesize that Republicans and conservatives believe in conservative
economic policies; whereas, Democrats and liberals believe in progressive economic policies.
Similar to the models that I presented in the previous chapter, I have used two-tailed hypothesis
testing for all socioeconomic and demographic variables.
5.3.1. Religious Belonging
What is the effect of religious belonging on attitudes toward economic policies? In Table
5.5, I present the results from a series of models regarding government spending. I find evidence
that religious belonging influences attitudes on spending. However, the results are generally
inconsistent. For example, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants (b = 0.323, z = 2.09) and
Catholics (b = 0.481, z = 3.53) are more likely to favor an increase in government spending on
social security than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Catholics are more
likely to support an increase spending on crime (b = 0.258, z = 1.91) than other religious
traditions and the religiously unaffiliated. Jewish adherents (b = 0.469, z = 1.81) and other non-
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Christian religious groups are more likely to support government spending on welfare (b =
0.659, z = 3.77) than the religiously unaffiliated or seculars. Hispanic Catholics (b = 0.536, z =
2.10) and other religions (b = 0.545, z = 3.03) are more likely to support spending on the poor
than the religious unaffiliated. Lastly, mainline Protestants (b = 0.313, z = 2.45), evangelical
Protestants (b = 0.328, z = 2.29), Catholics (b = 0.391, z = 3.16), and other Christians (b = 0.360,
z = 2.73) are in favor of defense spending.
The results of the 2016 ANES government spending models reveal that religious
belonging has an effect on government spending concerns. Nevertheless, there is little
consistency across spending areas. Among the various spending areas is at least one significant
coefficient, however, different religious denominations support different policy spending areas.
For example, mainline Protestants are concerned with social security and defense spending,
Evangelical Protestants favor increased spending on social security and defense and Catholics
favor spending in these area and spending on crime. Hispanic Catholics are concerned with
increasing spending on the poor, other Christians support defense spending, and other nonChristian religious groups prefer increased spending on welfare and the poor.
In Table 5.6 I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting
social security spending. The predicted probabilities are calculated by setting all other religious
traditions equal to 0. For example, the value presented for evangelical Protestants supporting an
increase in social security spending is 0.056, when all other religious traditions are equal to 0.
Among evangelical Protestants, the probability of supporting an increase in spending is 0.602
and the probability of being a secular or religiously unaffiliated and supporting increased
spending on social security is 0.532. Thus, there is a difference of 0.07. Mainline Protestants
(0.584) are more in favor of increased spending on social security than seculars, with a
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difference of .05. Catholics (0.636) also favor an increase in social security spending more than
the religiously unaffiliated (0.532) with a difference of 0.10 between Catholics and the
religiously unaffiliated. While these differences in the predicted probabilities are not large, the
underlying coefficients for these variables are significant.
In Table 5.7 I present the predicted probabilities for defense spending attitudes among the
religious traditions. Perhaps, this is the most consistent of the spending models regarding
differences among the religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated. Indeed, the predicted
probability results demonstrate that mainline Protestants (0.116), evangelical Protestants (0.118),
Catholics (0.124), and other Christian groups (0.121) are significantly more likely to support an
increase in spending on defense than seculars (0.090).
It appears that the various religious groups support increased spending on different
policies. Based on results of the ordered logit models, mainline Protestants, evangelical
Protestants and Catholics are more likely to support social security spending than the religiously
unaffiliated, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Catholics favor
increased government spending on crime. Jews and other non-Christian adherents favor
government spending on welfare. Hispanic Catholics and other non-Christian adherents are in
favor of spending on the poor. Several religious groups prefer increased spending on defense
including mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and other Christian groups.
These results highlight the variations among and within religious traditions. Consistent with the
hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, religious denomination has an influence on economic policy
concerns.
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Table 5.5. Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of economic policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (1)
Model (2)
Model (3)
Model (4)
Social Security
Crime
Welfare
Poor
b
z
b
z
b
z
b
z
Belonging
Mainline
0.240
1.69*
-0.145
-1.05
0.134
0.97
0.048
0.36
B. Protestant
0.276
1.03
0.143
0.56
0.103
0.45
0.314
1.19
Evangelical
0.323
2.09*
-0.018
-0.12
0.050
-0.32
0.201
1.36
Catholic
0.481 3.53***
0.258
1.91(
0.089
-0.68
0.052
0.41
H. Catholic
-0.146 -0.58
-0.189
-0.75
-0.049 -0.21
0.536
2.10*
Other Christian
0.220
1.57
-0.068
-0.49
0.026
-0.19
0.176
1.30
Jewish
-0.088 -0.33
-0.225
-0.87
0.469
1.81*
0.186
0.69
Other Religion
0.195 1.07
-0.343
-1.94
0.659
3.77***
0.545
3.03**
Behaving
Attendance
Contributions

Model (5)
Healthcare
b
z

Model (6)
Defense
b
z

-0.028
0.087

-0.23
0.39

0.313
-0.029

2.45*
-0.12

0.077

0.57

0.328

2.29*

0.064
-0.021

0.55
-0.09

0.391
0.075

3.16**
0.31

0.058
0.382
0.264

0.47
1.56
1.62

0.360
0.263
-0.085

2.73**
1.10
-0.50

-0.134
-0.075

-3.69***
-0.79

-0.008
0.038

-0.22
0.40

0.029
-0.125

0.83
-1.35

0.006
-0.177

0.18
-1.97*

-0.034
-0.067

-1.09
-0.83

-0.086
-0.026

-2.56**
-0.30

Believing
Importance
Guidance
Biblical
Literalism

0.136
0.084

0.84
1.25

0.338
-0.048

2.08*
-0.71

-2.22*
1.69

-0.048
0.095

-0.31
1.51

-0.136
0.096

-0.99
1.68

0.355
-0.001

2.39*
-0.02

0.213

2.91**

0.382

5.25***

-0.04

0.180

2.61**

0.009

0.14

0.341

5.06***

Spirituality

0.038

0.80

0.050

1.08

-0.348
0.109
0.003
0.081

-1.73

-0.034

-0.72

-0.031

-0.67

0.041

-0.88

Identification

-0.119

-5.01**

0.023

0.98

-10.53***

-0.206

-9.22***

-0.240

0.121

5.53***

Ideology

-0.164

-4.68**

0.047

1.36

-12.89***

-0.414

-12.13***

-0.345

0.374

11.34***

Political
Variables
0.239
0.439

Table 5.5, continued
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11.57***
11.17***

Model (1)
Social Security
b
z
Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Gender
Age
Education
Income
N
Pseudo R2
χ2
Prob(χ2)

Model (2)
Crime
b
z

0.002
0.240
-0.014
-0.222
0.183
0.020
-0.161

0.02
1.20
-0.08
-1.08
2.45*
8.78***
-6.18***

-0.102
0.085
0.127
0.495
0.142
0.016
-0.087

-1.25
0.45
0.76
2.28*
1.90
7.14***
-3.34***

-0.021

-3.85***
3,297
.0670
375.83
.0000

0.005

0.91
3,301
.0447
251.91
.0000

Model (3)
Welfare
b
z

0.037
0.376
0.463
0.403
0.013
-0.002
0.025
0.038

Model (4)
Poor
b
z

Model (5)
Healthcare
b
z

Model (6)
Defense
b
z

0.48
2.17*
2.90**
1.97
0.18
-1.14
0.98

-0.151
0.478
0.381
0.165
0.044
-0.000
-0.070

-1.96
2.45*
2.25*
0.80
0.62
-0.19
-2.83**

-0.150
0.331
0.039
0.001
-0.087
0.008
0.023

-2.14*
1.95
0.26
0.01
-1.35
4.30***
1.03

-0.082
0.192
0.011
-0.341
0.086
-0.018
-0.137

-1.09
1.00
0.07
-1.69
1.25
8.60***
-5.71***

-7.06***
3,296
.1524
1032.47
.0000

-0.023

-4.30***
3,293
.1290
880.80
.0000

-0.019

-3.98***
3,279
.0756
879.70
.0000

0.005

1.06
2,884
.0933
976.11
.0000
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Table 5.6 Predicted probabilities for social security spending attitudes associated with
religious denominations
Social Security
Spending
Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other Religion
Secular or unaffiliated

Decrease

Keep the same

Increase

0.060
0.058
0.056
0.048
0.085
0.061
0.081
0.063
0.075

0.355
0.350
0.342
0.316
0.416
0.359
0.407
0.363
0.394

0.584
0.592
0.602
0.636
0.499
0.580
0.512
0.575
0.532

Table 5.7 Predicted probabilities for defense spending attitudes associated with religious
denominations
Defense
spending
Decrease
1
2
3
4
5
Increase

M. Protestant
B. Protestant
E. Protestant
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Secular

0.045
0.061
0.044
0.042
0.055
0.043
0.047
0.064
0.059

0.066
0.083
0.065
0.062
0.077
0.063
0.068
0.086
0.081

0.108
0.127
0.107
0.103
0.121
0.105
0.110
0.130
0.125
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0.278
0.295
0.277
0.274
0.290
0.275
0.281
0.297
0.294

0.220
0.206
0.220
0.222
0.211
0.221
0.218
0.204
0.208

0.167
0.141
0.169
0.173
0.149
0.171
0.164
0.137
0.143

0.116
0.088
0.118
0.124
0.096
0.121
0.112
0.084
0.090

There are five other models that I present using 2016 ANES data: (7) government
services, (8) deficit, (9) taxes, (10) inequality, and (11) minimum wage. Model (7) represents
support for an increase in services provided by the government. Model (8) depicts public opinion
toward the importance of reducing the deficit. Model (9) involves public opinion on support for
increasing taxes on millionaires. Model (10) reveals public opinion on favorability of
government action to reduce inequality. Model (11) captures support for increasing minimum
wage.
In Table 5.8, I present the results of these models. First, once we control for the effects of
other independent variables, there is only limited evidence that religious belonging has an
independent effect on economic policy variables. Mainline Protestants (b = 0.211, z = 1.64) Jews
( b = 0.726, z = 2.91) and “other” religious individuals ( b = 0.474, z = 2.81) are significantly
more likely to support increasing services provided by the government. Hispanic Catholics (b =
-0.902, z = -3.33) are less likely to support increasing taxes on millionaires. The coefficients for
the remaining religious belonging variables fail to achieve conventional levels of statistical
significance. Clearly, religious denomination has a less consistent effect on economic policy
attitudes than moral policy attitudes.
Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey, in Table 5.9 I present the results for
five economic policy models. These models include public opinion on (1) the government’s
responsibility to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves, (2) government’s
spending on social services, (3) increasing taxes on the rich, (4) reducing inequality, and (5)
increasing the minimum wage. The results of these models again demonstrate that there is only
limited evidence that there are differences among and within religious traditions. I find that
Jewish adherents ( b = 1.872, z = 1.99) are more likely to believe that it is the government’s
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responsibility to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves. Evangelical
Protestants (b = 0.635, z = 2.08) are more likely to believe that the government should do more
to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor, and more likely to support increasing the
minimum wage (b = 0.382, 1.74) than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated.
Lastly, Hispanic Catholics (b = -1.016, z = -2.19) are less likely than the religiously unaffiliated
to believe that the government should reduce the gap between the rich and poor. It is important to
note that none of the other religious denomination variables have a significant effect on the
dependent variables in Table 5.9.
Overall, there is only mixed evidence that religious belonging variables are primary
drivers of Americans’ economic policy attitudes. However, there are a few findings that are
worth mentioning. First, there are some discernible differences among religious adherents in
their opinions on government spending. For example, certain religious groups are more likely to
favor government spending on social security (mainline Protestants, evangelicals and Catholics),
while other groups are more likely to support spending on the poor (Hispanic Catholics and
“other” non-Christian religious groups). Future research concerning government spending on
social service should include religious belonging identifiers. Secondly, Hispanic Catholics are
less likely to support increasing taxes on millionaires, less likely to believe in the government
reducing inequality, and more likely to support government spending on the poor. It appears that
Hispanic Catholics are conflicted in their economic policy opinions. Future research is needed to
flesh out these nuances. Lastly, the effect of the Jewish variable was statistically nonsignificant
in all models, with two exception: spending on welfare and their belief in government services
and responsibilities. This finding is interesting in that Jewish adherents are more likely to believe
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that the government should provide more services and that it is the responsibility of the
government to take care of the people who cannot take care of themselves.
5.3.2. Religious Behaving
What is the effect of religious behaving on economic policy concerns? I argue that
religious behaving or worship attendance is related to economic policy opinions. Those
individuals who are more religiously active will hold progressive policy stances on economic
issues. Indeed, those who are more active in their religious organizations are more likely to
support government spending.
Is this speculation on the connection between religious activity and progressive economic
policy attitudes supported empirically? First, in Table 5.5 I consider the effect of religious
service attendance on government spending. Those who attend religious services more frequently
are less likely to support spending on social security (b = -0.134, z = -3.69) and government
spending on military defense (b = -0.086, z = -2.56). In addition, those who contribute to
religious organizations are less likely to support government spending on the poor (b = -0.1777,
z = -1.97).
In Figure 5.1 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each outcome on the
dependent variable, social security spending. As the level of service attendance increases, so too
do opinions on keeping social security spending the same. In addition, as the frequency of
service attendance increases, attitudes on social security spending decreases. Indeed, 64% of
those who do not attend religious services favor increased spending on social security compared
to 51% of individuals who attend services more than once per week.
In Figure 5.2. I report the predicted probabilities associated with defense spending. These
results are interesting in that most individuals support a moderate level of defense spending.
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However, as the frequency of service attendance increases, support for spending decreases.
Those individuals who attend worship services more frequently are less supported of increasing

.8

spending on defense.

.4

.6

increase spending

.2

keep spending the same

0

decrease spending

0

1

2
Church Attendance

3

4

Figure 5.1 Predicted probabilities on attitudes toward social security spending by church
attendance

Moving on to Table 5.8, we see that religious worship attendance is also related to
reducing the federal deficit. Those individuals who attend worship services more frequently are
less likely to believe that it is important to reduce the deficit (b = 0.105, z = -3.20). Religious
contributions are also negatively related to opinions on reducing the gap between the rich and the
poor (b = -0.253, z = -3.08). Finally, in Table 5.9 one can see that none of the religious
attendance coefficients achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. Hence this variable
does not appear to have an effect on economic policy attitudes in the 2013 Economic Values
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Survey. Additional analyses may help to explain why religious attendance does not have an
influence on economic policy attitudes. However, based on these results religious activity does

.4

not have a consistent and systematic effect on economic policy attitudes.

0

.1

.2

.3

Midvalue

Support increase spending

Support decrease spending

Church attendance
Figure 5.2 Predicted probabilities on attitudes toward defense spending by church attendance

Overall, religious behaving influences economic policy concerns in some selected
instances. However, the effect is limited to a small handful of economic policies: spending on
social security, spending on the poor, spending on defense, and opinions on reducing the deficit.
Contrary to expectations, in these few instances those who attend religious services more
frequently are less likely to support government spending and less likely to hold progressive
economic policy opinions. It is clear that the effects of religious attendance on policy attitudes
are largely targeted toward moral policy attitudes and far less so to economic policy concerns.
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Table 5.8. Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of economic policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (7)
Service
b

z

Model (8)
Deficit
b

Model (9)
Taxes

z

z

b

z

-0.123

-0.77

-0.113

-0.90

-0.141

-0.92

0.22

0.006

0.02

0.120

0.53

0.438

1.26

0.179
-0.067
-0.089

1.26
-0.55
-0.39

-0.059
0.135
-0.902

-0.35
0.88
-3.33***

-0.022
-0.054
-0.077

-0.16
-0.45
-0.35

0.137
0.009
-0.119

0.82
0.06
-0.43

1.16
2.91**

0.056
-0.368

0.43
-1.46

0.062
-0.375

-0.40
-1.13

-0.119
-0.136

-0.96
-0.56

-0.066
0.002

-0.43
0.01

0.474

2.81**

-0.188

-1.10

-0.157

-0.75

0.138

0.84

0.223

1.04

-0.057
-0.110

-1.70
-1.25

-0.105
0.104

-3.20***
1.20

0.031
-0.078

0.83
-0.79

-0.037
-0.253

-1.19
-3.08**

-0.062
-0.047

-1.61
-0.46

Importance
Guidance

-0.471
0.216

-3.18***
3.57***

-0.110
0.229

-0.76
3.84***

0.067
-0.029

0.39
-0.42

-0.345
0.213

-2.44*
3.71***

0.187
0.084

1.07
1.17

Biblical Literalism
Spirituality

0.144
0.015

2.13*
0.28

0.014
-0.019

0.22
-0.43

-0.042
0.092

-0.56
1.88

0.028
-0.060

0.45
-1.34

0.109
-0.042

1.40
-0.75

Political Variables
Political Variables
Identification

-0.305

-13.51***

0.185

8.70***

-0.204

-8.11***

-0.247

-12.07***

-0.274

-10.62***

Ideology

-0.449

-13.46***

0.205

6.50***

-0.432

-11.05***

-0.389

-12.55***

-0.377

-9.60***

0.211

1.64*

-0.158

-1.23

B. Protestant

-0.065

-0.26

0.051

Evangelical
Catholic
H. Catholic

0.226
0.128
0.005

1.57
1.04
0.02

Other Christian
Jewish

0.152
0.726

Other Religion
Behaving
Attendance
Contributions

z

Model (11)
Minimum Wage
b

Belonging
Mainline

b

Model (10)
Inequality

Believing

Table 5.8, continued
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Model (7)
Service
b

z

Model (8)
Deficit
b

Model (9)
Taxes

z

b

z

Model (10)
Inequality
b

z

Model (11)
Minimum Wage
b

z

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married

-0.032

-0.43

0.007

0.10

-0.106

-1.22

-0.015

-0.21

-0.028

-0.33

Black
Hispanic
Asian
Gender
Age

0.656
0.402
0.199
0.160
-0.007

3.46***
2.52*
1.01
2.34*
-3.38***

0.038
0.184
-0.099
-0.002
0.008

0.21
1.18
-0.51
-0.04
4.17***

-0.474
0.338
-0.201
0.111
0.012

-2.32*
1.77
-0.88
1.39
5.23***

0.042
0.182
0.497
0.089
-0.011

0.25
1.24
2.57**
1.36
-5.49***

0.465
0.185
-0.125
0.130
0.015

1.88
0.98
-0.55
1.62
6.16***

Education
Income

-0.023
-0.021

-0.98
-4.12***

-0.050
-0.009

-2.14*
-1.72

0.007
0.013

0.25
2.26*

-0.043
-0.022

-1.92
-4.44***

-0.076
-0.009

-2.73**
-1.58

N
Pseudo R2
χ2

2,865
.1170
1260.84

3,298
.0654
526.05

3,300
.1045
591.52

3,290
.1024
1064.53

3,290
.1368
738.50

Prob(χ2)

.0000

.0000

.0000

.0000

.0000
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Table 5. 9.Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of economic policy opinions, EVS 2013 data
Model (1)
Responsibility
b

z

Model (2)
Social Services

Model (3)
Taxes

Model (4)
Inequality

Model (5)
Minimum Wage

b

z

b

z

b

z

b

z

Belonging
Mainline
B. Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
H. Catholic

0.163
0.134
0.156
0.396
-0.007

0.57
0.27
0.51
1.38
-0.02

0.083
0.803
0.335
0.299
-0.238

0.29
1.60
1.09
1.03
-0.53

-0.165
0.429
-0.057
-0.195
0.288

-0.81
1.30
-0.26
-0.95
0.92

0.005
0.073
0.635
0.386
-1.016

0.02
0.15
2.08*
1.34
-2.19*

-0.049
0.041
0.382
0.254
-0.379

-0.24
0.12
1.74*
1.24
-1.17

Jewish
Other

1.872
-0.090

1.99*
-0.30

-1.212
0.191

-1.39
0.62

0.711
-0.105

1.41
-0.48

0.650
-0.078

0.72
-0.25

0.620
-0.190

1.21
-0.84

Behaving
Attendance

0.089

1.42

-0.051

-0.80

-0.026

-0.59

-0.062

-0.98

-0.028

-0.63

Believing
Biblical Literalism
Image of God
Importance
Preserve Beliefs

-0.120
-0.134
0.095
-0.061

-0.56
-0.88
0.77
-0.55

0.304
0.234
0.115
0.202

1.44
1.53
0.94
1.83

-0.140
0.155
0.013
-0.210

-0.93
1.43
0.15
-2.64***

-0.323
0.013
0.283
-0.337

-1.49
0.08
2.32*
-2.98**

-0.053
0.150
0.012
-0.273

-0.34
1.33
0.13
-3.38***

Care for the poor

0.167

4.02***

-0.174

-4.16***

0.060

2.07*

0.189

4.51***

0.061

2.09**

Political Variables
Identification
Ideology

-0.263
-0.221

-5.01***
-2.55*

0.252
0.438

4.90***
4.90***

-0.344
-0.467

-9.19***
-7.35***

-0.479
-0.330

-8.77***
-3.71***

-0.261
-0.337

-6.88***
-5.26***
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Model (1)
Responsibility

Model (2)
Social Services

b

z

b

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married
Black
Hispanic

-0.067
0.288
-0.241

-0.42
0.74
-0.76

0.088
-1.205
0.265

Asian
Gender

0.381
-0.130

0.70
-0.90

Age
Educ
Income

0.002
0.028
-0.076

0.39
0.64
-1.49

N
Pseudo R2
χ2
Prob(χ2)

737
.0660
123.51
.0000

z

Model (3)
Taxes

Model (4)
Inequality

Model (5)
Minimum Wage

b

z

b

z

b

0.56
-3.09**
0.83

0.065
-0.325
-0.405

0.58
-1.29
-1.80

0.069
0.241
0.435

0.44
0.61
1.31

-0.123
1.117
0.187

-1.09
4.03***
0.78

0.487
-0.212

0.89
-1.47

-0.210
0.175

-0.54
1.69

-0.390
0.300

-0.74
2.07*

0.163
0.463

0.42
4.39***

0.006
0.003
0.020

1.50
0.06
0.39

0.003
0.020
-0.137

0.86
0.64
-3.74***

-0.012
-0.137
-0.155

-2.80**
-3.09**
-3.03**

-0.010
-0.044
-0.087

-3.25***
-1.37
-2.38*

734
.1383
276.29
.0000

1.410
.1021
383.58
.0000
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737
.1589
319.76
.0000

z

1,407
.0987
354.01
.0000

5.3.3. Religious Believing
What is the influence of religious believing on economic policy issues? I posit that
religious believing influences public opinion on economic policy issues and argue that biblical
literalism is related to how individuals make assessments on economic policies. While there are
competing arguments in the conservative/progressive nature of biblical literalism, I argue that
those individuals who believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible are more likely to hold
progressive economic policy opinions.
The results that I present in Table 5.5 demonstrate that those individuals who believe that
religion plays and important part of their daily lives are more likely to support spending on crime
(b = 0.338, z = 2.08) and defense (b = 0.355, z = 2.39) and less likely to support spending on
welfare policies (b = -0.338, z = -2.22). Biblical literalists are more likely to support government
spending on social security (b= 0.213, z = 2.91), crime (b = 0.382, z = 5.25), the poor (b = 0.180,
z = 2.61), and defense (b = 0.341, z = 5.06). Thus, these results add evidence to support the
hypothesis that biblical literalists hold more progressive economic policy concerns (except for
favorability in increasing defense spending). Those who believe that the Bible is the literal word
of God are more likely than those who believe that the Bible is the word of man to support
government spending. Religious guidance in daily life and spirituality does not have an effect on
attitudes toward government spending.
As an example, in Figure 5.3 I report the predicted probabilities associated with each
outcome on the dependent variable defense spending by biblical literalism. I find that those who
believe that the Bible is the word of God support defense spending (nearly 19%) compared to
those individuals who do not believe that the Bible is the literal word of God (12%). In addition,
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biblical literalists report extreme support for increased spending on defense (10%) more so than

.4

those who believe that the Bible is not the literal word of God (nearly 6%).

.2
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.1

Extreme Support

Oppose

0

Extreme Oppose

not the literal word

word of God, not literal

literal word of God

Figure 5.3 Predicted probabilities on attitudes toward defense spending by biblical
literalism

Turing to Table 5.8, religious believing influences opinions toward the government’s
responsibility in providing services, reducing the deficit, and reducing the gap between the rich
and the poor. Religious importance is related to opinions on government service (b = -0.471, z =
-3.18) and reducing inequality (b = -0.345, z = -2.44). Individuals who believe that religion is
important are less likely to believe that the government should provide more services than those
who do not believe that religion is an important part of their daily life. In addition, the
importance of religion negatively related to belief in reducing inequality between the rich and the
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poor. Those who believe religion is important do not support the government instilling policies
to reduce the income inequality. Religious guidance in related to opinions on government
service, reducing the deficit, and income inequality. Indeed, individuals who use religion as
guidance in their daily lives are more likely to support government services, reducing the federal
deficit, and reducing inequality. Lastly, biblical literalism ( b = 0144, z = 2.13) is related to
positive feeling of expanding government services. In sum, I demonstrate that religious believing
has a general influence on economic policy opinions. Consistent with the hypotheses, biblical
literalism related to more progressive economic policy opinions.
In Table 5.9 I present the results of the models using data from the 2013 Economic
Values Survey. This dataset is unique in that it provides additional measures of religious
believing. Included in these measures are two important variables: (1) preserve beliefs and (2)
care for the poor. The first variable, preserve beliefs, is coded 0 if respondent beliefs that
religious should adopt to modern beliefs, 1 if religious beliefs should be adjusted considering
new circumstances, coded 2 if beliefs and practices should be preserved. The second variable,
care for the poor, involves beliefs in Jesus’ teachings. Low values represent the belief that when
Jesus talked about caring for the poor he meant through private charity. High values represent the
belief that Jesus promoted a just society. When including these variables in the models, the
results demonstrate that both preserve belief and care for the poor have significant effects on
public opinion toward economic policies. Those who belief that religion should preserve
traditional beliefs are less likely to support increasing taxes on the rich (b = -0.210, z = -2.64),
less likely to believe in reducing income inequality (b = -0.337, z = -2.98), and less likely to
support an increase in minimum wage (b = -0.273, z = -3.38). These findings are unsurprising.
Those who hold more conservative religious beliefs also hold more conservative policy opinions
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and less likely to support social welfare policies than those individuals who hold progressive
religious beliefs. The variable “care for the poor” represents beliefs about Jesus’ teachings.
Those who belief that Jesus promoted a just society are more likely to believe that it is the
government’s responsibility to provide services to those who cannot help themselves (b = 0.167,
z = 4.02) than those who believe that Jesus’ teaching promoted private acts of charity. Likewise,
the “Jesus promotes a just society” believers are less likely to believe that the government
provides too many social services (b = -0.174, z = -4.16). These individuals are also more likely
to support increasing taxes on the rich (b = 0.060, z = 2.07), reducing inequality, (b = 0.189, z =
4.15), and increasing minimum wage (b = 0.061, z = 2.0) than those who believe that Jesus’
teachings promoted private acts of charity. Overall, these results are consistent with the
hypotheses. Those individuals who hold more conservative religious beliefs are more likely to
hold conservative economic policy opinions than those individuals who hold progressive
religious beliefs.
5.3.4. A Note on the Effects of Control Variables
Considering the effects of political and socioeconomic and demographic variables across
the models, there are a few things to highlight. First, political identification and political
ideology had an influence on all government spending economic policy concerns except
spending on crime. Republicans and conservatives are less likely than Democrats and liberals to
support government spending, regardless of the subject of government spending. Likewise,
Republicans and conservatives are less likely to support increasing government services, raising
taxes on the rich, reducing inequality, and increasing the minimum wage than Democrats and
liberals. Republicans and conservatives are however concerned with reducing the deficit.
Looking across models using the 2013 EVS data, I find that Republicans and conservatives are
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less likely to support the view that it is the government’s responsibility to take care of the poor,
increasing taxes on rich, reducing inequality, and increasing minimum wage than Democrats and
liberals. Lastly, Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe that the government
provides too many services. Overall, these results are consistent with expectations.
In addition to these political variables, there are key differences among the
socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models. First, married couples are less likely to
support spending on healthcare than unmarried couples. Second, African Americans are in favor
of government spending on both welfare and the poor and increasing social services. African
Americans are also more likely to support increasing minimum wage; however, they are less
likely to support raising taxes on the rich. Third, Hispanics are concerned with increasing
spending on welfare and the poor and increasing social services. Fourth, Asians support
increased spending on crime and reducing income inequality. Fifth, women are more likely to
support spending on social security, increasing social services, reducing inequality, and
increasing minimum wage than men. Sixth, older individuals favor spending on social security,
crime, healthcare, and military defense. They are also more likely to believe in reducing the
deficit and increasing taxes on the rich than younger individuals. However, they are less likely to
support an increase in social services and reducing inequality. Seventh, education is negatively
related to spending on social security, crime, the poor, healthcare, and military defense.
Education is also negatively related to opinions on reducing the deficit, reducing income
inequality, and increasing minimum wage. Finally, income is negatively related to government
spending on social security, welfare, the poor, and healthcare. Wealthy individuals are also less
supportive of increasing social services, reducing inequality, and increasing minimum wage.

134

5. 4. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have demonstrated whether there is an empirical link between religious
belonging, religious having, and religious believing and economic policy opinions. Specifically,
I am concerned with the effects of these three dimensions of religion on government spending. I
am also interested in the influence of religion on a number of other economic policy issues
including government services, the federal deficit, taxes on the rich, economic inequality, and
minimum wage. I find that there are some among and within denominational differences on
economic issues, especially approval of government spending, although, the results are
inconsistent across economic policies. I also find that religious behaving is related to attitudes
toward government spending where those individuals who attend church more frequently are less
likely to support government spending on social security and military defense than infrequent
service attenders. Frequent worship attenders are also less likely to support reducing the federal
deficit.
Lastly, I find that religious believing is related to economic policy concerns. Perhaps the
most interesting finding is that religious importance, religious guidance in daily life, and biblical
literalism have the most consistent effects among the models. Likewise, when using 2013 EVS
survey data I find that perceptions of Jesus’ teachings contributes to how individuals assess
government responsibility, social services, taxes on the rich, economic inequality, and raising the
minimum wage. The results of the models demonstrate that the effects of religious belonging,
religious behaving, and religious believing should be considered in analyses of economic public
opinion and that these variables should be measured separately when conducting empirical
research. In this conclusion, I provide a summary of the findings and offer comments about
future research.
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Religious belonging. The results of the models demonstrate that there are differences
among religious denominations on spending on social security, welfare, the poor, and military
defense. Indeed, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants and Catholics are more likely to
support spending on social security than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. In
addition, other non-Christian religious groups are more likely to support spending on welfare.
Hispanic Catholics and other non-Christian religious groups are more likely to approve of
government spending on the poor. Most notably, mainline Protestants, evangelical Protestants,
Catholics, and other Christian religious group are more likely to support government spending on
defense than black Protestants, Hispanic Catholics, Jews, other non-Christian adherents, and the
religiously unaffiliated. Regarding other economic policy issues, I find that mainline Protestants,
Jewish adherents, and other non-Christian religious groups are in favor of increasing government
services. Interestingly, I find that Hispanic Catholics are less likely to favor increasing taxes on
the rich.
Using 2013 EVS survey data, I find limited denominational differences. Evangelical
Protestants are more likely to support reducing inequality; whereas, Hispanic Catholics are less
like support the government’s role in reducing inequality between the rich and the poor. In
general, the results of the models are consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter, albeit
there does not seem to be a systematic effect among the religious belonging variables and
attitudes toward economic policy concerns.
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Hypothesis

Support

Notes

H1: Religious belonging →
economic policy opinions

Generally supported

Inconsistent findings across
policy areas

H1a: Mainline Protestants,
Catholics, and Jews→
progressive views

Partially supported

Mainline Protestants support
social security and defense
spending. Support social
services.
Catholics support spending on
crime, social security spending
and defense spending
Jews support spending on
welfare. Also believe in social
services and the government’s
responsibility in taking care of
the poor

Religious Behaving. What is the influence of religious behaving on economic policy
opinions? The results from Table 5.5 and Table 5.8 demonstrate that service attendance is related
to government spending on social security and military defense; however, there is no effect of
service attendance among the other government spending variables. Those who attend religious
services more frequently are less likely to support government spending in these areas. In
addition, frequent service attenders are less concerned with reducing the deficit than nonfrequent attenders. Those who contribute to religious organizations are less likely to support
government spending on the poor and reducing economic inequality. This suggests that those
individuals who are contributing to their churches are more likely to believe in private acts of
charity rather than government assistance. Consistent with the hypotheses, I find support that
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religious behaving influences economic policy concerns, especially as it relates to spending on
social welfare programs.
Therefore,
Hypothesis

Support

Religious behaving→ economic
policy opinions

Supported

H2b: Religiously active →
progressive opinions

Partially supported

Note

Religiously active individuals hold
conservative opinions on social
security spending, spending on the
poor, and reducing inequality and
progressive opinions on defense
spending and reducing the deficit

Religious believing. Perhaps the most complex of the three dimensions of religion is
religious believing. More so than the effects of religious belonging and religious behaving,
religious believing influences public opinion on economic policy concerns. In all models—using
both 2016 ANES and 2013 EVS data—a component of religious believing influenced
government spending opinions and other economic policies. Religious importance is positively
related to increased spending on crime and military defense. It is also negatively related to
government spending on welfare and increasing social services. Those who turn to religion as
guidance in their daily lives are more likely to favor increasing government services, reducing
the federal deficit, and reducing inequality than those individuals who do not use their religious
beliefs as guidance in day-to-day life. Biblical literalism is significant in nearly all of the
government spending variables. Indeed, those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of
God are more likely to support government spending on social security, crime, the poor, and
military defense. Biblical literalists are also more likely (than those who believe that the Bible is
a book stories) to support government social services. The 2013 EVS dataset provides two
138

additional variables that I have called “preserve beliefs” and “care for the poor.” Individuals who
believe that religion should preserve traditional beliefs rather than adopt to current trends are less
likely to support increasing taxes on the rich, reducing inequality, and reducing the minimum
wage. Most notably, those individuals who believe that Jesus’ teachings supported a just society
in caring for the poor—versus private acts of charity—are more likely to believe in the
government’s responsibility in helping the poor, less likely to believing in reducing social series,
more likely to support increasing taxes on the rich, more likely to support the reduction of
economic inequality, and more likely to support increasing the minimum wage.
Therefore,
Hypothesis

Support

Religious believing → economic
policy opinions

Supported

H3b: Biblical literalists →
progressive economic policy
opinions

Supported

Note

Biblical literalists support an
increase in government spending
(variety of issues)
Preserve traditional beliefs is
related to conservative economic
policies.
Care for the poor is related to
progressive opinions on
government responsibility,
increasing taxes, reducing
economic inequality, and raising
the minimum wage

Overall, these findings suggest that those individuals who hold conservative religious
beliefs are more likely to support government spending and economic policies. Those individuals
who hold progressive religious beliefs are more likely to support governing services and
government intervention in economic matters such as reducing inequality and increasing the
minimum wage. These findings are generally consistent with expectations.
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Future research. Two future projects come to mind based on the results of these models.
First, the variable “service” is interesting in that it asks respondents about their belief in whether
the government should provide fewer or more services. Jews and non-Christian religious groups
report support for government services. In addition, those who believe that religion is important
in daily life are less likely to support increasing service; however, those who believe that religion
provides guidance in day to day life are more likely to support government services. Biblical
literalists also favor government services. I would like to explore these findings at greater
length. Based on the results presented in this chapter, those who believe that religion is important
are less likely to disapprove of government services but when religion provides guidance in daily
life respondents are more likely to approve of government services. Religious importance and
religious guidance appear to capture two different religious belief sentiments. I suspect that
religious importance is related to more conservative religious beliefs; whereas, religious
guidance constitutes more progressive religious beliefs.
Secondly (and lastly), the 2013 EVS variable “responsibility” asks respondents about
their opinion on the government’s responsibility to take care of people who cannot take care of
themselves. The results presented in Table 5.9, Model (1) show that those who believe that Jesus
promoted a just society (rather than private acts of charity) are more likely to support the
government’s responsibility in taking care of those who cannot help themselves. While this
relationship is significant, all other coefficients in the model—with the expectation of Jews—are
not significant. I would like to further explore these differences. The data suggest that there is
little else that influences government’s responsibility than the interpretation of Jesus’ teachings.
In sum, the models that I have presented in this chapter reveal that there is a link between
religious belonging, behaving, and believing and economic policy concerns. These three
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religious dimensions influence economic public opinion in models of government spending and
government responsibility in other fiscal issues. In the next chapter, I explore the effect of
religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on hybrid policy issues including
opinions on immigration, the environment, and free trade agreements.
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Chapter 6. Hybrid Policy Opinions
6.1. Introduction
In Chapter 4, I find significant effects of the three dimensions of religion—belonging,
behaving, and believing—on Americans’ attitudes on moral policy issues. In Chapter 5, I find
that the driving force behind public opinion on economic issues is religious beliefs, with
religious belonging and religious behaving having inconsistent effect on economic policy
concerns. In this chapter, I am interested in the effect of the three dimensions of religion on
hybrid issues including the environment, immigration, and foreign policy. Hybrid policies are
those that have both value-based10 and economic components. For example, immigration is a
value issue when considering humanitarian concerns and is an economic issue when considering
the government funding of a border wall or government spending on social welfare programs to
aid immigrants. Attitudes toward the environment or climate change is another example of an
issue that can be considered both moral and economic. Climate change is a moral issue when one
places importance on making the Earth safe for future generations. It is also an economic issue
when government action, regulation, or spending addresses changing climate. Therefore, I argue
that these issues are both moral and economic in nature, and I use the term hybrid to designate
issues that share both moral and economic features. Since the issues that I discuss in this chapter
have both moral and economic components, I am interested in teasing out which aspects of
religion influence the various policy domains.

10

These value-based issues are different from the moral policy issues that I presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, the
moral issues were largely concerned with sexuality or “pelvic politics.” In this chapter, when I use the word moral, I
am interested in issues that are value-based or have a sense of fairness or ethical considerations. I consider
immigration a moral or values-based issue on the groups of humanitarian rights. The “moral” issues that I present in
this chapter focus on human dignity, altruism, and responsibility.

142

Using data from the 2016 ANES survey, I present a series of models that estimate the
effects of religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious believing on immigration
attitudes toward (1) citizenship of immigrants, (2) Syrian refugees, and (3) support for building a
border wall with Mexico. Also using 2016 ANES survey data, I analyze models concerning the
environment. Chiefly, I am interested in the influence of the three dimensions of religion on (1)
an environment protection versus job protection tradeoff scale, (2) government spending on the
environment. Lastly, I consider the effects of religion on two foreign policy issues: (1) military
force, and (2) free trade.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I offer a series of bivariate analyses that display
the distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration. These two issues are
chosen as examples due to their relevancy in contemporary politics. The prevailing scholarly
literature on the effects of religion on the environment and immigration is limited. However,
previous research has demonstrated that there is a considerable effect of religious denomination
(religious belonging) and worship attendance (religious behaving) on global warming opinions
(Shao and McCarthy 2019, forthcoming). Evangelical Protestants and frequent service attenders
are less likely to believe in global warming than other religious groups and infrequent service
attenders. I have included the third dimension of religion (religious believing) in the models to
further explore this relationship.
6.2. Religious Dimensions
6.2.1. Religious Belonging
What is the influence of religious belonging on the environment, and immigration? The
results presented in Table 6.1 reveal that there are differences among religious denominations
and their support for spending on the environment (χ2 = 111.1125, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) and
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increasing immigration (χ2 = 43.5883, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) in the United States. Specifically, most
Catholics (53%), Jews (64%), and other religious individuals (56%) report favorable attitudes on
increasing spending on the environment; on the other hand, only 41% of Protestants support
increased environmental spending, with large minorities of Protestants preferring to keep
spending the same (37%) or decrease spending (23%) on the environment. There are also
differences among the religious denominations with respect to attitudes toward immigration. For
example, many Protestants prefer decreasing (50%) immigration levels in the United States.
Conversely, a significant number of Jews (36%) report favorability in increasing immigration.
I also find key within-denominational differences. In Table 6.2, I report the distribution
of attitudes toward spending on the environment (χ2 = 97.0994, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) and increasing
immigration levels (χ2 = 49.6641, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) among Protestants. Black Protestants (70%)
are largely in favor of increasing spending on the environment; whereas, evangelical Protestants
are largely in favor of either decreasing spending (24%) on keeping spending on the environment
the same (39%). Mainline Protestants and black Protestants hold similar opinions on
immigration; favoring decreasing immigration (Mainline, 44%; black 38%) or keeping
immigration the same (Mainline, 42%; black 46%). Contrary to Mainline and black Protestants,
evangelical Protestants are most in favor of decreasing (63%) immigration.
In this chapter, I address these within denominational differences. The distribution of
attitudes that I present in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that mainline Protestants and Catholics are
more likely to hold moderate to progressive views on the environment and moderate to
conservative views on immigration, while Jewish adherents are more likely to hold progressive
views on these policy issues. Also, evangelical Protestants take conservative stances on hybrid
issues regarding the environment and immigration. My overarching argument in this dissertation
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is that religious belonging—within and among religious traditions— effects those hybrid policy
issues that involve humanitarian or value components and concerns.

Table 6.1. distribution of attitudes toward spending on the environment and immigration,
2016 ANES
Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Decrease

22.66%

12.90%

7.06%

9.44%

Keep the same

36.59%

34.19%

29.41%

34.52%

Increase

40.74%

52.90%

63.53%

56.04%

Spending on the
environment

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

Immigration

100
1,156
111.1125
0.000

100
930

100
85

100
1,176

Protestant

Catholic

Jewish

Other

Decrease

50.05%

45.63%

20.27%

45.99%

Keep the same

37.31%

40.95%

43.24%

39.59%

Increase

12.64%

14.32%

36.49%

14.42%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
1,013
43.5883
0.000

100
789
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100
74

100
985

Table 6.2. distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration among Protestants, 2016
ANES
Mainline

Evangelical
Protestant

Black Protestant

Decrease

13.30%

23.95%

3.38%

Keep the same

38.34%

38.69%

26.16%

Increase

48.36%

37.35%

70.46%

Spending on the
environment

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

Immigration

100
579
97.0994
0.010

100
597

100
237

Mainline

Evangelical
Protestant

Black Protestant

Decrease

44.40%

62.62%

38.69%

Keep the same

42.44%

30.02%

45.73%

Increase

13.16%

7.36%

15.58%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
509
49.6641
0.000

100
503

100
199

6.2.2. Religious Behaving
In Table 6.3 I focus on differences in attitudes between church attenders and non-church
attenders on spending on the environment and immigration. Looking first at opinions on
increasing spending on the environment among church attenders, I find that the differences in the
distribution of attitudes among Catholics, Jews, and other religious groups are significant ( χ2 =
84.9975, Prob(χ2) = 0.000). First, Catholics (50%), Jews (57%), and other religious groups
(55%) favor increasing spending on the environment; whereas, fewer (24%) Protestants report
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favorability in increasing spending (24%). Among non-church attenders, I find a similar pattern
(χ2 = 22.7490, Prob(χ2) = 0.001). Catholics (59%), Jews (72%), and other religious groups (59%)
favor increasing spending. Protestants (nearly 50%) are less likely to favor spending on the
environment than the other religious groups.
Comparing church attenders and non-church attenders, the distribution of attitudes
demonstrates a pattern of support for increasing spending on the environment regardless of
religious denomination; for all four religious groups, the level of support for increased spending
is higher for non-church attenders than for regular church attenders. Thus, I posit that church
attenders are more likely to hold conservative views on the environment than non-church
attenders, regardless of religious denomination. However, Jewish adherents and other religious
groups are more likely to hold progressive opinions on the environment—regardless of their
frequency of service attendance.
Differences among church attenders and non-church attenders exist among religious
denominations regarding increasing immigration in the United States. First, I find that among
church attenders Protestants (51%) report favorability in decreasing immigration. Many
Catholics (49%) and other religious groups (47%) also report favorability in decreasing
immigration. Jewish adherents (56%) mostly prefer keeping immigration levels the same. These
results of the bivariate analyses are statistically significant ( χ2 = 20.2477, Prob(χ2) = 0.000).
Regarding opinions among non-church attenders (χ2 = 30.7511, Prob(χ2) = 0.000), a significant
number of Jews (48%) favor increasing immigration. Protestants, Catholics, and other religious
groups are split in the opinions on decreasing immigration (Protestants 47%; Catholics 40%;
other 43%) or keeping immigration levels the same (Protestants 41%; Catholics 40%; other
42%). I find a progressive trend between the models of church attenders and non-church
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attenders. Non-church attenders are more progressive in their views on immigration than church
attenders. I speculate that frequent church attenders will hold more conservative opinions on
immigration than those who attend religious services less frequently.
Overall, there seems to be (limited) evidence that religious behaving influences
immigration attitudes. Indeed, the groups are similar in their immigration preferences, except for
Jewish non-service attenders who are more supportive of increased immigration than Jewish
service attenders.
6.2.3. Religious Belief
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that religious belief influences opinions on
both moral and economic policy issues. In Table 6.4, I consider the effects of biblical literalism
and religious importance on attitudes toward the environment and immigration. Here I find that
there are significant differences (χ2 = 188.6952, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) among those who believe that
the Bible is not the word of God, the Bible is the word of God but should not be taken literally,
and the Bible is the word of God on environment policy concerns. Specifically, those who
believe that the Bible is not the word of God favor increasing government spending on the
environment; whereas, fewer biblical literalists (44%) believe in increasing spending on the
environment.
In another example, religious importance is related to opinions on government spending
on the environment (χ2 = 105.8482, Prob(χ2) = 0.000) . In this case, those who believe that
religion is important (48%) report less favorable attitudes on increasing spending on the
environment than those who do not believe that religion is an important part of their daily lives
(64%).
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Table 6.3. distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration among church attenders and non-church attenders, ANES 2016
Church attenders

Non-church attenders

Protestants

Catholics

Jewish

Other

Protestants

Catholics

Jewish

Other

Decrease

23.93%

15.16%

8.70%

10.02%

17.84%

7.93%

5.13%

7.72%

Keep the same

37.70%

34.69%

34.78%

34.97%

32.37%

33.10%

23.08%

33.22%

Increase

38.36%

50.16%

56.52%

55.01%

49.79%

58.97%

71.79%

59.06%

100
46

100
878

100
39

100
298

Environment

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
915
84.9975
0.000

100
640

100
241
22.7490
0.001

100
290

Immigration
Church attenders

Non-church attenders

Protestants

Catholics

Jewish

Other

Protestants

Catholics

Jewish

Other

Decrease

50.75%

48.87%

17.07%

47.15%

47.44%

45.08%

24.24%

42.51%

Keep the same

36.22%

40.18%

56.10%

38.89%

41.40%

39.75%

27.27%

41.70%

Increase

13.03%

13.94%

26.83%

13.96%

11.16%

15.16%

48.48%

15.79%

100
41

100
738

100
33

100
247

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
798
20.2477
0.003

100
545

149

100
215
30.7511
0.000

100
244

Table 6.4. distribution of attitudes toward the environment and immigration by biblical literalism and religious
importance, 2016 ANES
Biblical Literalism

Religious Importance

Not the
word of
God

Word of
God but
not literally

Literal
Word of
God

Not
Important

Important

Decrease

8.38%

12.47%

19.85%

8.22%

16.40%

Keep the same

21.68%

37.27%

36.15%

28.17%

35.54%

Increase

69.94%

50.26%

44.00%

63.61%

48.06%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
1,038
188.6952
0.000

Decrease

16.10%

23.64%

35.34%

34.79%

48.85%

Keep the same

42.61%

41.68%

34.23%

42.97%

38.28%

Increase

9.64%

4.10%

4.40%

22.24%

12.87%

Total
N
χ2
Prob(χ2)

100
913
195.1880
0.000

Environment

100
1,932

100
1,209

100
1,459
105.8482
0.000

100
2,763

Immigration

100
1,658
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100
999

100
1,259
85.9059
0.000

100
2,346

There are also differences in the distribution of attitudes toward immigration among
biblical literalists, those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God, and those who believe
that the Bible is the word of God but should not be taken literally ( χ2 = 195.1880, Prob(χ2) =
0.000). Biblical literalists are split in their opinions on decreasing (35%) and keeping
immigration levels in the United States the same (34%). Those who believe that the Bible is not
the word of God largely support keeping immigration the same (42%). Religious importance also
plays a role in immigration attitudes; however, the majority of individuals—regardless of
religion’s importance in daily life—support either decreasing immigration or keeping
immigration levels the same in the United States. Notably, 22% of those who believe that
religion is not important support increasing immigration; whereas, only 13% of those who
believe that religion is an important party of daily life support increasing immigration.
6.2.4. Summary
These preliminary bivariate analyses expose potential differences among the three
dimensions of religion and attitudes toward issues that are considered both moral and economic.
These hybrid issues, the environment and immigration, have a mix of both moral and economic
components; therefore, I argue that religious belonging, religious behaving, and religious
believing influences hybrid policy opinions that are predominately concerned with values and
religious believing influences hybrid policy opinions that are predominately concerned with
economic considerations.
6.3. Empirical Results for Multivariate Models
In this section I present results for several ordered logistic regression models. In both sets
of models, I use data from the 2016 ANES. In Table 6.5, I report the results for environmental
policy concerns: (1) environment versus job tradeoff scale and (2) government spending on the
environment. In Table 6.7, I report the results for models dealing with support for immigration

policy: (1) increasing/decreasing immigration levels, (2) birthright citizenship, (3) increasing the
number of Syrian refugees allowed in the country, and (4) support for building a border wall
with Mexico. In Table 6.10, I present results from models concerning (1) the use of military
force and (2) free trade agreement opinions. In each model I include religious belonging,
religious behaving, and religious believing variables. In addition, I include partisan identification
and political ideology in the models as well as standard socioeconomic and demographic
variables. In models concerning immigration and foreign policy, I include two additional
variables, (1) foreign born and (2) parents foreign born. These variables capture the effects of
whether individuals are foreign born and the number of parents that the respondent has who are
foreign born.
My overall argument is that religion influences hybrid issues. However, I include in my
models separate sets of variables representing religious belonging, religious behaving, and
religious believing; this permits me to discern which religious dimension influences the hybrid
policy domains. I posit that religious believing influences those issues that involve government
spending or are more focused on the economic component of the policy dimension, i.e.
government spending on the environment or building a border wall with Mexico. I also argue
that all three religious dimensions will have an influence on hybrid policies that are
predominately values-based or concern humanitarian issues such as allowing Syrian refugees in
the country. Overall, since I include a variety of directional and non-directional hypotheses, I
report results from both one-tailed and two-tailed hypothesis tests, where appropriate.
6.3.1. Religious Belonging
Environment. What is the effect of religious belonging on attitudes toward environmental
policy opinions? In Table 6.5, I find that there are limited effects of religious belonging on
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environmental policy concerns. In Model (1), the dependent variable is an environment/jobs
tradeoff scale, which ranges from 0 (for a preference for “no regulation of the environment
because it will not work and will cost jobs” to 6 (for a preference to “regulate business to protect
the environment and create jobs”). I find that Catholics are less likely to support government
regulation of the environment (b = -0.259, z = -2.07) than other religious groups and the
religiously unaffiliated, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. However,
the coefficients of the other religious belonging variables are not statistically significant in
Model (1). It appears that non-Hispanic Catholics are the outliers in their preferences for weaker
environmental regulation. In Model (2), I find a similar pattern with regards to the influence of
religious belonging on government spending on the environment. Hispanic Catholics (b = -0.598,
z = -2.24) are less likely to support increased spending on the environment than other religious
groups and the religiously unaffiliated.
In Table 6.6, I present the various religious traditions and the probability of supporting
business regulation to protect the environment. In this discussion, I draw attention to the
statistically significant coefficients reported in Table 6.5. Among Catholics, the probability of
supporting government regulation of businesses to protect the environment is 0.222 and the
probability for those who are religiously unaffiliated is 0.261. While the differences between
Catholics and the religiously unaffiliated is not large, the underlying coefficients for these
variables are statistically significant.
Overall, the results of these models demonstrate that the effects of religious belonging on
models of environmental policy concerns are limited at best. I argue that this is due to the
economic nature of the variables in the models. Specifically, both models deal with the economic
side of environmental concerns: job creation and government spending. Consistent with the
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results of the models presented in Chapter 5, religious belonging has a limited effect on
economic issues.11 In the case of this chapter, both environmental policy issues were economic in
nature; however, in future projects I will consider dependent variables that capture the other
aspects of environmental policy concerns. For example, the 2014 PRRI/AAR Religion, Values &
Climate Change Survey contains environmental policy questions involving personal
responsibility to protect other species, preventing human suffering, respecting and taking care of
the earth, and protecting future generations. I believe that religious denomination will influence
opinions on the environment when moral components of climate change are discussed. 12
Immigration. The 2016 ANES included several measures of government regulation or
involvement in immigration policy. For the purposes of this dissertation, I include four models
dealing with immigration issues: (1) immigration levels, (2) citizenship of immigrants, (3)
increasing the number of Syrian refugees allowed in the United States, and (4) building a border
wall with Mexico. These variables include both moral and economic components of
immigration. The results of the models demonstrate that there are religious belonging effects in
all four models; however, there is most variation and statistical significance among the
coefficients in models that deal with increasing (decreasing) immigration. Black Protestants ( b =
-0.526, z = -2.30) and evangelical Protestants ( b = -0.439, z = -3.16) are less likely to support
increasing the number of immigrants allowed in the United States; whereas, Jews are more likely

11

There were several environmental variables in the 2016 ANES. Three variables were related to government policy
or spending: environment/jobs tradeoff, government spending on the environment, and the government’s
responsibility on regulating global warming. In addition, there were two variables that were not related to policy but
related to opinions on global warming. I did not find significant effects of the religious belonging variables in these
models. I did not include these results in the chapter because I am chiefly concerned with policy opinions and not
whether global warming is happening or if the respondent believes that global warming is manmade or due to
natural causes.
12
I did not include 2014 PRRI/AAR data in this dissertation because it did not specifically relate to policy issues,
rather the questions concerned environmental protection. In future projects I would like to explore religious
belonging and attitudes toward environmental conservation.
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to support increasing immigration (b = 0.507, z = 2.09), controlling for the effects of the other
variables in the models. Jewish adherents ( b = -0.669, z = -2.82) are also less supportive of
birthplace citizenship than the other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. These
findings are not surprising—I suspect that Jewish adherents rely on biblical teachings in the Old
Testament and religious doctrine when considering immigration citizenship opinions.
Evangelical Protestants ( b = -0.592, z = -4.23), Catholics (b = -0.351, z = -2.93), and other
Christian religious groups (b = -0.307, z = -2.42) are less likely to support allowing Syrian
refugees in the United States than other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. Other
non-Christian religious groups are largely in favor of allowing refugees in the United States ( b =
0.412, z = 2.48). Perhaps these findings demonstrate longstanding religious cultural divides
among religious traditions and their feelings toward other religious groups—i.e. Muslims. In the
last model that I present in Table 6.6, Model (4), Catholics (b = 0.402, z = 3.21) and other
Christians (b = 0.288, z = 2.19) are more likely to support building a border wall with Mexico
than the other religious groups and the religiously unaffiliated. This is an interesting finding,
especially because Mexico is predominately a Catholic country. In future analyses, I will explore
at greater length the relationship between Catholics and immigration opinions.
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Table 6.5. Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of environmental
policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (1)
Environment/Jobs
Tradeoff
b

Model (2)
Environment
Spending

z

b

z

Belonging
Mainline Protestants
Black Protestants
Evangelical Protestants
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian

0.002
-0.035
-0.208
-0.259
0.047
-0.049

0.01
-0.14
-1.43
-2.07*
0.19
-0.36

0.136
0.192
-0.037
0.118
-0.598
0.048

0.94
0.72
-0.24
0.85
-2.24*
0.33

Jewish
Other Religion

0.035
0.000

0.15
0.00

-0.022
0.009

-0.07
0.05

Behaving
Attendance
Contributions

-0.074
0.036

-2.15*
0.40

-0.043
0.011

-1.25
0.12

Religious Importance
Religious Guidance
Biblical Literalism
Spirituality

-0.286
0.208
-0.221
-0.000

-1.92
3.37**
-3.17**
-0.00

-0.143
0.050
-0.195
0.024

-0.90
0.78
-2.71**
0.51

Political Variables
Partisan Identification

-0.213

-9.37***

-0.189

-8.23***

Political Ideology

-0.383

-11.38***

-0.453

-12.48***

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Married
Black
Hispanic
Asian

-0.090
0.092
0.346
0.220

-1.18
0.49
2.07*
1.07

-0.141
0.328
0.860
0.508

-1.76
1.60
4.54***
2.22*

Gender
Age
Education
Income

0.188
-0.009
0.050
0.002

2.68**
-4.19***
2.03*
0.34

0.224
-0.006
-0.008
-0.008

3.00**
-2.55*
-0.29
-1.47

Believing

N
Pseudo R2

2,769
0.0892

3,298
0.1449

χ2
Prob(χ2)

907.55
.0000

926.48
.0000
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Table 6.6. Predicted probabilities for environment protection attitudes associated with religious denominations
Environment/job tradeoff
No
1
2
3
4
5
Regulate
regulation
business
M. Protestant
B. Protestant
E. Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Secular

0.044
0.045
0.053
0.055
0.042
0.046
0.042
0.044
0.044

0.074
0.076
0.086
0.089
0.072
0.077
0.072
0.074
0.074

0.097
0.099
0.108
0.110
0.095
0.100
0.096
0.097
0.097
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0.183
0.185
0.193
0.195
0.181
0.186
0.182
0.183
0.183

0.164
0.164
0.164
0.164
0.164
0.164
0.164
0.164
0.164

0.176
0.174
0.168
0.166
0.177
0.174
0.177
0.176
0.176

0.261
0.256
0.229
0.222
0.269
0.254
0.267
0.261
0.261

Table 6.7. Ordered Logistic Regression estimates for models of immigration policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (1)
Immigration

Model (2)
Citizenship

Model (3)
Refugees
z

Model (4)
Border Wall

b

z

b

z

b

b

z

Belonging
Mainline
B. Protestant

-0.013
-0.526

-0.10
-2.30*

-0.031
0.142

-0.25
0.65

-0.051
-0.439

-0.41
-1.96

0.033
0.164

0.24
0.71

Evangelical
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other Religion

-0.439
-0.221
0.084
-0.128
0.507
0.204

-3.16**
-1.84
0.38
-1.01
2.09*
1.22

-0.017
0.101
-0.241
-0.124
-0.699
-0.096

-0.13
0.87
-1.08
-1.01
-2.82**
-0.59

-0.592
-0.351
-0.123
-0.307
0.034
0.412

-4.23***
-2.93**
-0.55
-2.42*
0.13
2.48*

0.273
0.402
-0.443
0.288
0.069
-0.038

1.91
3.21***
-1.79
2.19*
0.24
-0.22

0.091
0.084

2.86**
0.99

-0.046
-0.031

-1.49
-0.38

0.156
0.182

4.83***
2.14*

-0.096
-0.208

-2.93**
-2.38*

Importance
Guidance

-0.281
0.099

-1.94
1.68

0.293
-0.145

2.10*
-2.55*

-0.357
0.140

-2.48*
2.37*

0.185
-0.039

1.25
-0.66

Literalism
Spirituality

-0.222
-0.038

-3.43***
-0.82

0.023
0.056

0.37
1.33

-0.205
0.008

-3.16**
0.17

0.277
-0.065

4.19***
-1.46

-8.31***
-10.02***

0.199
0.253

9.78***
8.35***

-0.300
-0.472

-14.10***
-14.86***

0.347
0.440

15.94***
13.34***

Behaving
Attendance
Contributions
Believing

Political Variables
Identification
-0.175
Ideology
-0.318
Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Foreign Born
P. Foreign Born
Married
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Gender

-0.109
0.200
-0.056
0.365
0.360
0.403
-0.164

-0.68
2.69**
-0.77
2.13*
2.28*
1.94
-2.45*

-0.081
-0.090
0.012
0.061
-0.832
0.095
-0.030

-0.51
-1.23
0.17
0.37
-5.18***
0.46
-0.47

-0.152
0.131
-0.064
-0.208
0.200
0.104
-0.046

-0.93
1.74
-0.87
-1.24
1.26
0.50
-0.69

-0.086
0.043
0.109
-0.103
-0.932
0.117
-0.035

-0.49
0.54
1.45
-0.58
-5.33***
0.53
-0.51

Age
Education
Income

-0.011
0.131
0.010

-5.55***
5.64***
2.09*

0.009
-0.032
-0.003

4.65***
-1.41
-0.56

-0.012
0.169
0.010

-5.84***
7.30***
1.97*

0.006
-0.130
-0.025

2.83**
-5.42***
-4.87***

N
Pseudo R2
χ2
Prob (χ2)

3,280
0.0925
868.87
.0000

3,291
0.0553
631.46
.0000
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3,281
0.1321
1476.45
.0000

3,281
0.1474
1557.25
.0000

In Table 6.8 and 6.9, I present the various religious traditions and the probability of
supporting increasing immigration and building a government funded border wall with Mexico.
Again, in this discussion I draw attention to the statistically significant coefficients reported in
Table 6.7. Black Protestants are significantly less likely to support increasing immigration than
seculars, a difference of .023. There is a similar pattern among evangelical Protestants and the
religiously unaffiliated concerning opinions on immigration. The probability of supporting a
increase in immigration is 0.041; whereas, the probability of being religiously unaffiliated or
secular and supporting an increase in immigration is 0.061. Thus, there is a difference of .02
among evangelical Protestants the religiously unaffiliated. Conversely, Jews are more likely to
support an increase in immigration (0.094) than the religiously unaffiliated (0.061). While the
differences between the various religious traditions and the religiously unaffiliated are small, the
underlying coefficients for these variables are statistically significant.

Table 6.8. Predicted probabilities for immigration attitudes associated with religious denominations
Immigration level
Decreased
1
2
3
Increased a
a lot
lot
Mainline Protestant
Black Protestant
Evangelical Protestant
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Secular

0.222
0.307
0.292
0.255
0.207
0.239
0.152
0.190
0.222

0.190
0.210
0.207
0.199
0.185
0.195
0.159
0.178
0.189
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0.415
0.366
0.375
0.397
0.422
0.406
0.441
0.429
0.416

0.113
0.079
0.085
0.099
0.121
0.105
0.154
0.130
0.114

0.060
0.038
0.041
0.050
0.066
0.054
0.094
0.073
0.061

Table 6.9. Predicted probabilities for border wall attitudes associated with religious denominations
Oppose
1
2
3
4
5
Border wall
border
wall
M. Protestant
B. Protestant
E. Protestant
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Secular

0.387
0.366
0.348
0.327
0.468
0.345
0.381
0.399
0.393

0.081
0.080
0.079
0.078
0.083
0.079
0.081
0.082
0.082

0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021
0.021

0.211
0.213
0.214
0.215
0.198
0.214
0.211
0.209
0.210

0.019
0.020
0.020
0.021
0.017
0.020
0.019
0.019
0.019

Support
border
wall

0.094
0.098
0.101
0.105
0.079
0.102
0.096
0.092
0.093

0.186
0.202
0.216
0.234
0.134
0.218
0.190
0.177
0.182

In Table 6.9, I report the predicted probabilities associated with the various religious
traditions and the probability of supporting the building of a government funded border wall with
Mexico. Catholics (0.234) and other Christian religious groups (0.218) are more likely to support
a border wall than the religiously unaffiliated (0.182).
What do these models tells us about the role of religious belonging on mass attitudes
relating to hybrid policy issues? First, these models demonstrate that there is a relationship
between religious belonging and immigration concerns. Chiefly, black Protestants, evangelical
Protestants, and Catholics are less likely to favor increasing immigration in the United States.
Catholics are also in favor of building a border wall with Mexico. Jewish adherents are more
progressive in their opinions on immigration; however, they are not in favor of allowing
undocumented immigrants to remain the United States without penalty. Arguably, religious
belonging has a significant effect on the models of immigration because the dependent variables
in the models concern a moral (relative to economic) component in question phrasing by using
“refugees” and “immigrants” rather than “undocumented workers.” In sum, while
denominational differences existed among models of immigration, there were limited
denominational differences on environmental policy opinions—largely due to the economic
nature of the ANES survey questions.
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Foreign policy. In Table 6.10 I present the results of two models dealing with foreign
policy concerns. First, there are generally no differences among religious traditions and opinions
on foreign policy—with the exception of one statistically significant coefficient. Jewish (b =
0.632, z = 2.53) adherents are more likely to support free trade agreements than other religious
groups. The non-existent statistical significance on religious belonging variables and foreign
policy opinions suggests that religious tradition does not play a role in shaping foreign policy
opinions, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. In future projects, I
would like to address this issue by including political knowledge and political interest variables
in the models. I suspect that those individuals who are more politically aware and who have
higher levels of political interest are more likely to have strong foreign policy attitudes.
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Table 6.10. Ordered Logistic regression estimates for models of foreign
policy opinions, 2016 ANES data
Model (7)
Military Force

Model (8)
Free Trade

b

z

b

z

Belonging
Mainline

0.100

0.77

0.058

0.47

Black Protestant
Evangelical
Catholic
Hispanic Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other Religion

0.270
0.079
0.201
0.150
0.232
0.203
-0.144

1.14
0.55
1.63
0.64
1.79
0.82
-0.82

-0.088
-0.094
0.079
0.211
0.048
0.632
0.166

-0.40
-0.69
0.66
0.96
0.38
2.53*
1.03

Attendance
Contributions

0.003
-0.211

0.10
-2.41*

0.011
0.068

0.34
0.82

Believing
Importance

0.079

0.54

-0.114

-0.81

Guidance
Biblical Literalism
Spirituality

0.072
0.285
0.045

1.20
4.24***
0.97

0.029
-0.101
0.019

0.50
-1.60
0.46

Political Variables
Partisan Identification
Political Ideology

0.041
0.149

1.89
4.64***

-0.072
-0.071

-3.50***
-2.32*

Socioeconomic/
Demographic
Foreign Born

-0.214

-1.25

0.244

1.52

Parents Foreign Born
Black
Hispanic

0.034
-0.032
-0.292

0.44
-0.18
-1.73

0.002
0.194
0.231

0.03
1.18
1.46

Asian
Gender

-0.422
-0.110

-1.84
-1.60

0.087
-0.194

0.41
-2.94**

Age
Education
Income

0.003
-0.041
0.002

1.59
-1.73
0.44

0.006
0.182
0.011

3.06**
7.92***
2.34*

Behaving

N
Pseudo R2
χ2
Prob(χ2)

3,285
0.0317
260.74
.0000

3,266
0.0243
260.64
.0000
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6.3.2. Religious Behaving
Environment. What is the influence of religious behaving on Americans’ attitudes on
environmental policy? In the models presented in Table 6.5, environmental policy opinions,
religious worship attendance has a negative effect on the environment/jobs tradeoff. Those
individuals who are more frequent service attenders are less likely to believe in regulating
businesses to protect the environment than those who attend services less frequently. There are
no other significant effects of service attendance or religious contributions in the models
regarding environmental concerns. Again, these findings are consistent with my argument that
hybrid policy issues that are couched in economic terms will not be influenced by religious
behaving in the same ways that behaving factors influence moral issues. The exception in this
case is model (1) or the environment/jobs tradeoff. It is possible (and consistent with the
bivariate preliminary findings) that church goers in general hold more conservative views on the
environment compared to those individuals who are infrequent service attenders.
In Figure 6.1, I report the predicted probabilities of supporting government regulation of
business to protect the environment by service attendance. Included in this figure, are the top two
and bottom two categories on the environment/jobs tradeoff scale. As one can see, a church
attendance increases support for regulation of businesses to protect the environment decreases.
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.25
.1

.15

.2

Regulation/protect environment

0

.05

No regulation/ protect jobs

0

1

2
Church attendance

3

4

Figure 6.1. Predicted probabilities and support for environmental protection by
church attendance

Immigration. Turning to Table 6.7, immigration policy opinions, I find that there are
significant effects of religious attendance and immigration opinions, controlling for the effects of
the other variables in the models. The results demonstrate that religious behaving is related to
immigration concerns in three of the four models. Frequent service attenders are more likely to
support increasing immigration ( b = 0.091, z = 2.86), and allowing Syrian refugees in the United
States (b = 0.156, z = 4.83) than those who do not attend religious services frequently,
controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Consistent with these findings,
frequent service attenders are less likely to support building a border wall with Mexico (b
= -0.096, z = -2.93) than less religious adherents. Whether one has contributed to a religious
organization is also related to immigration opinions. Similar to the findings on the relationship
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between service attendance and immigration, the coefficient for religious contributes is positive
and statistically significant regarding opinions on allowing Syrian refugees in the United States
(b = 0.182, z = 2.14). In addition, those who contribute to religious organizations are also less
likely to support building a border wall with Mexico (b = -0.208, z = -2.38).
In Figure 6.2, I present the predicted probabilities for support for immigration by church
attendance. On one hand, as service attendance increases so too does support for increasing
immigration in the United States. On the other hand, as service attendance increases, there is also
a slight decrease in approval for increasing immigration. In Figure 6.3, I show the predicted
probabilities for support building a border wall. There are significant differences among church
attenders and support for the border wall. Indeed, those who are frequent attenders are less likely
to support the border wall (11%) than non-frequent attenders (nearly 15%). In addition, those
who are frequent service attenders are more likely to oppose a government funded border wall
with Mexico (37%) than non-frequent attenders (27%).
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Figure 6.2. Predicted probabilities and support for immigration
by church attendance
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Oppose border wall
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Support border wall

0

1
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Church attendance

3

Figure 6.3 Predicted probabilities and support for building a border wall
by church attendance
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Foreign policy. Religious contributions are related to negative opinions concerning using
military forces or deploying troops to Iraq (b = - 0.211, z = -2.41). Those who contribute to
religious organizations are less likely to favor military intervention. This is consistent with the
hypotheses that religiously active individuals will hold more progressive policy stances on issues
that involve humanitarian concerns, i.e. war.
These results demonstrate the importance of including the religious behaving dimension
of religion when modeling the effects of public opinion on immigration. While the results of the
models regarding environmental policy concerns are less clear, I suggest that religious believing
influences opinions on the environment when moral or values-based components of the
environment are incorporated into survey questions.
6.3.3. Religious Believing
Throughout this dissertation, I argue that religious believing is related to both moral and
economic policy opinions. In this section, I will demonstrate that religious believing is related to
both environmental policies and immigration policies. I measure religious believing as (1)
religious importance, (2) religious guidance, (3) biblical literalism, and (4) spirituality. For
example, I argue that biblical literalism is negatively related to environmental and immigration
policy issues. Those individuals who believe that the Bible is the literal word of God are more
likely to hold conservative views on the environment and immigration than those who believe
that the Bible is the word of man.
In Table 6.5, one can see that religious guidance in daily life is positively related to belief
in regulating businesses to protect the environment (b = 0.208, z = 3.37). Those who use religion
as guidance in their daily life support government regulation of business to protect the
environment compared to those who do not consider religion as guidance in day-to-day living,
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controlling for the effects of the other variables in the models. Regarding biblical literalism,
those who believe that the Bible is the word of God are less likely to support regulation of
businesses (b = -0.221, z = -3.17) and spending on the environment (b = -0.195, z = -2.71) than
those who believe that the Bible is not the literal word of God. These findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that religious believing is related to both economic and moral policy issues. I have
considered these environmental policy issues economic in nature; therefore, the statistical
significance of the coefficients is no surprise. I have shown that religious belonging is related to
environmental policy concerns, and these results here suggestion that scholars analyzing public
opinion on environmental issues should also include religious believing measures in their
models. In Figure 6.4 I show the predicted probabilities for environmental protection by biblical
literalism. The dark lines represent the top two and bottom two categories on the dependent
variable, environment/job tradeoff. As on can see, there are considerable differences among
biblical literalists and those who do not believe that the bible is the literal word of God. Indeed,
biblical literalists are less supportive of business regulation to protect the environment than those
who do not believe in the literal interpretation of the bible.
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literal word of God

Figure 6.4. Predicted probabilities and support for the environment by biblical literalism

Immigration. The results of the models in Table 6.7 demonstrate that religious believing
has an influence on immigration policy opinions. First, religious importance is related to
citizenship concerns and Syrian refugee approval. Those who believe that religion is important
support birthright citizenship (b = 0.293, z = 2.10) and they are less likely approve of allowing
Syrian refugees in the county (b = -0.357, z = -2.48) than those who believe that religion is not
important. Second, religious guidance also plays a role in shaping opinions on citizenship and
Syrian refugees. Those who rely on religion for guidance are more likely less likely birthright
citizenship (b = -0.145, z = -2.55) and more likely to support allowing Syrian refugees in the
country (b = 0.140, z = 2.37). While the direction of the coefficients of these variables seem to
contradict one another; perhaps, these findings demonstrate differences between those who
believe that religion is important and those who use religion as guidance in day-to-day living and
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how these groups apply their religious beliefs and practices. I suspect that those who use religion
as guidance in daily living are more prone to expressing their religious beliefs and applying these
religious convictions to policy opinions. Third, biblical literalism is related to several
immigration policies including opinions on the number of immigrants allowed in the country (b
= -0.222, z = -3.43), Syrian refugees (b = -0.205, z = -3.16), and building a border wall with
Mexico (b = 0.277, z = 4.19). Biblical literalists are less likely to support increasing immigration
in the United States and allowing Syrian refuges in the country and more likely to support
building a border wall with Mexico than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God.
This finding is consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 and the results presented in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5: biblical literalists hold more conservative policy opinions than those
who believe that the Bible is not the word of God. Lastly, it is important to note spirituality does
not have an effect on any of the dependent variables in the models. I believe that this is related to
large ideological differences among those who are spiritual.13

13

In figure 6.5 I show the predicted probabilities of supporting an increase(decrease) in immigration by biblical
literalism. There are significant differences among biblical literalists/non-literalists. Those who believe that the
Bible is the literal word of God favor decreasing immigration in the United States. This result is consistent with the
hypotheses that biblical literalists are generally more conservative but inconsistent with hypothesis 3c: Biblical
literalists take more progressive policy stances on hybrid issues that involve humanitarian concerns.

170

.5
.3

.4

keep the same

.2

decrease

0

.1

increase

not the literal word

word of God, not literal

literal word of God

.4

Figure 6.5. Predicted probabilities and support for immigration
by biblical literalism
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Figure 6.6. Predicted probabilities and support for building a border wall
by biblical literalism
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Foreign policy. Consistent with the results of most hybrid policy models, doctrinal beliefs
have an effect on support for military force. Biblical literalists are more likely (b = 0.285, z =
4.24) to support sending troops to Iraq than those who do not believe in the literal interpretation
of the Bible. This finding is inconsistent with the hypotheses. I argued that biblical literalists
would hold more progressive policy opinions than other individuals and the results demonstrate
overall conservative policy opinions regarding military force.
6.3.4. A Note on the effects of Control Variables
In this chapter I concentrate on the influence of religious belonging, behaving, and
believing on hybrid policy issues. However, there are significant findings among the political
and socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models. There are several findings that are
worth pointing out. First, Republicans and conservatives are less likely to support government
regulation of businesses to protect the environment and government spending on the
environment than Democrats and liberals, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the
models. Second, Republicans and conservatives are also less likely to support immigration
policies that allow an increasing number of immigrants or refugees in the country and more
likely to support policies that restrict immigration such as penalties for undocumented
immigrants and a border wall with Mexico. The converse is true for Democrats and liberals who
prefer increasing immigration and the number of Syrian refuges allowed in the country and
disapprove of building a border wall with Mexico.
In addition to the political variables, there are several noteworthy findings among the
socioeconomic and demographic variables. There are two variables that I included the models
relating to immigration: foreign born and parents foreign born. These variables capture whether
the respondent is foreign born of if the respondent has parents who are foreign born.
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Interestingly, the only model that considerations on being foreign born or having parents who are
foreign born has an effect is Model (1): Immigration. Those respondents who have more than
one parent who are foreign born are more likely to support increasing immigration in the United
States than those respondents who have no parents who are foreign born, controlling for the
effects of the other variables in the models. Again, the coefficients of these variables are not
significant in other immigration models.
Race, gender, age, education, and income have various effects on environmental and
immigration policies. Turning to opinions on the environment, Hispanics, Asians, women,
younger individuals, and those with higher levels of income hold progressive opinions on
government involvement environment regulations, supporting government regulation of
businesses or government spending on the environment. Considering the effects of these
variables on immigration policies, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to favor
increasing immigration in the United States. Hispanics are also less likely to believe that there
should be no penalty for undocumented immigrants and less likely to support building a border
wall with Mexico. Women are less likely to support increasing immigration compared to men.
Age has a significant influence in all models regarding immigration. Those who are older are less
likely to support increasing immigration and more likely to support a border wall than younger
individuals. Lastly, education and income have an influence on immigration policy opinions. The
more education and wealthy are more likely to favor policies that increase the number of
immigrants or refugees allowed in the United States than those who have less education and
lower levels of income.
In sum, these results are similar to the results presented in previous chapters. Republicans
and conservatives hold more conservative policy opinions than Democrats and liberals. Women
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are more progressive in their opinions than men. Older individuals are more conservative in their
policy opinions than younger individuals. And those who have higher levels of education are
more progressive than those with fewer years of education.
6.4. Conclusion
Overall, the results demonstrate that religious believing is related to policy opinions
concerning the environment and immigration. As expected, those issues that have economic or
fiscal components are influenced by religious believing. While religious behaving and religious
belonging have an influence, the findings are often mixed. Those issues that have moral (in this
case humanitarian) characteristics are influences by all three policy domains. These findings are
consistent with the hypotheses presented in the previous chapters. In addition, these findings
provide additional support to the notion that the clergy, church social groups, and religious
doctrine are clear in their stance on moral or value based polices, whereas, economic issues are
more ambiguous. These results demonstrate the importance of including the three dimensions of
religion separately when modeling public opinion toward these issues and considering whether
an issue has moral or economic components. In this conclusion, I provide a basic summary of the
findings and I offer closing remarks and future research projects.
Religious belonging. I find that religious belonging has a limited influence on
environmental policy concerns. Catholics reported negative feelings toward regulating business
to protect the environment and create jobs. Hispanic Catholic were not in favor of the
government increasing spending on the environment. In previous projects, my coauthor and I
found that evangelical Protestants are less likely to believe in the seriousness of global warming
(Shao and McCarthy 2019, forthcoming). The results of Model (1) and Model (2) show no
significant effects in the relationship between evangelical Protestants and attitudes toward
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environmental policies. I suspect that evangelical Protestants do not consider environmental
policies important because they are less likely to believe that global warming is a problem.
Religious belonging is also related to immigration opinions. Black Protestants,
evangelical Protestants are less in favor of increasing immigration in the United States; whereas,
Jewish adherents are in favor of raising immigration levels in the country. When asked about the
government policy regarding unauthorized immigrations now living in the United States, Jews
repot negative attitudes toward birthright citizenship. Evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and
other Christians report negative attitudes toward allowing Syrian refugees in the United States;
whereas, other non-Christian religious groups are in favor of increasing Syrian immigration.
Lastly, Catholics and other-Christian groups are in favor of building a border wall with Mexico,
controlling for the effects of the other variables in the model. In future projects I will explore the
last of these issues—religion and building a border wall. I suspect that exposure to the media and
favorability of President Trump has an influence in border wall opinions.
Overall, the results of these models are (generally) consistent with the hypotheses.
Hypothesis

Support

Note

H1: Religious Belonging → hybrid
policy opinions

Partially supported

Moral leaning policies:
supported
Economic leaning policies:
limited effect

H1a: Mainline Protestants, Catholics,
Jews → progressive policy opinions

Partially supported

Catholics exhibit more
conservative environmental
and immigration policy
opinions
Jews hold progressive policy
opinions regarding
immigration

Religious behaving. Religious behaving influences policy opinions on the environment,
and immigration. Specifically, worship attendance influences opinions toward the
175

environment/job tradeoff scale. Frequent service attenders reported negative feelings toward
regulating businesses to protect the environment. They are also more likely to support increasing
immigration and allowing Syrian refugees in the United States and less likely to support building
a border wall with Mexico than non-frequent service attenders. Consistent with the hypotheses
presented in Chapter 2, I find that religiously active individuals hold progressive policy stances
on issues that involve humanitarian concerns. Another component of religious behaving is
contributing to religious organizations. Those who contribute are more likely to support allowing
refugees in the United States and less supportive of building a border wall with Mexico than
those who do not financially contribute to religious organizations. These individuals are also less
likely to support using military force.
Therefore,
Hypothesis

Support

Note

Religious behaving→ hybrid policy
opinions

Supported

Moral leaning policies: supported
Economic leaning policies: limited
effect

H2: Religiously active →
conservative opinions on
government funding; progressive
opinions on humanitarian concerns

Partially supported

Attendance is related to
conservative and progressive
opinions—depending on
government funding vs
humanitarian concerns
Frequent attenders are less likely to
support government regulation and
environment protections, more
likely to support increasing
immigration and less likely to
support building a border wall.

Due to the exploratory nature of this chapter, I limited analyses to one data source;
however, in forthcoming projects I will include data sources that offer a more diverse set of
religious behaving variables.
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Religious believing. The last dimension of religion that I consider in this chapter and
dissertation is religious believing. Specifically, I posit that religious importance, religious
guidance, and biblical literalism are related to how individuals’ asses the environment and
immigration.
Most notably, I find that religious importance and religious guidance is related to
immigration policy opinions. Religious importance is related to positive immigration policy
opinions where those who believe that religion is an important part of their daily life are in favor
of allowing unauthorized immigrants to remain the United States without penalty. However,
these individuals are also less likely to believe in increasing the number of Syrian refugees
allowed in the country. In a similar way, religious guidance is related to both citizenship and
refugees. There is one important exception. Religious guidance is negatively related to support
for birthright citizenship positively related to allowing Syrian refugees in the United States.
Future research is needed to better explain these differences. I suspect that religious importance
and religious guidance involves different aspects of religious believing. Those who believe
religion is important in daily life are not necessarily the same individuals who believe that
religion should provide guidance in daily life. I am interested in further exploring these
differences.
I also find that biblical literalism is related the nearly all hybrid policy opinion models.
Those who believe that the Bible is the word of God are less likely to support environmental
policies, holding conservative views on the environment vs. job tradeoff and government
spending on the environment. In addition, biblical literalists are also less likely to support
increasing immigration and allowing Syrian refugees in the United States and more likely to
support building a border wall with Mexico than those who believe that the Bible is a book
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written by man. Lastly, biblical literalists believe in using military force by sending troops to
fight ISIS. I am interested in exploring the relationship between biblical literalism and
immigration concerns on other issues including public opinion on policies regarding immigrant
children, Mexico- U.S. border conditions, and the responsibility of the U.S. government to
provide necessities to undocumented migrants.
Overall, these results are consistent with the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2:
Hypothesis

Support

Religious believing → hybrid
policy opinions

Supported

H3c: Biblical literalists→
conservative policy opinions on
economic leaning policies and
progressive policy opinions on
humanitarian policies.

Not/partially supported

Note

Biblical literalists hold conservative
policy opinions on the environment,
immigration, and foreign policy

In this chapter, I have demonstrated a need for including religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing in models regarding policies that have both economic and
moral components. In all policy areas, there were significant affects among the religious
believing variables and environmental and immigration policies. In the next chapter, I provide an
overview of the dissertation and offer future project ideas. I also propose thoughts on developing
a theory of religious dimensions that include incorporating religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing in all models of public opinion concerning moral policy issues
I also argue that these dimensions should be included and considered separately in future
analyses to better understand the effects religion on economic policy concerns. Indeed, biblical
literalism plays a significant role in shaping economic policy opinions.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
7.1. Introduction
How does religion influence political opinions? Traditional scholarship treats religion as
a social group where individuals are influenced by their religious organizations and consequently
adopt political opinions based on their interactions with their religious group (ethnoreligious
perspective). Scholars also note key differences within religious denominations in terms of
conservative and progressive theologies (traditional-modernism perspective). Contemporary
scholars incorporate insights from both the ethnoreligious perspective and the traditionalmodernism perspective and measure religion by including three dimensions (also known as the
3B’s) of religion in their models: belonging, behaving, and believing. With this knowledge the
question now becomes: how do religion variables—i.e., denominational affiliation, religious
participation, and religious beliefs influence views on political opinions?
A lack of a unified theory involving the influence of religion and politics plagues the
field. In this dissertation, I outlined several existing theories (most coming from the field of
sociology) and argued the importance of including the ethnoreligious perspective, the traditionalmodernist approach, and “3B” classification of religion and politics in the models. I argue that
the social group phenomena of religion is still an influencer in shaping public opinion, however,
religious organizations matter for assessments of moral or values-based issues more so than
economic concerns. The clergy—and consequently religious doctrine—are clear in assessments
regarding moral or values-based issues, whereas, interpretations of economic policies are
ambiguous. While I did not directly study the influence of the clergy in this project, I assume
their influence based on the works of other scholars (i.e. Olson 2009; Smith and Harris 2005;
McDaniel 2011). I incorporate aspects of the traditional-modernist approach by delineating
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Protestants among three groups: mainline Protestants, black Protestants, and evangelical
Protestants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mainline Protestants and black Protestants are
more progressive in their policy opinions; whereas, evangelical Protestants are more
conservative. I also consider differences between Hispanic Catholics and non-Hispanic
Catholics. Traditionally, Hispanic Catholics are more conservative in their religious beliefs than
non-Hispanic Catholics.
The final component of this dissertation is the inclusion of the “3B’s” of religion in the
models of public opinion. One benefit of the “3B” approach is the natural overlap among the
existing theories and how religion is measured. However, I highlight the importance of
measuring religious behaving and religious believing separately in the models. I call the “3B’s”
the three dimensions of religion because of their unique nature in shaping political attitudes. The
first dimension, religious belonging, has a significant effect on moral policy issues. The second
dimension, religious behaving, also influences moral policy opinions. The third dimension,
religious believing, influences both moral and economic policy opinions. Indeed, biblical
literalism is an important driver in economic policy assessments. This third dimension of religion
that is often coupled with religious behaving proves to be the force behind most policy opinions.
7.2. Summary
In Table 7.1 I demonstrate the overall trends among the religious belonging, religious
behaving, and religious believing dimensions related to moral policy concerns. 14 As you can see,
there is some consistency among the religious belonging category. For example, mainline
Protestants are more progressive in their attitudes toward moral policies (except for attitudes

I report (simple) results from ordered logit and logit regression models. I include a “+” or a “- “ when the
coefficient of the variables was statistically significant in the full models. All summary models in this chapter use
2016 ANES data. I divide the religious dimensions by color: religious belonging is represented by blue cells,
religious behaving is represented by orange cells, and religious believing represented by is green cells.
14
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toward the death penalty); whereas evangelical Protestants are more conservative. Catholics are
generally supportive of LGBTQ rights; however, Hispanic Catholics hold both conservative
(transgender bathroom opinions) and progressive (same-sex marriage and discrimination) moral
policy opinions. Lastly, Jews are more progressive in their attitudes. Interestingly and
inconsistent with expectations, the coefficient for black Protestants was not statistically
significant in the models, suggesting that black Protestant hold similar moral policy opinions to
the religiously unaffiliated and secular, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the
model.
Moving on to the religious behaving dimensions of religion, the coefficient of service
attendance is statistically significant in all moral policy opinion models. Frequent service
attenders are less likely to support LGBTQ rights than non-frequent attenders. The data also
show that frequent attenders are less supportive of abortion and the death penalty than nonfrequent service attenders. Thus, service attendance is related to conservative LGBTQ policy
views and pro-life opinions. Likewise, those who make religious contributions are also more prolife in their policy opinions.
The last dimension, religious believing, there are some inconsistencies among the effect
of the religious believing variables and moral policy opinions. However, religious guidance and
biblical literalism are related to conservative LGBTQ rights opinions. Those who believe that
religion serves as guidance in daily life and those who believe that the Bible is the literal word of
God are less likely to support LGBTQ policies. Indeed, the coefficient for biblical literalism is
significant in all ANES models. Biblical literalists are also against abortion and in favor of the
death penalty; whereas, those who use religion as guidance in their daily life hold pro-life
sentiments concerning abortion legislation and the death penalty.
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What does this tell us about the effect of the three dimensions of religion on moral
policies? Overall, I conclude that there are (generally) consistent effects and that scholars should
include all three dimensions separately in public opinion analyses relating to moral or valuebased policy concerns. Indeed, there is a great deal of consistency among service attendance and
biblical literalism on moral policy opinions. In future analyses, I will take a closer look at those
individuals who believe that religion is an important part of daily life and those who believe that
religion serves as guidance in daily life. In several models, the direction of the coefficients was
in opposite directions (and statistically significant). I would like to further address why religious
importance is related to progressive policy opinions, yet religious guidance is related to
conservative moral policy opinions.
In Table 7.2 I present a simple summary of the effect of the three religious dimensions on
economic policy concerns. First, religious belonging has some effect on economic policy
opinions where all groups favor an increase in government spending (except for black
Protestants) on one or more policy area. For example, mainline Protestants and evangelical
Protestants favor increased spending on social security and defense, Catholics favor spending on
social security, crime, and defense, Hispanic Catholics are concerned with increasing spending
on the poor, other Christians favor spending on defense, Jewish adherents prefer government
spending on welfare, and other non-Christian religious groups favor spending on welfare and the
poor. Considering the other economic issues, there is little affect of religious denomination on
economic policy concerns. Mainline Protestants, Jews, and other non-Christian groups are
progressive in their opinions on whether the government should offer more services. Hispanic
Catholics also conservative in their beliefs about whether taxes should be increased on the rich.
In sum, these results demonstrate that religious belonging influences economic policy opinions;
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however, the effects are limited to government spending issues. There also is little consistency
among the various traditions and spending concerns. For example, mainline Protestants do not
prefer increased spending in all areas, they only favor increased spending on social security and
defense. Likewise, each religious group has specific preferences on certain government spending
areas.
Table 7.1. Summary of the three dimensions and moral policy concerns, 2016 ANES data
Same sex
marriage
Mainline
B. Protestant
E. Protestant
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Attendance
Contributions
Importance
Guidance
Literalism
Spirituality

+
+

-

-

Same sex
discrimination

Same sex
Adoption

Same sex
service

+

+

+

+

Transgender
bathroom

Abortion

Death
penalty

+

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

-
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+

+

+
-

-

-

+

+
+

Table 7.2. Summary of the three dimensions and economic policy concerns, 2016 ANES data
Social
Security
Mainline
B. Protestant
E. Protestant
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Attendance
Contributions
Importance
Guidance
Literalism
Spirituality

Crime

Welfare

Poor

Healthcare

Defense

Govt.
Service

+

+

+

+
+

+
+

+

Deficit

+

Taxes

Inequality

+

+
+

+
+

+

-

-

-

+
+

+

-

+
+

+
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+
+

+

+

Minimum
wage

The effect of religious behaving is also inconsistent. However, there are a few
noteworthy findings. Service attendance is related to conservative opinions on social security
spending, defense spending, and reducing the deficit. Religious contributions are related to
conservative opinions on spending on the poor and reducing inequality. Overall, those
individuals who are more frequent attenders and who contribute to religious services are less
likely to favor increased spending, reducing the deficit, or inequality. These findings highlight a
general conservative trend among service attenders (albeit a weak trend). In future analyses, I
will address why service attenders oppose spending on social security but not spending on
welfare and the poor. Perhaps religious beliefs and doctrinal conservativism are influencing these
economic policy opinions.
The religious belonging variables have the most consistent effects on economic policies.
Specifically, religious importance and biblical literalism have an effect on several policy
concerns. For the most part, those who believe that religion is important hold a mix of
conservative and progressive economic policy opinions. Indeed, these individuals are more likely
to support spending on crime and defense and less likely to support spending on welfare. They
also hold conservative opinions on increasing government services and reducing inequality.
Biblical literalists hold progressive economic policy opinions on several issues including
increasing spending on social security, crime, and the poor. Biblical literalists also favor
increasing government services.
In sum, the general trends suggest that religious denomination plays a role in shaping
economic opinions; however, the various religious groups support spending on different policy
areas. There is a general conservative trend among the religious behaving measures and a
progressive trend among religious believing measures. Scholars should continue to include the
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three dimensions of religion in their economic policy models—this is especially true for the
religious behaving and religious believing dimensions.
The last set of policy issues that I consider in this dissertation is hybrid policies. In Table
7.3 I show the general trend among the religious dimensions and public opinion on the
environment, immigration, and foreign policy. First, Hispanic Catholics are the only religious
group who are less likely to support business regulation to protect the environment and increased
spending on the environment. The other coefficients were not statistically significant in the full
models. Based on prior research and literature, I expect that evangelical Protestants hold (much
more) conservative views on the environment than other religious groups. Additional analyses
are needed to sort out these mixed results. Second, there is a general conservative trend in
opinions among Christian religious groups regarding immigration. Black Protestants, evangelical
Protestants, Catholics, and other Christian groups report favorability in decreasing immigration
levels in the United States. In addition, evangelical Protestants, and other Christian groups favor
a government funded wall with Mexico. Jewish and other religious non-Christian groups support
increasing immigration and allowing Syrian refugees in the country. Lastly, Jewish adherents
support free trade agreements. Overall, there were some consistency among religious belonging
and hybrid policy opinions. Non-Christian adherents are more (generally) progressive in their
hybrid policy opinions; whereas Christians are more conservative.
Service attendance is related to conservative environmental policy opinions and
progressive immigration and foreign policy concerns. In addition, those who contribute to
religious organizations hold progress immigration opinions supporting Syrian refugees in the
country and opposing a border wall with Mexico. These individuals are also less likely to support
military force in Iraq. Overall, this is consistent with expectation that religiously active
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individuals hold progressive policy opinions concerning hybrid issues with humanitarian
concerns.
What is the effect of religious belonging on hybrid policy opinions? Similar to the results
of the other models, there are differences among individuals who believe that religion is
important and those who believe that religion services as guidance in daily life. Those who
believe religion is important hold nonservice preferences on immigration; whereas, those who
believe that religion serves as guidance in daily life hold progressive immigration policy beliefs.
Additional research is needed to flesh out the driving force behind these differences. Notably,
biblical literalists hold conservative views on spending on the environment, increasing
immigration, building a border wall, and using military force in Iraq. This is consistent with the
overall hypothesis that those who believe that the Bible is the word of God are more likely to
hold conservative policy opinions than those who believe that the Bible is not the word of God.
I suspect that a great deal of variation in support for hybrid policies is related media
attention of the issues. For example, concern over allowing Syrian refugees in the country
received a lot of media attention, whereas, most individuals know little about birthright
citizenship or free trade agreements. In future projects, I will consider media attention and
exposure of the issues in the models. I will also consider political knowledge and political
interest in future models. I suspect that those religious individuals who are more politically
aware will hold stronger hybrid policy opinions.
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7.3. Concluding remarks
I argue that it is essential to include all three religious’ dimension in models pertaining to
moral issues. Economic concerns are often driven by one’s interpretation of the bible and the
importance (or guidance) of religion in daily life. I also argue for greater consideration of
religious beliefs including biblical literalism and interpretations of Jesus’ teaching. One’s belief
that the Bible is the word of God—or not—greatly influences policy assessments. Biblical
literalists are more conservative on moral policy opinions and more progressive on economic
policy opinions, i.e. government spending. Scholars who study public opinion should consider
these findings when modeling political attitudes. Overall, there is an impact of the three religious
dimensions on moral, economic, and hybrid policy opinions.
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Table 7.3. Summary of the three dimensions and hybrid policy concerns, 2016 ANES data
Environment
/jobs
Mainline
B. Protestant
E. Protestant
Catholic
H. Catholic
Other Christian
Jewish
Other religion
Attendance
Contributions
Importance
Guidance
Literalism
Spirituality

Environment
spending

Immigration

Citizenship

-

Refugees

Border wall

-

+

-

+

Military Force

Free trade

+

-

-

+
+
-

+
-

-
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+
+
+
+
-

-

-

+
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Appendix. Variable Description
______________________________________________________________________________
Moral Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Abortion (ANES/GSS)

3= legal in all circumstance or matter of personal
choice; 2= many reasons; 1= rape, incest, life of
mother; 0= never legal

Support for same-sex marriage (ANES)

1= respondent supports same-sex marriage; 0 =
respondent supports civil unions but not samesex marriage; -1 = no legal recognition of a gay
or lesbian couple

Support for same-sex marriage (GSS)

4 = strongly agree homosexual couples should
have the right to marry… 0 = strongly disagree

Anti-discrimination laws (ANES)

3 = strongly favor anti-discrimination laws to
protect gays and lesbians against job
discrimination… 0 = strongly oppose

Gay adoption (ANES)

1 = gay and lesbian couples should be legality
permitted to adopt; 0 = gay and lesbian couples
should not be able to adopt

Required service (ANES)

5 = strongly believes in business owners being
required to provide services for gay and lesbian
couples… 0 = strongly believes being allowed to
refuse services

Transgender bathrooms (ANES)

5 = strongly believes that transgender people
should be allowed to use the bathroom of their
identified gender… 0 = very strongly believes
that transgender people should use bathroom of
the gender they were born with

Pornography laws (GSS)

2 = should be laws against the distribution of
pornography, whatever the age; 1 = should be
laws against the distribution of pornography to
persons under 18; 0 = should be no laws
forbidding the distribution of pornography
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Description of variables, continued
Moral Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Sex education (GSS)

1= respondent is for sex education in public
schools; 0 = respondent is against sex education
in public schools

Assisted suicide (GSS)

1 = respondent agrees that doctors should be
allowed by law to end a patient’s life if
requested; 0 = respondent disagrees

Capital punishment (ANES)

3 = strongly supports the death penalty… 0 =
strongly opposes the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder

Capital punishment (GSS)

1 = respondent favors the death penalty; 0 =
respondent opposes the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder

Prayer in schools (GSS)

1 = respondent approves of the court ruling that
no state or local government may require the
reading of the Lord’s Prayer of Bible verses in
public schools; 0 = respondent disapproves
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Description of variables, continued
_______________________________________________________________________________
Economic Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Government service (ANES)

6 = government should provide more services…
0 = government should provide fewer services

Government responsibility (EVS)

3 = completely agree that it is the responsibility
of the government to take care of people who
can’t take care of themselves… 0 = completely
disagree

Government spending (ANES)
(social security, crime, welfare, poor)

1 = respondent favors increased spending; 0 =
respondent favors keeping spending the same; -1
= respondent supports decreased spending

Government spending (ANES)
(healthcare, defense spending)

6 = respondent favors increased spending… 0 =
favors decreased spending

Spending on social services (EVS)

3 = completely agree that the government is
providing too many social services that should be
left to religious groups and private charities; 2 =
mostly agree; 1 = mostly disagree; 0 =
completely disagree

Deficit reduction (ANES)

4 = extremely important to reduce the deficit… 0
= not important at all to reduce the national
deficit

Taxes (ANES)

2 = respondent supports increasing taxes on
millionaires; 1 = neutral feelings; 0 = opposed

Taxes (EVS)

3 = strongly favor increasing the tax rate on
Americans earning more than $250,000 a year…
0 = strongly oppose

Inequality (ANES)

4 = strongly agree that the government should
reduce income inequality… 0 = strongly opposes
government action to reduce inequality
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Description of variables, continued
_______________________________________________________________________________
Economic Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Inequality (EVS)

3 = completely agree that the government should
do more to reduce the gap between the rich and
the poor; 0 = completely disagree

Minimum wage (ANES)

2 = respondent believes that the minimum wage
should be increased; 1 = minimum wage should
be kept the same; 0 = minimum wage should be
decreased or eliminated

Minimum wage (EVS)

3 = strongly favor increasing the minimum wage
from $7.25 an hour to $ 10.00 an hour… 0 =
strongly oppose
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Description of variables, continued
Hybrid Variables

Description

_______________________________________________________________________________
Immigration

level (ANES)

4= immigration should be increased a lot… ; 0 =
decreased a lot

Citizenship (ANES)

6 = support for birthright citizenship… 0 =
oppose birthright citizenship

Refugees (ANES)

6 = strongly supports allowing Syrian refugees in
the United States… 0 = strongly oppose

Border wall (ANES)

6 = strongly supports building a border wall with
Mexico… 0 = strongly opposes

Environment/job protection (ANES)

6 = regulate business to protect the environment
and crease jobs… 0 = no regulation of businesses
to protect the environment because it will not
work and will cost jobs

Environment spending (ANES)

1 = government should increase spending on the
environment; 0 = spending should be kept the
same; -1 = decrease spending on the environment

Military (ANES)

6 = strongly supports sending troops to fight
ISIS… 0 = strongly opposes

Free trade (ANES)

6 = strongly favors free trade agreements; 0 =
strongly opposes free trade agreements
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Description of variables, continued
Religion Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Mainline Protestant

Black Protestant

(ALL)

(ALL)

1 = respondent is mainline Protestant; 0 =
otherwise.
1 = respondent is black Protestant; 0 = otherwise

Evangelical Protestant (ALL)

1 = non-black evangelical Protestants; 0 =
otherwise

Catholic

1 = respondent is Catholic; 0 = otherwise.

(ALL )

Hispanic Catholic (ALL)

1= respondent is Hispanic and Catholic; 0 =
otherwise

Other Christian

1 = respondent is of other Christian tradition; 0 =
otherwise

(ANES)

Jewish (ALL)

1 = respondent is Jewish; 0 = otherwise

Other non- Christian religion (ANES)

1 = respondent is a member of other nonChristian religious tradition; 0 = otherwise

Other religion (GSS)

1 = respondent is of other Christian and nonChristian faith; 0 = otherwise

Other faith (GSS)

1= respondent is of other Christian and nonChristian faith; 0 = otherwise

Religiously unaffiliated (ALL)

seculars, atheists, agnostics, “nones”

Religious fundamentalism (GSS)

2 = respondent classifies religion as fundamental;
1 = moderate ; 0 = liberal

Church attendance (ANES)

4= respondent attends church every week…; 0=
never attends religious services

Church attendance (GSS)

8 = more than once a week… 0 = never attends
religious services

Church attendance (EVS)

5 = more than once a week; 0 = never attends
services
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Description of variables, continued
_______________________________________________________________________________
Religion Variables

Description

Prayer (GSS)

5 = respondent prays several times a day… 0 =
never

Religious contributions (ANES)

1 = respondent has contributed to a religious
group in the past 12 months; 0 = otherwise

Religious activity participation (GSS)

9 = respondent participates in the activities and
organizations of a church once a day… 0 = never

Religious conversion (GSS)

1 = respondent has tried to encourage someone to
believe in Jesus Christ or accept Jesus message; 0
= never

Religious behavior (GSS)

Factor analysis of the religious behaving
variables (service attendance, religious activity,
frequency of prayer, religious conversion)

Religious importance (ANES)

1= religion is an important part of R’s life; 0= not
important

Religious importance (EVS)

3 = religion is most important thing… 0 =
religious is not important

Religious guidance (ANES)

3= religion provides R a great deal of guidance;
…; 0= religion is not an important part of daily
life

Religious participation (GSS)

1 = R has contributed to religious groups in the
past 12 months; 0= otherwise

Biblical literalism (ANES)

2= Bible is the literal word of God; 1= word of
God but not literally; 0= not the word of God

Biblical literalism (GSS)

2 = Bible is the actual word of God; 1 = Bible is
the inspired word of God; 0 = Bible is an ancient
book of fables

205

Description of variables, continued
_______________________________________________________________________________
Religion Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Biblical literalism (EVS)

2 = Bible (or another holy book) should be
taken Literally; 1 = not literally but word of
God; 0 = not the word of God

Spirituality (ANES)

1= respondent is spiritual; 0 = otherwise

Post life (GSS)

1= respondent believes that there is a life after
death; 0 = respondent does not believe that there is a
life after death

Belief in God (GSS)

5 = respondent knows that God exists and has no
doubts… 0 = respondent does not believe in God

Strength of religiosity (GSS)

0 = respondent is not religious… 3 = respondent is
very religious… 0 = respondent is not religious

Strength of spirituality (GSS)

3 = respondent is very spiritual… 0 = respondent is
not spiritual

Image of God (EVS)

2 = God is a person; 1 = God is an impersonal
force; 0 = respondent believes that there is no God

Preserve beliefs (EVS)

2 = R believes that religion should preserve
traditional believes; 1 = adjust beliefs; 0 = adopt
modern beliefs

Care for the poor (EVS)

4 = respondent believes that Jesus’ teachings
promoted a just society… 0 = Jesus promoted private
acts of charity

206

Variable description, continued
_______________________________________________________________________________
Partisan/Socioeconomic/
Demographic Variables
Description
_______________________________________________________________________________
Partisan identification

High values = respondent is a strong
Republican… 0 = respondent is a strong
Democrat.

Political ideology

Political ideology scale: High values= respondent
is a strong conservative; . . . ; 0 = respondent is a
strong liberal.

Black

1 = respondent is black; 0 = otherwise.

Hispanic

1 = respondent is Hispanic; 0 = otherwise.

Asian

1 = respondent is Asian; 0 = otherwise.

Gender

1 = respondent is a woman; 0 = respondent is a
man.

Married

1 = respondent is married; 0 = otherwise.

Age

Age (in years).

Education

Respondent education, High values = post
graduate degree… 0 = grade school

Household income

Respondent household income measured as a
scale ranging from 0 (low income) to -- (high
income).

Parents foreign born (ANES)

2 = two parents born outside of the United
States; 1 = one parent born outside the U.S.; 0 =
no parents born outside the United States

Foreign born (ANES)

1 = respondent is foreign born; 0 = respondent is
not foreign born
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